September 2025

Beyond the Business Case for Lawyer Well-Being: Tracking Individual Health Metrics

Noah Leinen, MJLST Staffer

Introduction and Context

“[T]he commodification of the legal profession is an ‘unambiguous contributor’ to the pervasiveness of lawyer distress.”[1] In other words, associates suffer for each dollar a firm earns. Historically, lawyers were more likely to be anxious, interpersonally insensitive, isolated, obsessive-compulsive, and hostile.[2] And, at least as of the 1990s, we were more likely to suffer from depression, phobic anxiety, and paranoid ideation as well.[3] Although language has changed, lawyers today are more suicidal, more likely to be problem drinkers, depressed, and stressed.[4] And yes, we are still anxious.[5] So, we are unhappy and unhealthy (and undoubtedly still unethical).[6]

Who cares? Young professionals, like me, for one. But firm executives ought to as well because of the increase in well-being initiatives.[7] If these initiatives don’t actually help associates, firms are simply burning cash.

Generally speaking, promoting wellness is a good investment as it reduces attrition.[8]  Healthy people make a healthy firm, which is more stable and productive, making them more likely to resist drastic market shifts by increasing associate retention over the long run. But not all strategies are equal, and optimizing such initiatives is an ongoing project.

Instead of dumping money into inefficient strategies, like hiring a well-being speaker for a brief Tuesday lunch hour, firms should invest in individual-based well-being strategies. One way to increase individual health is to track it. Thus, personal health metric devices ought to be a standard benefit for new associates. The question, however, is how a firm might improve individual wellness and well-being.

Methods of Measuring Well-Being

Although there is no definition of well-being, the scientific community discusses it as a composite of subparts, including but not limited to economic, emotional, physical, and spiritual dimensions.[9] Another definition might include interpersonal, communal, and occupational wellness as additional elements. Simply put, well-being is not one-dimensional.

Well-being is also difficult—if not downright impossible—to meaningfully measure. One might try a social welfare analysis from microeconomics to capture collective well-being, for example, by summing the total wealth, utility, or capability of a community as a proxy for well-being. This could provide insight into a community’s wellness. As a proxy, this is not useless, but it is unlikely to give a strong measuring stick for comparing the collective well-being of two firms. Alternatively, one might try to record, qualitatively, each individual’s satisfaction of the hierarchy of needs as conceived by Maslow. Besides economic welfare analysis and psychology, human health metrics may also provide meaningful insights. Finally, long-term friendships are really, really good for human longevity and healthspan.[10] Conversely, isolation is clearly detrimental to one’s well-being.[11] Measuring an individual’s significant relationships (their depth, consistency, and length) might therefore also serve as a useful proxy for estimating well-being. Regardless of whether the analysis is economic, psychological, or sociological in nature, well-being is complex. Despite this complexity, firms still try to improve it.

Current Methods and Strategies of Improving Well-Being

From wellness speakers to weeklong celebrations, titled “Well-being Week”, firms have a host of strategies for improving the health of their workers. Some firms have well-being committees consisting of self-selected employees who provide educational wellness opportunities for fellow colleagues.[12] Other firms hire dedicated well-being directors to spearhead internal well-being initiatives, both to provide similar educational opportunities and also destigmatize dialogue regarding mental health issues.[13] Finally, the ABA has published a Well-Being Toolkit, which includes an eight-step action plan for legal employers, along with other lawyer well-being resources, such as book recommendations, public speakers, and consultants.[14] Firms have several methods for improving well-being; however, one uncommon approach is distributing individual health metric devices.

Firm-Wide Distribution of Individual Health Metric Devices

Beyond books, speakers, and dedicated committees of employees, one comparatively simple step that has not been widely adopted is enabling and encouraging individuals to track their health metrics. From a broad meta-survey in 2022, activity trackers were found to generally improve physical activity and health.[15] Such behavioral changes persisted for upwards of six months.[16] Fitness trackers, such as a Whoop Band or Oura Ring, can serve as physical activity trackers.

Health metric monitors often record sleep data as well. Sleep monitoring is correlated with an improved perception of sleep quality and reduced disturbances.[17] Instead of being caused by the health metric monitor, however, this correlation could be caused by an increase in physical activity.[18] The perception of improved sleep may simply have occurred after participants started working out more.[19] So, if the goal is to improve sleep, tracking physical activity data instead of sleep data is a safer investment. Thus, firms should consider explicitly including physical activity tracker devices in benefits packages, with the goal of improving individual physical well-being, which, when aggregated, is likely to improve firm well-being.

Conclusion

Well-being initiatives are a step in the right direction toward improving lawyer well-being. Given that a firm’s number one resource is its workers, improving individual health can improve overall collective firm health. As tracking individual health metrics via personal fitness devices is likely to lead to an increase in individual well-being, then in the name of a more productive and stable firm, personal fitness devices should be provided to every associate.

 

Notes

[1] Jarrod Reich, Capitalizing on Healthy Lawyers, The Practice (Mar. 2020), https://clp.law.harvard.edu/knowledge-hub/magazine/issues/approaching-lawyer-well-being/capitalizing-on-healthy-lawyers/.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Patrick Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871, 871 (1999).

[7] See e.g. Well-Being Pledge Campaign, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyer_assistance/well-being-in-the-legal-profession/well-being-pledge-campaign/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2025, 3:05 PM).

[8] Reich, supra note 1.

[9] Tara Bautista, et. al., What is Well-Being? A Scoping Review of the Conceptual and Operational Definitions of Occupational Well-being, 7 J. Clinical & Translational Sci. 1, 1, 8 (2023).

[10] Zara Abrams, The Science of Why Friendships Keep Us Healthy, 54 Monitor on Psych. (4) (June 1, 2023), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2023/06/cover-story-science-friendship.

[11] Id.

[12] Operationalizing Well-Being, The Practice, (Mar. 2020), https://clp.law.harvard.edu/knowledge-hub/magazine/issues/approaching-lawyer-well-being/operationalizing-well-being/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2025, 3:08 PM).

[13] Id.

[14] Anne Brafford, Well-being Toolkit for Lawyers and Legal Employers, ABA, (Aug. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyer_assistance/well-being-in-the-legal-profession/well-being-pledge-campaign/.

[15] Ty Ferguson et. al., Effect of Wearables on Sleep in Healthy Individuals: A Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses, 4 Lancet Digital Health (8), e615 (2022).

[16] Id.

[17] Sarah Berryhill et. al., Effect of Wearables on Sleep in Healthy Individuals: a Randomized Crossover Trial and Validation Study, 16 J. Clinical Sleep Med. 5, 775 (2020).

[18] Id.

[19] Iuliana Hartescu et. al., Increased Physical Activity Improves Sleep and Mood Outcomes in Inactive People with Insomnia: a Randomized Controlled Trial, 24 J. Sleep Rsch. 5, 526 (2015) (discussing a strong correlation between increased physical activity with improved sleep).


New British Antitrust Legislation Provide Model for U.S. Tech Regulation

Carson Holmgren, MJLST Staffer

The rapid rise of generative AI in recent years has boosted key players in the field to record-breaking valuations.[1] Yet many major firms lack the server capacity needed to operate their models at scale and rely heavily on third-party cloud service providers (“CSPs”) to meet their computing needs.[2] This dependency has fueled massive growth in the CSP industry, with annual global revenue predicted to exceed $400 billion in 2025[3] and $2 trillion by 2030.[4] Roughly 60% of the global CSP market is controlled by just three U.S. companies: Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud.[5] While critics warn of the risk in letting so few companies dominate the cloud,[6] Washington has largely stood idle and allowed these companies to consolidate their position in the market. However, recent legislation in the United Kingdom may offer U.S. policymakers a blueprint for creating a more completive CSP market.

The U.S. has adopted a passive stance towards CSP regulation for two primary reasons: a reactive antitrust framework and a political environment hostile to regulation.

U.S. antitrust law focuses not on a firm’s position in the market, but whether the firm’s conduct harms competition.[7] These harms may be difficult to quantify[8] but are primarily measured through effects on consumer welfare, such as higher prices or reduced output.[9] Absent the manifestation of such harms, private parties are unable to sue, and regulators are unable to take aggressive enforcement actions.[10] Private and public actors must essentially wait for anticompetitive behavior to occur and cause harm before they can act.

The current political context reinforces this inertia. The Trump administration has cultivated close ties with tech firms[11] and pushed a broader deregulatory agenda.[12] Aggressively regulating firms seen as friendly to the administration is, therefore, a low political priority.

The United Kingdom has presented an alternative to this passive approach. In 2024, the U.K. House of Commons passed the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (“DMCCA”), aimed at expanding the regulatory powers the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) may exert over tech companies.[13] Unlike the current U.S. framework, the DMCCA allows the CMA to act before market harms manifest, establishing a more proactive regulatory regime.[14]

One of the new powers granted to CMAs is the ability to designate a company as having strategic market status (“SMS”). An SMS designation requires findings of entrenched market power, strategic significance to digital markets, and meeting turnover thresholds.[15] Firms having SMS are subject to additional oversight, including Conduct Requirements (“CRs”) and Pro-Competition Interventions (“PCIs”).[16]

CRs regulate how SMS-designated firms interact with consumers, competitors, and partners, imposing baselines of fair conduct.[17] CRs may prohibit discriminatory conditions against particular users, prevent self-preferencing, ensure interoperability with rival services, and mandate that sensitive user data not be used to secure an unfair advantage.[18]

PCIs can be implemented through Pro-Competition Orders (“PCOs”) and are structural sanctions aimed at attacking the source of a company’s entrenched market power. A PCO may require a company to make fundamental changes to their operations, and are distinguishable from CRs in that they are considered on-off interventions designed to reshape the competitive environment itself.[19]

How the CMA will apply its powers under the DMCCA remains uncertain, as the regime is still in its early phases. The first DMCCA investigation was launched in January 2025 and resulted in a proposal to issue Google’s search engine an SMS designation.[20] This proposal was positively received by academics and consumer advocacy groups,[21] but no CRs or PCIs have been introduced.

The U.K.’s CSP market is similarly concentrated, with Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure controlling roughly 80% of the market.[22] On July 31, 2025, the CMA published the findings of a pre-DMCCA report, noting that the two firms market dominance harms competition.[23] The report recommended SMS investigations, making it likely that both firms will eventually be designated as having SMS.

While no CRs or PCIs have been proposed, the report hints at what actions the CMA may take. It notes that less than 1% of users change CSPs annually, largely due to artificial barriers, including self-preferencing software compatibility requirements and high egress fees when migrating data to rival services.[24] The CMA could remove these barriers by issuing CRs requiring interoperability between competitors and limiting egress fees. Such actions would increase user mobility and spur greater competition between CSPs.

Microsoft’s licensing practices were also flagged as a concern. The CMA found that users had to adopt a full suite of Microsoft products to use Microsoft Azure effectively, making it difficult to change CSP once adopted. Microsoft can extract such concessions from customers due to its dominant operating system and software. To address this entrenched power, something more substantial than a CR is required. A one-off PCI, such as unbundling software or adjusting licensing terms for Microsoft Azure customers, could reduce Microsoft’s structural advantage and open up the market.

The DMCAA provides a model of what proactive antitrust regulation could look like in the United States. Critical components of the emerging AI economy are highly concentrated and ripe for anticompetitive exploitation. Adopting legislation mirroring the DMCCA would allow U.S. regulators to set clear rules for fair conduct upfront, rather than relying on long, resource-intensive efforts to break up monopolies after the damage is already done.

 

Notes

[1] Skye Jacobs, AI Boom Drives Record S&P 500 Valuations, but Goldman Sachs Warns of $1 Trillion Risk Ahead, TechSpot (Sept. 6, 2025), https://www.techspot.com/news/109358-ai-boom-drives-record-sp-valuations-but-goldman.html.

[2] Nihad A. Hassan, The Impact of Generative AI on Cloud Infrastructure Demand, Cybernews (May 3, 2025), https://cybernews.com/security/generative-ai-cloud-infrastructure.

[3] Felix Richter, The Big Three Stay Ahead in Ever-Growing Cloud Market, Statista (Aug. 21, 2025), https://www.statista.com/chart/18819/worldwide-market-share-of-leading-cloud-infrastructure-service-providers.

[4] Goldman Sachs, Cloud Revenues Poised to Reach $2 Trillion by 2030 Amid AI Rollout (Sept. 4, 2024) https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/cloud-revenues-poised-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2030-amid-ai-rollout.

[5] Id.

[6] Max Von Thun, Cloud Computing is Too Important to be Left to the Big Three, Financial Times (May 25, 2025), https://www.ft.com/content/5c930686-9119-402d-8b9b-4c3f6233164e.

[7] Daniel Francis, Antitrust Without Competition, 74 Duke L.J. 353, 355–56 (2024).

[8] Id.

[9] Lina M. Khan, The Amazon Anti-Trust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710, 720 (2017).

[10] Herbet Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, 99 Wash. U. L.R. 787, 837–38 (2022).

[11] Ali Swenson, These Tech Billionaires Flanked Trump at Inauguration, AP News (Jan. 20, 2025) https://apnews.com/article/trump-inauguration-tech-billionaires-zuckerberg-musk-wealth-0896bfc3f50d941d62cebc3074267ecd.

[12] See The White House, President Trump, Tech Leaders Unite to Power American AI Dominance (Sept. 5, 2025) https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/09/president-trump-tech-leaders-unite-american-ai-dominance/; see also Alexandra Charbi & Juan Rojas, Merger Enforcement Policies of the Second Trump Administration: Early Developments and Priorities, ABA Antitrust L. Section (Aug. 29, 2025), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/resources/newsletters/merger-enforcement-policies-second-trump-admin.

[13] See White & Case LLP, Navigating the New UK Antitrust Landscape (Jan. 8, 2025), https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/navigating-new-uk-antitrust-landscape.

[14] Id.

[15] Competition and Markets Authority, How the UK’s Digital Markets Competition Regime Works (last updated Jan. 23, 2025), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-the-uks-digital-markets-competition-regime-works?ucriteria-for-strategic-market-status.

[16] Id.

[17] Lisa Mildt, Nanret Senok & Luke Streatfield, Remedies Under the DMCCA: A New Digital Regulation Toolkit in the U.K., Hausfeld Competition Bull., (Mar. 28, 2025) https://www.hausfeld.com/what-we-think/competition-bulletin/remedies-under-the-dmcca-a-new-digital-regulation-toolkit-in-the-uk.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Competition and Markets Authority, Strategic Market Status Investigation Into Google’s General Search Services (June 24, 2025) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68598b13eaa6f6419fade67b/Proposed_decision.pdf.

[21] Anush Ganesh, Google SMS Designation Responses – A Comprehensive Analysis, SCiDA (Sept. 11, 2025) https://scidaproject.com/2025/09/11/google-sms-designation-responses-a-comprehensive-analysis/.

[22] Competition and Markets Authority, supra note 22.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.