Articles by mjlst

The Heavy Cost of Costless Lies

March 17, 2022
Constitutional Law

Shuang Liu, MJLST Staffer

Does repetition of a lie make it truer? “What a ridiculous question,” you might think. But according to psychological experiments, the answer is yes.

In a series of psychological experiments, scientists provided true and false statements to participants, repeating only some of the statements, and asked the participants to evaluate whether the statements were true or false. The results showed that people typically evaluated repeated statements truer than those that appeared just once. The effect of repetition was summarized by Christian Unkelbach et al. in 2019:

The effect appears with information ranging from trivia (“The thigh bone is the longest bone in the human body”) to consumer opinions (“Billabong shampoo leaves hair shiny with no residue”) to false news items (“Donald Trump sends his own plane to transport 200 stranded marines”). It is present with repetition intervals from minutes to weeks to months.

In addition to the frequency of statements, temporal order also affects people’s trust in statements. For example, if people read the statement “Falstaff was the last opera of Verdi” first and the statement “Othello was the last opera of Verdi” later, they are more likely to believe the latter statement is false. To make things worse, the phenomenon of confirmation bias reveals that when a person has drawn a conclusion on a given matter, either consciously or subconsciously, the person is inclined to disregard information that contradicts the conclusion.

The implication of these experiments can be huge. Consider a scenario where a famous person says “COVID is not real” with literally no explanation. People will then hear it countless times from various sources including the press, and potentially family, friends, and collogues. As a result, some of these people will tend to believe this lie more than later statements that contradict it but are true. When the lie is closely related to public interest, just as the one in this example, its negative effects are serious.

Nevertheless, the law does not defend people against such serious lies at all. The First Amendment protects free speech including false statements, as long as no defamation issue is involved. Generally, there are two reasons for not outlawing lies. Firstly, the First Amendment “presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” Secondly, the “First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.” Penalties for lies will also deter statements that are believed to be true when made, but could be disproven later. However, as will be discussed below, these two reasons are not adequate for allowing lies to be legally costless.

To begin with, the presupposition that truth can be gathered from various contradictory sources does not reflect the reality. Most information people obtain today is secondhand. People can hardly confirm the truthiness of most information directly. Therefore, people have no better option than choosing to believe some of the accessible sources. This choice, as illustrated above, is far from rational. You may think that simple repetition and temporal primacy cannot mislead you. But statistical results show a considerable portion of people can and will be fooled in such ways. Moreover, confirmation bias suggests once a person believes a lie, the person will strengthen the lie in his or her mind by selectively absorbing future information. Accordingly, the presumption that truth can be found from various sources may hold in the scenario of a discovery proceeding in litigation, for example, but never for most people in their daily life.

Moreover, the concern that punishing lies may also deter true statements can be dispelled by a systematic solution. Firstly, whether a speaker is liable for his or her false statement should not turn on whether the statement is false objectively. Rather, the test should be whether the speaker, as a reasonable person, has had sufficient factual bases for the statement before making it. After all, even respectable scientists have made false statements about the nature of the universe, but hardly can anyone say they were lying. Additionally, in order not to disrupt people’s normal life, the requirements of not lying should be imposed only on public officials when they are speaking in their positions. This role-based requirement is consistent with the well-established policy that government officials “are to be treated as men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.” It is also aligned with the fact that statements of public officials are more likely to be viewed, heard, reported, and spread, and hence are deserved to be more strictly regulated. Lastly, to be held liable for lying, the false statement should bear some relation to the public interest. Trivial lies that do not hurt the public interest are not worth the legal cost for preventing them.

As can be expected, to outlaw false statements, even only those made by public officials, entails a radical change in the Constitutional law. But the efforts will pay off because people will be less harmed by lies, and the government will receive more credence from people as a result.

Xenotransplantation: Ethics and Public Policy Need to Catch Up to the Science

March 5, 2022
Bioethics, Biotechnology, Discrimination, Ethics, FDA, Health, Medical Devices, New Technology, Personalized Medicine

Claire Colby, MJLST Staffer

In early January, surgeons at the University of Maryland Medical Center made history by successfully transplanting a genetically altered pig heart to a human recipient, David Bennett.  The achievement represents a major milestone in transplantation. The demand for transplantable organs far outpaces the supply, and xenotransplantation–the implantation of non-human tissue into human recipients–could help bridge this gap. In the U.S. alone, more than 106,000 people are on the waiting list for transplants. Legal and ethical questions remain open about the appropriateness of implementing xenotransplants on a large scale. 

The FDA approved the January transplant through an emergency authorization compassionate use pathway because Bennett likely would have died without this intervention. Larger clinical trials will be needed to generate enough data to show that xenotransplants are safe and effective. The FDA will require these trials to show xenotransplantations are non-inferior to human organ transplants. IRB requirements bar interventions where risk outweighs benefits for patients, but accurately predicting and measuring risk is difficult. 

If xenotransplantation becomes standard clinical practice, animal rights proponents may balk at the idea of raising pigs for organs. Far before that point, pre-clinical trials will make heavy use of animal models. Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs) which oversee animal research in universities and medical entities apply a “much lower ethical standard” for animals than human research subjects. Bioethicists apply a “3R” framework for animal subjects research that stresses replacing animal models, reducing animal testing, and refining their use. Because of the inherent nature of xenotransplantation, applying this framework may be near impossible. Ongoing discussions are needed with relevant stakeholders.  

If both human and animal organs are approved for widespread transplant, but human organs prove superior, new allocation policies are needed to determine who gets what. Organ allocation policy is currently dictated by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN). As it stands, organ transplantation shows inequality across racial groups and financial status. New allocation policies for organs must not reinforce or worsen these disparities. 

Like all medical interventions, patients must be able to provide informed consent for xenotransplantation. The recipient of the altered pig heart had previously been deemed ineligible for a human heart transplant because his heart failure was poorly managed. Reserving experimental interventions, like xenotransplantations, for the sickest patients raises serious ethical concerns. Are these desperate patients truly able to give meaningful consent? If xenotransplantation becomes a common practice, the traditional model of institutional review boards may need updating. Currently, individual institutions maintain their own IRBs. Xenotransplantation of altered animal organs may involve several sites: procurement of the organ, genetic editing, and transplantation may all take place in different locations. A central IRB for xenotransplantation could standardize and streamline this process. 

In all, xenotransplantation represents an exciting new frontier in transplant medicine. Responsibly implementing this innovation will require foresight and parallel innovation in ethics and public policy. 

Hydrogen – The Fuel of the Future?

March 5, 2022
Climate Change, Energy Law, Environment, Regulatory

Max Meyer, MJLST Staffer

Hydrogen is viewed by many as being a key part of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. Recently, a bipartisan group of lawmakers expressed interest in hydrogen and want to support its adoption in the United States. When used as a fuel source, hydrogen produces only water and heat. It could potentially be used to power cars, trucks, and airplanes and generate electricity. Hydrogen is used on a fairly minimal scale today, but entities ranging from industry to government are increasing investment in the technology. Currently, hydrogen is regulated by a variety of federal agencies, but no comprehensive regulatory scheme exists.

 

Hydrogen Production 

Hydrogen is one of the most abundant elements on earth, but it only exists in compound form with other elements. Hydrogen has the highest fuel content of any fuel by weight.

Hydrogen can be separated from compounds in a few different ways. It can be produced from steam-methane reforming which accounts for 95% of hydrogen production in the U.S. In this process, “natural gas (which is mostly methane) reacts with high pressure, high temperature steam in the presence of a catalyst to produce a mixture of mostly hydrogen and carbon monoxide.” The product stream is then processed further to produce a stream of mostly hydrogen. Water can be added to this mixture to convert the carbon monoxide into carbon dioxide. If the carbon dioxide is subsequently capture and stored underground, the hydrogen produced is referred to as blue hydrogen. If the carbon dioxide is not captured, the hydrogen is called grey hydrogen.

Hydrogen can also be produced from water by electrolysis which splits water molecules into pure hydrogen and oxygen using electricity. When renewable energy is used for electrolysis the resulting hydrogen is often referred to as green hydrogen.

 

Why Is It Important?

Using fuel cells, hydrogen can produce electricity. A fuel cell contains two electrodes, one negative and one positive, with an electrolyte in the middle. Hydrogen is fed into the negative electrode and air is fed into the positive end. At the negative end, a catalyst separates the hydrogen molecules into protons and electrons. To produce electricity, the electrons go through an external circuit before entering the positive electrode. Then, the protons, electrons, oxygen unite to produce water and heat. Fuel cells can be used in a number of applications ranging passenger and commercial vehicles to powering buildings.

 

Current Regulatory Framework

Hydrogen is regulated by several federal agencies. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) regulates hydrogen pipelines. PHMSA’s mission is to “protect people and the environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous materials[.]” Thus, PHMSA’s regulation of hydrogen pipelines is focused on safety. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates hydrogen in workplaces OSHA’s regulation of hydrogen specifically covers the installation of hydrogen systems. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also regulates hydrogen in several ways. Hydrogen is regulated under the EPA’s Mandator Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, Effluent Standards under the Clean Water Act, and Chemical Accident Prevention program. However, the EPA’s regulation of hydrogen is primarily a result of hydrogen’s relationship to fossil fuels. The regulations are concerned with the production of hydrogen from fossil fuels such as the methane steam reform process outlined above.

The Department of Energy (DOE) has invested in research and development concerning hydrogen. In 2020, the DOE released its Hydrogen Program Plan. The DOE’s program is intended to “research, develop and validate transformational hydrogen and related technologies… and to address institutional and market barriers, to ultimately enable adoption across multiple applications and sectors.”

In 2021, Congress passed an infrastructure bill with $9.5 billion of funding for clean hydrogen initiatives. $8 billion of that funding is directed towards the creation of Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs across the country to increase the use of hydrogen in the industrial sector. $1 billion is for clean hydrogen electrolysis research to lower costs from producing hydrogen using renewable energy. Finally, $500 million is for Clean Hydrogen Manufacturing and Recycling to “support equipment manufacturing and strong domestic supply chains.”

 

Regulation in the Future

The federal government currently does not regulate the construction of hydrogen pipelines. Presently, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Natural Gas Act “regulates the siting, construction, and operation of interstate natural gas pipelines.” If Congress were to give FERC this same power for hydrogen pipelines it would allow for national planning of the infrastructure and lead to a comprehensive pipeline network. Recently, members of Congress have considered the regulatory framework covering hydrogen pipelines and if additional authority over these pipelines should be given to FERC or other federal agencies. However, these discussions are still in the preliminary stages.

Hydrogen has the potential to play a large role in the United States’ effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It can be used in a variety of industries including the transportation and industrial sectors. Congress has recognized hydrogen’s importance and must continue to invest in lowering the costs of hydrogen production and building hydrogen infrastructure.

Hunting the Hunters: The Recent Saga of Gray Wolf Hunting and Protection

March 5, 2022
Agriculture, Animal Law, Endangered Species Act, Environment, Environmental Law, Public Lands

Mason Medeiros, MJLST Staffer

Hunting is a common activity throughout the United States. Whether for sport or sustenance, it is commonly practiced in every state across the country. States, to protect animals from overhunting and extinction, have enacted laws detailing which animals can be hunted and the period of time in which the hunt can occur. Furthermore, the Endangered Species Act has made it illegal to hunt, harm, or damage the habitat of any species on the endangered species list. But what happens when the government removes a species from the endangered species list? And particularly, what happens when a state has a statutory hunting period for such species? This question was brought to light in Wisconsin, and across the nation, when the federal government the gray wolf from the endangered species list on January 4, 2021. The resulting hunts and legal disputes have created a thrilling saga about the future of the gray wolf and the protections available to them. This post will discuss (1) the Wisconsin wolf hunt litigation and aftermath, (2) what a recent Ninth Circuit opinion means for the future of the gray wolf, and (3) what this saga shows about the weakness of endangered species protections in the United States.

 

The Wisconsin Wolf Hunt Litigation

Soon after the gray wolf was delisted, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (W-DNR) began receiving requests for a wolf hunt. The first of such requests came from Republican lawmakers on January 15—less than 20 days after the delisting. They based their argument based on two statutes: Wisconsin Statute 29.185(1m) and Wisconsin Statute 29.185(5)(a). Statute 29.185(1m) states that “[i]f the wolf is not listed on the federal endangered list and is not listed on the state endangered list, the [W-DNR] shall allow the hunting and trapping of wolves” as regulated by this section. This provision is further developed by Statute 29.185(5)(a), which requires the W-DNR to “establish a single annual open season for both hunting and trapping wolves that begins on the first Saturday in November of each year and ends on the last day of February of the following year.” The lawmakers argued that, when taken together, these statutes require the W-DNR to immediately allow a wolf hunt for the remainder of the 2021 season because the wolves were no longer under federal protection.

On January 22, in a 4-3 vote, the W-DNR Board voted against allowing a wolf hunt for the remainder of the 2021 season. Rather than starting a hunt right away, they claimed that they needed additional time “to develop a science-based harvest quota, gather input from tribes and update its wolf management plan.” This decision, however, was short-lived.

On February 3, Hunter Nation, Inc., a Kansas-based organization, filed a lawsuit challenging the W-DNR’s decision. The court ruled that, because of the state’s statutes mandating the hunting season, the W-DNR must allow it to occur during the remainder of the season. Complying, the W-DNR set a quota of 200 wolves, 81 of which were reserved for native Ojibwe tribes. In only three days, hunters unaffiliated with the tribes exceeded this quota by killing 218 wolves.

 

The Ninth Circuit Returns Protections for the Gray Wolf

Luckily, protections for the gray wolf are beginning to return. On February 10, 2022, a Federal District Court in the Ninth Circuit returned federal protections for wolves in Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30123 (N.D. Cal. 2022). The court found that, when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service delisted the gray wolves, they failed to consider threats to gray wolf populations outside of the Great Lakes and Northern Rocky Mountains and “didn’t rely on the best available science.”

This decision returned federal protections to gray wolves in the contiguous United States outside of Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana, which remain under state control. Many pro-hunting groups oppose the decision, claiming that the wolf populations have recovered enough and should be managed by the state. Conservation organizations, on the other hand, believe that the decision is a step in the right direction but that more government intervention is needed to protect wolf populations in the remaining states from overhunting. While this decision is a major step in wolf protection, it does not address the issue of what happened to the wolves when they were initially delisted.

 

Better Policies are Needed to Protect Animals Coming Off of the Endangered Species List

This saga has highlighted some of the weaknesses in the endangered species program. Even though the animals are protected while on the list, they can immediately be hunted once the government removes them. This is particularly the case in states with statutorily mandated hunting seasons for certain species. Once one of these species is removed from the endangered species list, the statutes act as a trigger, forcing the hunt to begin. These “trigger laws” have major impacts on the species and need to be addressed.

One of the major issues with the trigger laws is that they do not provide a chance for the state to ensure that the quotas they set are scientifically accurate. Rather, the hunt needs to start during a statutorily required period.

Additionally, the hunters may not follow the quotas set by the state. This situation occurred in the 2021 Wisconsin hunt when hunters unassociated with tribes killed over 200 wolves, nearly doubling their quota in only three days. This hunt had potentially devastating effects on the wolf population. Wisconsin’s Green Fire, a conservation group, estimates that the wolves’ reproduction rate will be depleted by 24–40% because of the loss of females and alpha males in the hunt. If these rates remained, it would lead to a rapid decrease in wolf populations.

To address this concern, the government need to implement further protections for animals that they delist. Even though the species’ population is reportedly stable at the time they are delisted, the sudden hunting can quickly return them to critical levels. One potential solution is to mandate a protection period between the delisting and when hunting can actually begin. This period will allow states to develop scientifically accurate quotas and ensure that their protocols for the hunt are up to date while negating the applicability of potential trigger laws hidden in a state’s statutes.

Zombie Deer: Slowing the Spread of CWD

February 18, 2022
Administrative Law, Agriculture, Animal Law, Environment, Environmental Law, Public Lands

Warren Sexson, MJLST Staffer

Minnesota is one of the premier states in the Union for chasing whitetails. In 2020, over 470,000 licenses were purchased to harvest deer. As a hunter myself, I understand the importance of protecting Minnesota’s deer herd and habitat. The most concerning threat to whitetail deer in the state is Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD). CWD alters the central nervous system, similar to “mad cow disease,” causing deer to lose weight, stumble, drool, and behave similarly to an extra on The Walking Dead. It was first discovered in 1967 in Colorado mule deer and is transmissible to other ungulates such as moose, elk, red deer, black-tail deer, Sitka deer, and reindeer. It is 100% fatal in animals it infects and there is no known treatment or vaccine. While it currently poses no threat to humans, Canadian researchers have shown eating the meat from infected animals can infect hungry macaques, prompting the CDC and the World Health Organization to recommend against consumption of CWD positive animals. Luckily, in Minnesota there were only a handful of cases last season. Challenges still remain, however, and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the state legislature have tools at their disposal to combat the spread.

The DNR currently has a comprehensive response plan. In order to get a deer hunting license, the hunter has to pick what “zone” he or she will be hunting in. Minnesota is divided up into zones based off of the deer population and geography. Each zone has different guidelines for how many licenses will sell to the public. Some are “limited draw,” meaning a lottery system where only a certain number of applicants are selected, others are “over-the-counter,” meaning anyone who wants a license in that unit may buy one. Within the zoning system, the DNR has three “CWD Zone” classifications that restrict harvesting deer depending on the risks of the disease—surveillance, control, and management zones. Surveillance zones are where CWD has been found in captive deer or in wild deer in an adjacent zone. Control zones border the management zones, and management zones take up most of the south-eastern portion of the state, where CWD is highly concentrated. The restrictions in each type of zone vary, with surveillance zones being the least restricted and management zones being the most. Hunters have a key role in slowing the spread of CWD. Reducing deer populations in CWD ridden areas helps to reduce contact among deer and lower infection rates. However, there are other ways to further Minnesota’s commitment to slowing the spread of CWD.

The DNR can use emergency actions; it has done so recently. In October of 2021, the DNR temporarily banned moving farmed deer into and within the state through emergency action. Farmed deer (deer raised in captivity for use in trophy hunting) are a main vector of transmission for CWD. The ban was lifted in December but could have lasted longer. The DNR has emergency authority under Minn. Stat. § 84.027 Subd. 13(b) and (g). By enacting emergency declarations, the DNR can continue to use proven measures to slow the spread: requiring testing in high risk areas, banning movement between deer farms, increasing legal limits, and requiring hunters who desire a big buck to first harvest does in so called “Earn-a-Buck” programs. But, such emergency authority can only be 18 months at the longest. While limited in time, emergency orders provide the DNR the flexibility it needs to combat the disease’s spread.

The agency could also attempt to regulate by standard rulemaking authority as laid out in Chapter 14 of Minnesota’s statutes. The agency likely has authority to regulate deer hunting rules relating to CWD and recently has gained concurrent authority over deer farms along with the Board of Animal Health. However, if the DNR attempted to ban deer farming or imposed severe regulatory requirements, industry and interest groups would likely respond with legal challenges to the rulemaking process. In previous attempts to severely restrict deer farms, the Minnesota Deer Farmers Association has filed lawsuits attempting to block restrictions.

While the DNR likely can regulate deer hunting to slow the spread, the legislature is the best option for stopping deer farming as a whole. It is not necessarily a one-sided issue; a bi-partisan coalition of hunters and environmentalistswish to see the practice banned. State Rep. Rick Hansen (DFL) who chairs the House Environment and Natural Resources Finances and Policy Committee has discussed ending the practice and buying out all existing operators. Craig Engwall, head of the Minnesota Deer Hunters Association has additionally called for such a ban. State legislation would be the most comprehensive way to slow the spread of CWD.

State legislators should also consider funding more research for potential vaccines and treatments for CWD. Funding is beginning to pick up; Canadian researchers have begun working on potential vaccines. Additionally, Rep. Ron Kind’s (D-WI) bill, the Chronic Wasting Disease Research and Management Act passed the House of Representatives with Bipartisan support and awaits a vote in the Senate. While this is encouraging, more can be done to support scientific research and protect deer herds. If Minnesota wants to lead the United States in solving such a global issue, the bipartisan support exists to help tackle the largest threat to deer hunting in the U.S. and the state.

CWD threatens the state’s large and historic deer hunting tradition. The DNR and the state legislature have the tools at their disposal to impose meaningful reform to combat the spread of “zombie-deer,” so the population can thrive for generations to come.

Social Media Influencers Ask What “Intellectual Property” Means

February 18, 2022
Copyrights, Data, Intellectual Property, Internet, Social Media, Trademark Law

Henry Killen, MJLST Staffer

Today, just about anyone can name their favorite social media influencer. The most popular influencers are athletes, musicians, politicians, entrepreneurs, or models. Ultra-famous influencers, such as Kylie Jenner, can charge over 1 million dollars for a single post with a company’s product. So what are the risks of being an influencer? Tik Tok star Charli D’Amelio has been on both sides of intellectual property disputes. A photo of Charli was included in media mogul Sheeraz Hasan’s video promoting his ability to “make anyone famous.” The video featured many other celebrities such as Logan Paul and Zendaya. Charli’s legal team sent a cease-and-desist letter to Sheeraz demanding that her portion of the promotional video is scrubbed. Her lawyers assert that her presence in the promo “is not approved and will not be approved.” Charli has also been on the other side of celebrity intellectual property issues. The star published her first book In December and has come under fire from photographer Jake Doolittle for allegedly using photos he took without his permission. Though no lawsuit has been filed, Jake posted a series of Instagram posts blaming Charli’s team for not compensating him for his work.

Charli’s controversies highlight a bigger question society is facing, is content shared on social media platforms considered intellectual property? A good place to begin is figuring out what exactly intellectual property is. Intellectual property “refers to creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and symbols, names, and images used in commerce.” Social media platforms make it possible to access endless displays of content – from images to ideas – creating a cultural norm of sharing many aspects of life. Legal teams at the major social media platforms already have policies in place that make it against the rules to take images from a social media feed and use them as one’s own. For example, Bloggers may not be aware what they write may already by trademarked or copyrighted or that the images they get off the internet for their posts may not be freely reposted. Influencers get reposted on sites like Instagram all the time, and not just by loyal fans. These reposts may seem harmless to many influencers, but it is actually against Instagram’s policy to repost a photo without the creator’s consent. This may seem like not a big deal because what influencer doesn’t want more attention? However, sometimes influencers’ work gets taken and then becomes a sensation. A group of BIPOC TikTok users are fighting to copyright a dance they created that eventually became one of biggest dances in TikTok history. A key fact in their case is that the dance only became wildly popular after the most famous TiKTok users began doing it.

There are few examples of social media copyright issues being litigated, but in August 2021, a Manhattan Federal judge ruled that the practice of embedding social media posts on third-party websites, without permission from the content owner, could violate the owner’s copyright. In reaching this decision, the judge rejected the “server test” from the 9th Circuit, which holds that embedding content from a third party’s social media account only violates the contents owner’s copyright if a copy is stored on the defendant’s serves. .  General copyright laws from Congress lay out four considerations when deciding if a work should be granted copyright protection: originality, fixation, idea versus expression, and functionality. These considerations notably leave a gray area in determining if dances or expressions on social media sites can be copyrighted. Congress should enact a more comprehensive law to better address intellectual property as it relates to social media.

A New Sheriff in the Wild West: How the Cryptocurrency Industry’s Failure to Neutralize Hacking Threats Has Rendered Federal Regulation a Necessity

February 16, 2022
Uncategorized

Dan O’Dea, MJLST Staffer

In today’s financial world, few things are more captivating than the rapidly evolving cryptocurrency space. It has been a wild twelve months for the cryptocurrency industry, and specifically for Bitcoin owners. Bitcoin doubled its value in 2021 and peaked at just over $68,000/coin, only to erase nearly all of those gains when the crypto market crashed in January 2022. The crash was largely prompted by fears that the Federal Reserve would withdraw stimulus from the market by raising interest rates. In the process, the crypto market lost over $1 trillion in market value, and an asset class that many have called a “hedge opportunity” for investors against inflation crashed down with the stock market as a whole.

But extreme market volatility is not the only risk investing in cryptocurrency poses for its some 300 million investors. Hackers and thieves have been wreaking havoc on the Decentralized Finance (De-Fi) industry, with their latest exploit coming in the form of a $320 million theft of Ethereum from Wormhole, one of the most popular bridges linking the blockchains of the popular Ethereum and Solana coins. These blockchains are of great use, as they are capable of developing “smart contracts” to replace banks and lawyers in certain business transactions. Blockchain “bridges” like Wormhole are important facilitators for these contracts. Unfortunately, in the process, bridges like Wormhole have become a target for cyberattacks due to fundamental limits on their security as they house hundreds of millions of dollars of assets in escrow. This latest theft on Wormhole is not even the largest in the De-Fi crypto space’s history, where a $600 million theft from a platform called Poly Network takes the cake. Interestingly, the hacker’s goal in that theft was simply to open a dialogue with the platform about security issues on the blockchain, and ultimately all funds were returned. Attacks have not been limited to the platform level, as smaller-time thieves have turned to phishing scams and SIM Swap schemes (in which an individual misrepresents their identity to your cell phone provider in an effort to intercept dual-factor authentication messages and gain access to your crypto accounts) to steal from individual investors. Unfortunately, victims of the vast majority of cryptocurrency thefts are extremely unlikely to recoup their funds once they have been stolen, due to the anonymity afforded to wallet holders on the blockchain, who in some cases can reveal no identifiable details about themselves while transacting cryptocurrency.

It is important to note that when a cryptocurrency platform loses money, it is not the platform alone that incurs a loss. Rather, the clients whose accounts were pillaged by hackers bear the entire loss, or, if the platform collapses from the theft and liquidators are appointed, every user on the platform will bear the loss to some degree. So what recourse do the victims of cryptocurrency theft have? While Cryptocurrency platforms such as Coinbase attempt to educate users about the types of scams they may encounter, if a theft occurs, victims are usually on their own. While state prosecutor’s offices and federal enforcement agencies like the FBI will investigate and prosecute identifiable criminals, and individual plaintiffs can bring private civil actions against them, the largest challenge faced by victims of cryptocurrency theft is identifying the thieves in the first place. In an effort to identify perpetrators, both the FBI and private parties with deep pockets have begun to contract with private tech firms specializing in tracking down stolen crypto, such as CipherTrace. While working with a crypto-tracking firm gives an aggrieved individual the best chance of tracking down their thieves, it is still unlikely that the parties will ever be identified and funds ever recouped.

Security requirements are far from standardized across the crypto industry—true to its nickname, the “Decentralized Finance” (De-Fi) industry, operates essentially free from regulatory constraints in the United States. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has cautioned investors of the risks posed by cryptocurrency investments relating to hacking and volatility, but because the space is not subject to federal securities regulation requirements, investors often enter the world of cryptocurrency investing underinformed as to its true risks. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has begun to wade into the fray of regulating cryptocurrency platforms, most recently with the introduction of a proposal that some are calling a “trojan horse” regulatory tool to be wielded against the crypto industry. The proposal contains an expansive definition of the term “treasury platforms” that would likely allow the SEC to issue protocols for cryptocurrency and De-Fi platforms. The trojan horse notwithstanding, the SEC has been vocal about its plans to introduce formal regulatory guidelines and procedures for the cryptocurrency industry in the long term. Even the White House has waded into the crypto regulatory waters, with the Biden administration set to release an executive order designed to create a government-wide strategy to regulate the cryptocurrency industry that could release as soon as mid-February, 2022. The proposal comes on the heels of the FTC’s release of data showing cryptocurrency scams have skyrocketed, and as concern levels over crypto money laundering schemes rise.

While many have scoffed at the idea that the decentralized finance industry should be regulated, it is likely that the prospect of federal regulation actually represents a good thing for a cryptocurrency market that has been referred to as “The Wild West,” and that has drawn comparisons to the late 2000s subprime mortgage market. Federal regulation of the cryptocurrency industry will prompt new protocols for its platforms designed to enhance risk disclosures made to prospective crypto investors and strengthen the security measures protecting investments. Further, regulation is likely to prompt registration and reporting requirements that will make it easier to catch crypto thieves by providing greater information to law enforcement agencies. The crypto industry continues to prove it cannot protect itself from the threat of hacking, and investors are largely bearing the costs of these failures. Just as the SEC stepped in to protect investors from being burned by highly speculative and worthless securities in the 1930s, aiding its regulatory hand to the cryptocurrency industry in a non-burdensome manner should again provide investors with a new set of protections in 2022.

Legal Personhood and Cocaine Hippos: Animals as “Interested Persons” and Their Rights in Court

February 16, 2022
Uncategorized

Douglas Harman, MJLST Staffer

On October 15, 2021, a federal magistrate judge ruled that a group of hippos in Colombia can be recognized as “interested persons” per federal statute for the purposes of deposing two Ohio Wildlife experts. These hippos are the descendants of hippos illegally imported to Colombia by drug kingpin Pablo Escobar. When Escobar was killed, the hippos were not relocated and were left to their own devices in Colombia. Since then, the hippos have multiplied and present significant environmental challenges. The issue in the US arose from litigation in Colombia concerning the fate of the hippos, which resulted in a request to depose the two Ohio experts. These hippos will be referred to as the “cocaine hippos” because that seems to be the term most commonly associated with them (and, quite frankly, it’s amusing).

This decision, though hailed by animal rights groups as groundbreaking, is likely more a technicality than a guiding precedent. Specifically, the ruling comes because Colombia treats animals as “sentient beings” with certain rights. Because the suit by the hippos is permitted in Colombia, US law treats the hippos as “interested persons” for the purposes of deposing US experts on ethical sterilization methods. Regardless of the breadth or technicality of the decision in question, it nonetheless represents a significant step to affix the title of “person” to a non-homosapien, and it has not happened in a US court before, despite repeated efforts by animal rights organizations. However, other countries do recognize various degrees of animal sentience.

The Legal Concept of Non-Human “Personhood”

The issue of whether animals should be considered “persons” has a variety of scientific, psychological, and philosophical elements. This blog post is not here to debate whether animals should be considered persons in terms of political theory or philosophy; plenty of ink has been spent in that pursuit elsewhere. This discussion focuses on how non-persons may receive limited rights to sue in court and perform certain legal functions as if they were persons, like the deposition of experts in the matter of the cocaine hippos.

 The implications of animal consciousness are relevant because growing understanding of animal cognition and consciousness has informed a discussion of whether animals, and other non-humans like trees or natural areas, should be allowed to have their own rights vindicated in court. That is to say, there are a number of ongoing legal discussions about obligations owed to non-humans that governments are obligated to respect, and how those rights are allowed to be vindicated in court. It is this narrower, legal version of non-human “personhood” that was granted to Colombia’s cocaine hippos in the present action.

History of Non-Human “Personhood” Debate in the US

Although the court ruling in the cocaine hippos matter is the first time a US court has attached “person” status to an animal, it is not the first time the issue has been discussed. Attempts to give animals legal status and treat them as “persons” in certain legal areas developed from the animal rights movement, which has a long history in the US and Great Britain. In the last several years, several courts have referred to animal legal rights in the context of personhood, albeit rather obliquely at times. One of the biggest ongoing debates concerns the rights of Happy the Elephant; animal rights activists are pursuing a writ of habeas corpus for Happy, arguing she deserves to be treated as a person in the eyes of the law.

Non-human personhood is not without precedent. Courts have allowed corporations to be considered “artificial persons” in limited circumstances in court since the 1600s. Jurisprudence has since developed in the United States towards increasing “personhood” of corporations, referring to a railroad as a person for the purposes of the 14th amendment in 1886. Today corporations have near-total personhood, including the right to make religious objections to laws and practice free speech.

There is also some precedent for inanimate objects holding “personhood” status under the law. Every law student (and a great many other Americans, it is to be imagined) have discussed or at least heard of the Tree that Owns Itself (while it almost certainly does not own itself as a technical matter, it certainly does in the public mind and in the official statements of the local government). Additionally, Justice William O. Douglas in his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton argued that standing doctrine should be amended to allow organizations to sue on behalf of inanimate things, including land, rivers, trees, etc. This opinion essentially lays out an idea of legal personhood for inanimate objects, and would presumably also extend with relative ease to animals.

As a factual matter, the reality of non-human personhood, while remarkably developed for corporations in the United States, has relatively little real applications to animals today. This is one of the main reasons that the attachment of the “interested persons” label to the Colombian hippos felt significant to many in the animal rights movement.

Recognition of Non-Human “Personhood” in Other Countries

While animals have not commonly been granted legal rights in the United States, they do in many other countries. Spain recognized animals as “sentient beings” and have greater standing than inanimate objects. In doing so, it joined about 32 other countries that do the same, including France, the U.K., the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand, and Tanzania. South Korea is doing something similar in granting animals legal status.

South America is also moving on the front on non-human rights. In 2014, a court in Argentina recognized the basic rights of Sandra the Orangutan, and agreed that she was being detained illegally in the Buenos Aires Zoo. Additionally, Colombia, the state in which the cocaine hippos case originates, has vested portions of the Amazon Rainforest with legal rights, and, as mentioned, recognizes animal sentience and limited legal rights.

What This Means for Colombia’s Cocaine Hippos (and Other Animals)

In the immediate term, the magistrate judge’s recognition of the cocaine hippos as “interested persons” has allowed for the expert deposition sought by the Colombian lawyers advocating on the hippos’ behalf. Effort is now under way to chemically sterilize the hippos, rather than cull or surgically castrate them.

More broadly, there appears to be more references to the inherent rights of animals in American jurisprudence, rather than simply their function as property. The act of classifying the hippos as “interested persons” did not rock the legal boat (in fact, the magistrate judge remains quite well regarded by her colleagues). Those interested in animal rights will doubtless be heartened by increased use of personhood and rights language used with respect to animals. Hopefully, the treatment of Pablo Escobar’s rogue cocaine hippos in US court is indicative of progressive trend in the law’s treatment of animals.

The Mysterious Disappearance of Deference: What Is the Supreme Court’s Current Relationship to Federal Agencies?

February 7, 2022
Administrative Law, Bioethics, Copyrights, Regulatory, Uncategorized

Carly Michaud, MJLST Staffer

The Supreme Court has had no shortage of administrative law cases in the (possibly) final sessions of one of the Court’s administrative law scholars, Justice Stephen Breyer. Yet, Breyer has found himself and his ideological compatriots in the opposition on the topic in which he situates his expertise. In the recent case regarding OSHA’s ability to require COVID-19 vaccines, Breyer’s dissent repeated discusses the proper deference an agency’s determination should be given by the Supreme Court.

Notably absent from the case is any mention of the previous key to the relationship between the courts and federal agencies: Chevron deference. In fact, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, was, (as of a 2014 analysis in the Yale Journal on Regulation) the “Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law decision”. While previously considered a niche area, administrative law is now so ubiquitous in practice that as of July 2021, 55 law schools require students take a course in administrative law or one of its mainstays: legislation or statutory interpretation.

In spite of this, Chevron appears nowhere in the discussion of OSHA’s vaccine mandate, nor in the court’s earlier revocation of the CDC’s eviction moratorium. This absence suggests that perhaps this Court has become a body of health experts, relying on their own understanding of COVID-19 to determine whether these agency-created regulations are effective in their mission. Both cases center on whether an agency action to prevent the spread of COVID-19 is within the purview of their empowering statute, and, despite the broad statutory authorities of these agencies to protect the health of Americans, both actions were deemed beyond that authority.

But back to Chevron, has it been abandoned as a standard? Not yet, although there was some discussion of this proposition during the oral argument of American Hospital Association v. Becerra last November. The Court has not released an opinion yet on this case, however the Court of Appeals had previously upheld HHS’s ability to set reembursement rates, per its statutory authority.

In a final thrust of irony, the death knell for Chevron deference may come from a case challenging the very statute and the very agency whose decision-making was at issue in Chevron: the EPA and the Clean Air Act. This is particularly ironic as the EPA administrator whose decision-making was being challenged in Chevron was Anne Gorsuch, the mother of Supreme Court justice and noted antagonist of agency authority: Neil Gorsuch. Yes, in a tale mirroring Hamlet, Neil Gorsuch seems determined to destroy the administrative state that had entangled his mother in various administrative scandals. The latest edition of this showdown between the Gorsuchs and EPA is scheduled for Monday February 28, which will see the Supreme Court hearing arguments in West Virginia v. EPA and its consolidated cases.

This behavior by the Court belies a grave concern both about the continued disempowerment of federal agencies—which have been empowered directly by Congress—at the hands of the unelected judiciary. Further, the most cynical of us may see this as a direct assault on the authority of agencies that some justices may politically disagree with, further disregarding the knowledge of learned experts to push their own political agendas.

The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”): Not a Trademark Court but a Narrow Administrative Procedure Against Abusive Registrations

December 22, 2021
Internet, Trademark Law

Thao Nguyen, MJLST Staffer

Anyone can register a domain name through one of the thousands of registrars on a first-come, first-serve basis at a low cost. The ease of entry has created so-called “cybersquatters,” who register for domain names that reflect trademarks before the true trademark owners are able to do so. Cybersquatters often aim to profit from cybersquatting activities, either by selling the domain names back to the trademark holders for a higher price, by generating confusion in order to take advantage of the trademark’s goodwill, or by diluting the trademark and disrupting the business of a competitor. A single cybersquatter can cybersquat on several thousand domain names that incorporate well-known trademarks.

Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP provides that the complainant must successfully establish all three of the following of elements: (i) that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii) that the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) that the registrant registered and is using the domain name in bad faith. Remedies for a successful complainant include cancellation or transfer to the complainant of the disputed domain name.

Although prized for being focused, expedient, and inexpensive, the UDRP is not without criticism, the bulk of which focuses on the issue of fairness. The frequent charge is that the UDRP is inherently biased in favor of trademark owners and against domain name holders, not all of whom are “cybersquatters.” This bias is indicated by statistics: 75% to 90% of URDP decisions each year are decided against the domain name owner.

Nonetheless, the asymmetry of outcomes, rather than being a sign of an unfair arbitration process, may simply reflect the reality that most UDRP complaints are brought when there is a clear case of abuse, and most respondents in the proceeding are true cybersquatters who knowingly and willfully violated the UDRP. Therefore, what may appear to be the UDRP’s shortcomings are in facts signs that the UDRP is fulfilling its primary purpose. Furthermore, to appreciate the UDRP proceeding and understand the asymmetry that might normally raise red flags in an adjudication, one must understand that the UDRP is not meant to resolve trademark dispute. A representative case where this purpose is addressed is Cameron & Company, Inc. v. Patrick Dudley, FA1811001818217 (FORUM Dec. 26, 2018), where the Panel wrote, “cases involving disputes regarding trademark rights and usage, trademark infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices and related U.S. law issues are beyond the scope of the Panel’s limited jurisdiction under the Policy.” In other words, the UDRP’s scope is limited to detecting and reversing the damages of cybersquatting, and the administrative dispute-resolution procedure is streamlined for this purpose.[1]

That the UDRP is not a trademark court is evident in the UDRP’s refusal to handle cases where multiple legitimate complainants assert right to a single domain name registered by a cybersquatter. UDRP Rule 3(a) states: “Any person or entity may initiate an administrative proceeding by submitting a complaint.” The Forum’s Supplemental Rule 1(e) defines “The Party Initiating a Complaint Concerning a Domain Name Registration” as a “single person or entity claiming to have rights in the domain name, or multiple persons or entities who have a sufficient nexus who can each claim to have rights to all domain names listed in the Complaint.” UDRP cases with two or more complainants in a proceeding are possible only when the complainants are affiliated with each other as to share a single license to a trademark,[2] for example, when the complainant is assigned rights to a trademark registered by another entity,[3] or when the complainant has a subsidiary relationship with the trademark registrant.[4]

Since the UDRP does not resolve a good faith trademark dispute but intervenes only when there is clear abuse, the respondent’s bad faith is central: a domain name may be confusingly similar or even identical to a trademark, and yet a complainant cannot prevail if the respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name and/or did not register and use the domain name in bad faith.[5] For this reason, the UDRP sets a high standard for the complainant to establish respondent’s bad faith. For example, UDRP provides a defense if the domain name registrant has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name in a bona fide offering of goods or services. On the other hand, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) only provides a defense if there is prior good faith use of the domain name, not simply preparation to use. Another distinction between the UDRP and the ACPA is that the UDRP requires that complainant prove bad faith in both registration and use of the disputed domain to prevail, whereas the ACPA only requires complainant to prove bad faith in either registration or use.

Such a high standard for bad faith indicates that the UDRP is not equipped resolve issues where both parties dispute their respective rights in the trademark. In fact, when abuse is non-existent or not obvious, the UDRP Panel would refuse to transfer the disputed domain name from the respondent to the complainant.[6] Instead, the parties would need to resolve these claims in regular courts under either the ACPA or the Latham act. Limiting itself to addressing cybersquatting allows the UDRP to become extremely efficient in dealing with cybersquatting practices, a widespread and highly damaging abuse of the Internet age. This efficiency and ease of the UDRP process is appreciated by trademark-owning businesses and individuals, who prefer that disputes are handled promptly and economically. From the time of the UDRP’s creation until now, ICANN has not shown intention for reforming the Policy despite existing criticisms,[7] and for good reasons.

 

[Notes]

[1] Gerald M. Levine, Domain Name Arbitration: Trademarks, Domain Names, and Cybersquatting at 102 (2019).

[2] Tasty Baking, Co. & Tastykake Invs., Inc. v. Quality Hosting, FA 208854 (FORUM Dec. 28, 2003) (treating the two complainants as a single entity where both parties held rights in trademarks contained within the disputed domain names.)

[3] Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Golden Beauty / goldendoorsalon, FA 1668748 (FORUM May 7, 2016) (finding rights in the GOLDEN DOOR mark where Complainant provided evidence of assignment of the mark, naming Complainant as assignee); Remithome Corp v. Pupalla, FA 1124302 (FORUM Feb. 21, 2008) (finding the complainant held the trademark rights to the federally registered mark REMITHOME, by virtue of an assignment); Stevenson v. Crossley, FA 1028240 (FORUM Aug. 22, 2007) (“Per the annexed U.S.P.T.O. certificates of registration, assignments and license agreement executed on May 30, 1997, Complainants have shown that they have rights in the MOLD-IN GRAPHIC/MOLD-IN GRAPHICS trademarks, whether as trademark holder, or as a licensee. The Panel concludes that Complainants have established rights to the MOLD-IN GRAPHIC SYSTEMS mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”)

[4] Provide Commerce, Inc v Amador Holdings Corp / Alex Arrocha, FA 1529347 (FORUM Jan. 3, 2014) (finding that the complainant shared rights in a mark through its subsidiary relationship with the trademark holder); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Indian Springs Motor, FA 157289 (FORUM June 23, 2003) (“Complainant has established that it has rights in the TOYOTA and LEXUS marks through TMC’s registration with the USPTO and Complainant’s subsidiary relationship with TMC.”)

[5] Levine, supra note 1, at 99; see e.g., Dr. Alan Y. Chow, d/b/a Optobionics v. janez bobnik, FA2110001967817 (FORUM Nov. 23, 2021) (refusing to transfer the <optobionics.com> domain name despite its being identical to Complainant’s OPTOBIONICS mark and formerly owned by Complainant, since “[t]he Panel finds no evidence in the Complainant’s submissions . . . [that] the Respondent a) does not have a legitimate interest in the domain name and b) registered and used the domain name in bad faith.”).

[6] Swisher International, Inc. v. Hempire State Smoke Shop, FA2106001952939 (FORUM July 27, 2021).

[7] Id. at 359.

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