The Apathetic Divide: Surrogacy and the Anglo-American Courtroom

Kelso Horne, MJLST Staffer

The State of New York defines Gestational Surrogacy as “a process where one person, who did not provide the egg used in conception, carries a fetus through pregnancy and gives birth to a baby for another person or couple.” The process of surrogacy can be fraught with legal, technical, and moral issues, particularly when the surrogacy is paid for via contract with the surrogate, also called Compensated Gestational Surrogacy (CGS). Until 2020, this kind of contractual paid surrogacy was illegal in the state of New York. That year, it was legalized, and the regulatory regime normalized by the Child-Parent Security Act.  In contrast, the state of Louisiana has one of the harshest gestational surrogacy regimes in the world, outright banning CGS, and requiring both sets of gametes to come from a couple married residing in the state of Louisiana. But these competing regulatory regimes are not replicated across the nation. To the contrary, most states have not passed any laws legalizing or banning CGS or other fertility practices, like the sale of gametes. With sparse case law and frequent legal limbo, the question of “is CGS legal for me?” can be a difficult question for many Americans.

Across the Atlantic, the question used to be an easy one to answer. In 1985 the UK Parliament Enacted the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, which made it an offense to “initiate or take part in any negotiations with the view of making a surrogacy arrangement”, along with some related activities, like compiling information to assist in the creation of surrogacy arrangements. Critically, however, the Act did not criminalize the act of looking to hire a surrogate, or looking to become one, only being a middleman, or publishing advertisements on behalf of those looking to obtain the services of a surrogate. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 defined the mother of a child under UK law as “[t]he woman who is carrying or has carried a child… and no other woman”. In 2001, the Lords Appeal in Ordinary, which acted as the UK’s highest court until 2009, heard the appeal in Briody v. St Helens and Knowsley Area Health Authority. The question before the Lords was one of damages. A woman, rendered infertile as a result of medical negligence, sought £78,267 in order to obtain the services of a surrogate in California, which had legalized CGS in 1993 in the landmark case Johnson v. Calvert. The Lady Justice Hale, speaking for the court, foreclosed the use of CGS in California or elsewhere, as the proposal was “contrary to the public policy of the country”. While she did not entirely dismiss the idea of providing damages to pay for surrogacy procedures, she said it would be permitted only in the case of a voluntary, unpaid surrogate.

Few appellate court judges get to issue an opinion on the same facts twice in their career. In 2020, in one of her final cases prior to retiring, the Lady Justice Hale, now sitting on the UK Supreme Court, which by then had replaced the Lords Appeal in Ordinary, did just that.  In Whittington Hospital NHS Trust (Appellant) v XX, the court determined that a woman who had been rendered infertile as a result of medical negligence could claim damages, including the costs to pay a United States based surrogate to carry her children. CGS, while still entirely illegal in the UK, could now nevertheless provide the basis for damages in a UK court. The Court did note some factual differences between Whittington Hospital and Briody, notably, that the likelihood that a surrogacy arrangement would result in a child was higher in the former. However, the court’s main argument for its opposite ruling was a change in cultural attitude to surrogacy and its role in society, stating “[t]he use of assisted reproduction techniques is now widespread and socially acceptable.”

While admitting that surrogacy was now widely accepted in UK society, the dissent, authored by The Lord Justice Carnwath, nevertheless disagreed with the Court. It argued that the criminal law of the UK remained clearly averse to commercial surrogacy, and that by awarding damages for CGS in California the court misaligned the UK’s civil and criminal law. Thus, the CGS regimes of the UK and the U.S. are now bound together. UK citizens may seek surrogacy arrangements and have them compensated by the UK government through the UK’s National Health Service, but they must use an American “womb”. A financial arrangement which the UK itself deems too unethical to allow inside its own borders is nevertheless legalized and compensated when occurring in other countries. The deeply strange situation is mirrored in the opaque CGS law in the United States itself.

A quick glance at any 50-state review of laws, compiled either by supporters or opponents to commercial surrogacy, paint a similar picture. They show strange ad hoc mixes of case law which often cover ancillary issues or are at least 30 years old. Some scholars have started to publicly discuss the possible ethical pitfalls of “procreative tourism”, but without clear legal rules governing what arrangements are and are not allowed, it becomes difficult to discuss possible solutions. The dangers of this shadow regime were thrown into stark relief by the war in Ukraine, which prior to the Russian invasion was a major source of surrogate mothers. Mothers were paid on average $15,000 per child, which is considerable in a country where, prior to the invasion, the GDP per capita was less than $5,000. The United States needs to determine if it wishes to become a “destination” country for procreative tourism, as the result in Whittington would seem to suggest it is, and whether it wishes to allow its own citizens the opportunity to travel abroad to engage in CGS.

This blog has touched on only a small fraction of the issues which are faced when determining the ideal regulatory regime for surrogacy. However, a lack of discussion, and a failure to acknowledge possible risks leaves us ignorant of what the problems may be, let alone the route to potential solutions. States have largely failed to address the issue since the first CGS baby was born in their borders, usually in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. It’s time for a serious examination of CGS regulation as it exists, as well as a meaningful discussion about safeguarding the health and wellbeing of those involved in such a transaction. The UK has now done the same, passing the buck without a serious response to the issues surrounding CGS. Regardless of one’s opinion on the results of the Louisiana and New York regulations, potential participants in a surrogacy arraignment in those two states know the boundaries. That should be the case nationwide.