Business Law

The Introduction of “Buy Now, Pay Later” Products

November 20, 2024
Administrative Law, Agencies, Business Law, Financial Law, Regulatory

Yanan Tang, MJLST Staffer

As of June 2024, it is estimated that more than half of Americans turn to Buy Now, Pay Later (“BNPL”) options to purchase products during financially stressful times. [1] BNPL allows customers to split up the payment of their purchases into four equal payments, requiring a down payment of 25 percent, with the remaining cost covered by three periodic payment installments. [2]

 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Interpretive Rules

In response to the popularity of BNPL products, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) took action to regulate BNPL products.[3] In issuing its interpretive rules for BNPL, the CFPB aims to outline how these products fit within existing credit regulations. The CFPB’s interpretive rules for BNPL products were introduced in May 2024, following a 60-day review period with mixed feedback. The rules became effective in July, aiming to apply credit card-like consumer protections to BNPL services under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).

Specifically, the interpretive rules assert that these BNPL providers meet the criteria for being “card issuers” and “creditors”, and therefore should be subject to relevant regulations of TILA, which govern credit card disputes and refund rights.[4] Under CFPB’s interpretive rules, BNPL firms are required to investigate disputes, refund returned products or voided services, and provide billing statements.[5]

This blog will first explain the distinction between interpretive rules and notice-and-comment rulemaking to contextualize the CFPB’s regulatory approach. It will then explore the key consumer protections these rules aim to enforce and examine the mixed responses from various stakeholders. Finally, it will analyze the Financial Technology Association’s lawsuit challenging the CFPB’s rules and consider the broader implications for BNPL regulation.

 

Interpretive Rules and Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Explained

In general, interpretive rules are non-binding and do not require public input, while notice-and-comment rules are binding with the force of law and must follow a formal process, including public feedback, as outlined in the Administrative Procedural Act (“APA”) §553.[6] The “legal effect test” from American Mining Congress v. MSHA helps determine whether a rule is interpretive or legislative by examining factors like legislative authority, the need for a legal basis for enforcement, and whether the rule amends an existing law.[7] While some courts vary in factors to distinguish legislative and interpretive rules, they generally agree that agencies cannot hide real regulations in interpretive rules.

 

Comments Received from Consumer Groups, Traditional Banks, and BNPL Providers

After soliciting comments, CFPB received conflicting feedback on the proposed interpretive rules.[8] However, they also urged the agency to take further action to protect consumers who use BNPL credit.[9] In addition, traditional banks largely supported the rule, because BNPL’s digital user accounts are similar to those of credit cards and should be regulated similarly.[10] In contrast, major BNPL providers protested against CFPB’s rule.[11] Many BNPL providers, like PayPal, raised concerns about administrative procedures and urged CFPB to proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking.[12] In sum, the conflicting comments highlight the challenge of applying traditional credit regulations to innovative financial products, leading to broader disputes about the rule’s implementation.

 

Financial Technology Association’s Lawsuit against CFPB’s New Rules

After the interpretive rules went into effect in July, FTA filed a lawsuit against the agency to stop the interpretive rule.[13] In their complaint, FTA contends that CFPB bypassed APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking process, despite the significant change imposed by the rule.[14] FTA argues that the agency exceeded statutory authority under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as the act’s definition of “credit card” does not apply to BNPL products.[15] FTA also argues that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to account for the unique structure of BNPL products and their compliance challenges with Regulation Z.[16]

The ongoing case between FTA and CFPB will likely focus on whether CFPB’s rule is a permissible interpretation of existing law or a substantive rule requiring formal rulemaking under APA § 553. This decision should weigh the nature of BNPL products in relation to consumer protections traditionally associated with credit card-like products. In defending the agency’s interpretive rules against FTA, CFPB could consider highlighting the legislative intent of TILA’s flexibility and rationale for using an interpretive rule.

 

Notes

[1] See Block, Inc., More than Half of Americans Turn to Buy Now, Pay Later During Financially Stressful Times (June 26, 2024), https://investors.block.xyz/investor-news/default.aspx.

[2] Id.

[3] See Paige Smith & Paulina Cachero, Buy Now, Pay Later Needs Credit Card-Like Oversight, CFPB Says, Bloomberg Law (May 22, 2024), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/buy-now-pay-later-soon-will-be-treated-more-like-credit-cards.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] 5 U.S.C.A. § 553.

[7] Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 302 U.S. App. D.C. 38, 995 F.2d 1106 (1993).

[8] See Evan Weinberger, CFPB’s ‘Buy Now, Pay Later’ Rule Sparks Conflicting Reactions, Bloomberg Law (Aug. 1, 2024), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpbs-buy-now-pay-later-rule-sparks-conflicting-reactions.

[9] See New York City Dep’t of Consumer & Worker Prot., Comment Letter on Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Use of Digital User Accounts To Access Buy Now, Pay Later Loans, Docket No. CFPB-2024-0017 (Aug. 31, 2024), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/CFPB-2024-0017-0027; see also Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., Comment Letter on Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Use of Digital User Accounts To Access Buy Now, Pay Later Loans, Docket No. CFPB-2024-0017, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2024), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/CFPB-2024-0017-0028.

[10] See Independent Community Bankers of Am., Comment Letter on Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Use of Digital User Accounts To Access Buy Now, Pay Later Loans, Docket No. CFPB-2024-0017 (July 31, 2024), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/CFPB-2024-0017-0023.

[11] See Financial Technology Ass’n, Comment Letter on Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Use of Digital User Accounts To Access Buy Now, Pay Later Loans, Docket No. CFPB-2024-0017 (July 19, 2024). https://www.regulations.gov/comment/CFPB-2024-0017-0038.

[12] See PayPal, Inc., Comment Letter on Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Use of Digital User Accounts To Access Buy Now, Pay Later Loans, Docket No. CFPB-2024-0017 (July 31, 2024). https://www.regulations.gov/comment/CFPB-2024-0017-0025.

[13] See Evan Weinberger, CFPB Buy Now, Pay Later Rule Hit With Fintech Group Lawsuit, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 18, 2024), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpbs-buy-now-pay-later-rule-hit-with-fintech-group-lawsuit.

[14] Complaint, Fin. Tech. Ass’n v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 1:24-cv-02966 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2024).

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

Whistleblowers Reveals…—How Can the Legal System Protect and Encourage Whistleblowing?

April 27, 2023
Agencies, Business Law, Corporate Ethics, Regulatory, Securities Law

Vivian Lin, MJLST Staffer

In July 2022, Twitter’s former head of security, Peiter Zatko, filed a 200+ page complaint with Congress and several federal agencies, disclosing Twitter’s potential major security problems that pose a threat to its users and national security.[1] Though it is still unclear whether  these allegations were confirmed, the disclosure drew significant attention because of data privacy implications and calls for whistleblower protection. Whistleblowers play an important role in detecting major issues in corporations and the government. A 2007 survey reported that in private companies, professional auditors were only able to detect 19% of instances of fraud but whistleblowers were able to expose 43% of incidents.[2]In fact, this recent Twitter scandal, along with Facebook’s online safety scandal in 2021[3] and the famous national security scandal disclosed by Edward Snowden, were all revealed by inside whistleblowers. Without these disclosures, the public may never learn of incidents that involve their personal information and security.

An Overview of the U.S. Whistleblower Protection Regulations

Whistleblower laws aim to protect individuals who report illegal or unethical activities in their workplace or government agency. The primary federal law protecting whistleblowers is the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), passed in 1989. The WPA provides protections for federal employees who report violations such as  gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or dangers to public health or safety.[4]

In addition to the WPA, there are other federal laws that provide industry specific whistleblower protections in private sectors. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in response to the corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s. It requires public companies to establish and maintain internal controls to ensure the accuracy of their financial statements. Whistleblowers who report violations of securities law can receive protection against retaliation, including reinstatement, back pay, and special damages. To further encourage more whistleblowers to come forward with potential securities violations, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank           Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in 2010 which provides incentives and additional protections for whistleblowers. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) established its whistleblower protection program under Dodd-Frank to award qualified whistleblowers for their tips that lead to a successful SEC sanction. Finally, the False Claims Act (FCA) allows individuals to file lawsuits on behalf of the government against entities that have committed fraud against the government. Whistleblowers who report fraud under the FCA can receive a percentage of the amount recovered by the government. In general, these laws give protections for whistleblowers in the private corporate setting, providing anti-retaliation protection and incentives for reporting violations.

Concerns Involved in Whistleblowing and Related Laws

While whistleblower laws in the United States provide important protections for individuals who speak out against illegal or unethical activities, there are still risks associated with whistleblowing. Even with the anti-retaliation provisions, whistleblowers still face retaliation from their employer, such as demotion or termination, and may face difficulties finding new employment in their field. For example, a 2011 report indicated that while the percentage of employees who noticed wrongdoings at their workplaces decreased from the 1992 survey, about one-third of those who called out wrongdoings and were identified as whistleblowers experienced retaliation in the form of threats and/or reprisals.[5]

Besides the fear of retaliation, another concern is the low success rate under the WPA when whistleblowers step up to make a claim. A 2015 research analyzed 151 cases where employees sought protection under the WPA and found that 79% of the cases were found in favor of the federal government.[6] Such a low success rate, in addition to potential retaliation, likely discourages employees from disclosing when they identify wrongdoings at their workplace.

A third problem with the current whistleblowing law is that financial incentives do not work as effectively as expected and might negatively impact corporate governance. From the incentives perspective, bounty hunting might actually discourage whistleblowers when not used well. For example, Dodd-Frank provides monetary rewards for people who report financial fraud that will allow the SEC impose a more than $1 million sanction on the violator, but if an employee discovers a wrongdoing that will not lead to a sanction over $1 million, a study shows that the employee will be less likely to report it timely.[7] From a corporate governance perspective, a potential whistleblower might turn to a regulatory agency for the reward rather than reporting it to the company’s internal compliance program, providing the company with the opportunity to do the right thing.[8]

Potential Changes 

There are several ways in which the current whistleblower regulations can improve. First, to encourage employees to stand up and identify wrongdoings at the workplace, the SEC’s whistleblower protection program should exclude the $1 million threshold requirement for any potential reward. Those who notice illegal behaviors that might not result in a $1 million sanction should also receive a reward if they report the potential risks.[9] Second, to deter retaliation, compensation for retaliation should be proportionate to the severity of the wrongdoing uncovered.[10] Currently, statutes mostly offer backpay, front pay, reinstatement, etc. as compensation for retaliation, while receiving punitive damages beyond that is rare. This mechanism does not recognize the public interest in retaliation cases—the public benefits from the whistleblower’s act while she risks retaliation. Finally, bounty programs might not be the right approach given that many whistleblowers are motivated more by their own moral calling rather than money. Perhaps a robust system ensuring whistleblower’s reports be thoroughly investigated and building stronger protections  from retaliation would work better than bounty programs.

In conclusion, whistleblowers play a crucial role in exposing illegal and unethical activities within organizations and government agencies. While current U.S. whistleblower protection regulations offer some safeguards, there are still shortcomings that may discourage employees from reporting wrongdoings. Improving whistleblower protections against retaliation, expanding rewards to include a wider range of disclosures, and refining the approach to investigations are essential steps to strengthen the system. By ensuring that their disclosures are thoroughly investigated and their lives are not severely impacted, we can encourage more whistleblowers to come forward with useful information which will better protect the public interest and maintain a higher standard of transparency, accountability, and corporate governance in the society.

Notes

[1] Donie O’Sullivan et al., Ex-Twitter Exec Blows The Whistle, Alleging Reckless and Negligent Cybersecurity Policies, CNN (Aug. 24, 2022, 5:59 AM EDT), https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/23/tech/twitter-whistleblower-peiter-zatko-security/index.html.

[2] Kai-D. Bussmann, Economic Crime: People, Culture, and Controls 10 (2007).

[3] Ryan Mac & Cecilia Kang, Whistle-Blower Says Facebook ‘Chooses Profits Over Safety’, N.Y. Times (Oct. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/technology/whistle-blower-facebook-frances-haugen.html.

[4] Whistleblower Protection, Office of Inspector General, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/whistleblower-protection#:~:text=The%20Whistleblower%20Protection%20Act%20 (last accessed: Mar. 5, 2023).

[5] U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Blowing the Whistle: Barriers to Federal Employees Making Disclosures 27 (2011).

[6] Shelley L. Peffer et al., Whistle Where You Work? The Ineffectiveness of the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the Promise of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 35 Review of Public Personnel Administration 70 (2015).

[7] Leslie Berger, et al., Hijacking the Moral Imperative: How Financial Incentives Can Discourage Whistleblower Reporting. 36 AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 1 (2017).

[8] Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd- Frank Act “Bounty Hunting”, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 483.

[9] Geoffrey C. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 73.

[10] David Kwok, The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation, 96 Hastings L.J. 1225.

Who Has to Pay? Major Contractual Elements That Affect Which Party Bears the Cost of Supply Chain Delays and Price Increases in Construction Projects

April 17, 2022
Business Law, Contract Law, COVID-19, Supply Chain

Kristin Thompson, MJLST Staffer

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic there have been supply chain issues occurring around the world, causing constant price increases and delivery delays for construction materials.[1] While there are numerous factors that will affect exactly where the expenses of those delays fall, this article briefly outlines the major contractual elements that will come into play when determining whether the contractor, subcontractor or owner bears the risk. The first question that should be asked when investigating COVID-19 related supply chain issues is, “what does the contract say?” However, my first area of analysis begins when the answer to that question is “we don’t have one yet.”

 

The contract is not yet executed

This is the first major element to be addressed: what point of the contractual process the parties are in. To be clear, once the contract and subcontracts are executed the parties must rely on contract remedies and their pricing structures for relief. However, if the contracts have not yet been executed the contractor and subcontractors still have the potential to push the risk onto the owner or devise an equitable way to share those risks. They can build the supply chain-related price increases and project delay costs into their estimates, putting the owner in the position to either accept the increased cost and timeline or forego the project. During this pre-execution process the contractors will largely either be bidding a cost plus guaranteed maximum price model (“GMP”) or a lump sum model.[2] Here the GMP is ideal as the contractor can build the increased costs into the contingency. The lump sum model will call for an upward adjustment to their estimated total costs to account for the increases, chancing that those estimates will be enough. After adjusting their price model, the contractor and subcontractors can then add contractual language specifically saying that they are allowed time extensions for any and all supply chain delays, define their force majeure clause as inclusive of a pandemic or epidemic, and include change in law provisions that cover mandates issued as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

 

The Contract is Executed

In this case, the parties will need to dive into their contract to see who bears the responsibility for extra costs and find out if they are able to extend their timelines without consequence. Issues relating to extra costs will be almost exclusively determined by whether or not a GMP or lump sum price model was used. Absent provisions stating otherwise, a GMP will allocate the extra costs to the owner up to the guaranteed maximum price as those costs come out of the contingency fee, while a lump sum contract will allocate them to the contractor as the costs will come out of the total bid price.[3] In the latter scenario, the contractor can then hold subcontractors to the price of their contract and make them bear their own price increases which would relieve the contractor from some of the extra cost burden. However, the contractor must keep in mind the reality in which a subcontractor would not be able to bear the extra costs and then either go out of business or refuse to perform. Legal action taken will either be futile if the subcontractor is insolvent, or expensive and time-consuming if they refuse to perform.

The parties then must determine whether or not schedule extensions resulting from supply chain issues are proper. This determination will largely be based on the force majeure clause and change in law provision located in the general conditions.

 

Force Majeure Clause

If the COVID-19 pandemic is found to be included as a force majeure event, the contractor will be allowed a time extension for the extra work relating thereto. Some contracts pre-dating the pandemic already used language relating to a pandemic or epidemic. The most regularly used form contracts, 200AIA.201-017[4] and ConsensusDocs 200[5],include broad force majeure provisions that have been read to include the pandemic.[6] The AIA provides for “other causes beyond contractors control,[7]” and the ConsensusDocs200 for “any cause beyond the control of constructor” and “epidemics.[8]” The specific delays must still be attributed to the pandemic, and proving causation will depend on the amount of proof the suppliers can provide to support that claim. The more challenging situations are those in which the contracts have narrow force majeure clauses or contain catch-all phrases.[9] Interpretation in these cases tend to be dependent on state law and vary widely.[10] If found to not include the pandemic, the contractor will not be guaranteed a time extension for delays and will be held to their original timeline absent other contractual provisions affording them an extension.

 

Changes in Law Provision

The final factor is whether the contract has a change of law provision. If so, executive orders or other changes of law related to the pandemic may allow for time extensions.[11] For instance, a delay in production because a factory producing specified windows had to cut their work force in half to stay in line with federal social distancing mandates would constitute a change in law allowing the contractor an extension while they wait for the windows. ConsensusDOCS 200 currently provides that “the contract price or contract time shall be equitably adjusted by change order for additional costs resulting from any changes in laws…[12]” thus laying out an avenue for relief for those party to a ConsensusDOCS 200 contract. Conversely, the AIA.201-2017 currently does not provide a change in law provision, taking away this option for the large number of contractors that use this form.

In sum, when viewing supply chain delays and expenses in an attempt to ascertain who bears the risk one should look to where the parties are at in their contractual process, the price model being used, the general conditions involved and the breadth of the force majeure and change in law provisions.

 

Notes

[1] Continued Increases In Construction Materials Prices Starting To Drive Up Price Of Construction Projects, As Supply-chain & Labor Woes Continue, The Associated General Contractors of America (November 9, 2021).

[2] Richard S. Reizen, Philip P. Piecuch, & Daniel E. Crowley, Practice Note, Construction Pricing Models – Choosing an Appropriate Pricing Arrangement, Gould + Ratner (2018).

[3] Joseph Clancy, How Do Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) Contracts Work?, Oracle (May 20, 2021).

[4] AIA Document 201-2017.

[5] ConsensusDOCS 200.

[6] Force Majeure Provisions: COVID-19, Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’ National Association (June 3, 2021).

[7] AIA Document 201-2017 § 8.3.1.

[8] ConsensusDOCS 200 § 6.3.1.

[9] Douglas V. Bartman, Force Majeure in Construction and Real Estate Claims, American Bar Association (July 17, 2020).

[10] Id.

[11] Peter Hahn, Enough About Force Majeure! What Other Options Does a Construction Contractor Have for COVID-19 Pandemic Losses?, JDSupra (April 3, 2020).

[12] ConsensusDOCS 200 § 3.21.1

Google Fined for GDPR Non-Compliance, Consumers May Not Like the Price

February 19, 2019
Business Law, Data, Ethics, Privacy, Social Media

Julia Lisi, MJLST Staffer

On January 14th, 2019, France’s Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) fined Google 50 million euros in one of the first enforcement actions taken under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). The GDPR, which took effect in May of 2018, sent many U.S. companies scrambling in attempts to update their privacy policies. You, as a consumer, probably had to re-accept updated privacy policies from your social media accounts, phones, and many other data-based products. Google’s fine makes it the first U.S. tech giant to face GDPR enforcement. While a 50 million euro (roughly 57 million dollars) fine may sound hefty, it is actually relatively small compared to maximum fine allowed under the GDPR, which, for Google, would be roughly five billion dollars.

The French fine clarifies a small portion of the uncertainty surrounding GDPR enforcement. In particular, the French DPA rejected Google’s methods for getting consumers to consent to its  Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. The French DPA took issue with the (1) numerous steps users faced before they could opt out of Google’s data collection, (2) the pre-checked box indicating users’ consent, and (3) the inability of users to consent to individual data processes, instead requiring whole cloth acceptance of both Google’s Privacy Policy and Terms of Service.

The three practices rejected by the French DPA are commonplace in the lives of many consumers. Imagine turning on your new phone for the first time and scrolling through seemingly endless provisions detailing exactly how your daily phone use is tracked and processed by both the phone manufacturer and your cell provider. Imagine if you had to then scroll through the same thing for each major app on your phone. You would have much more control over your digital footprint, but would you spend hours reading each provision of the numerous privacy policies?

Google’s fine could mark the beginning of sweeping changes to the data privacy landscape. What once took a matter of seconds—e.g., checking one box consenting to Terms of Service—could now take hours. If Google’s fine sets a precedent, consumers could face another wave of re-consenting to data use policies, as other companies fall in line with the GDPR’s standards. While data privacy advocates may applaud the fine as the dawn of a new day, it is unclear how the average consumer will react when faced with an in-depth consent process.

A Data Privacy Snapshot: Big Changes, Uncertain Future

February 19, 2019
Business Law, Cyber Security, Data, Internet

Holm Belsheim, MJLST Staffer

When Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar announced her candidacy for the Presidency, she stressed the need for new and improved digital data regulation in the United States. It is perhaps telling that Klobuchar, no stranger to internet legislation, labelled data privacy and net neutrality as cornerstones of her campaign. While data bills have been frequently proposed in Washington, D.C., few members of Congress have been as consistently engaged in this area as Klobuchar. Beyond expressing her longtime commitment to the idea, the announcement may also be a savvy method to tap into recent sentiments. Over the past several years citizens have experienced increasingly intrusive breaches of their information. Target, Experian and other major breaches exposed the information of hundreds of millions of people, including a shocking 773 million records in a recent report. See if you were among them. (Disclaimer: neither I nor MJLST are affiliated with these sites, nor can we guarantee accuracy.)

Data privacy has been big news in recent years. Internationally, Brazil, India and China are have recently put forth new legislation, but the big story was the European Union’s General Data Privacy Regulation, or GDPR, which began enforcement last year. This massive regulatory scheme codifies the European presumption that an individual’s data is not available for business purposes without the individual’s explicit consent, and even then only in certain circumstances. While the scheme has been criticized as both vague and overly broad, one crystal clear element is the seriousness of its enforcement capabilities. Facebook and Google each received large fines soon after the GDPR’s official commencement, and other companies have partially withdrawn from the EU in the face of compliance requirements. No clear challenge has emerged, and it looks like the GDPR is here to stay.

Domestically, the United States has nothing like the GDPR. The existing patchwork of federal and state laws leave much to be desired. Members of Congress propose new laws regularly, most of which then die in committee or are shelved. California has perhaps taken the boldest step in recent years, with its expansive California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) scheduled to begin enforcement in 2020. While different from the GDPR, the CCPA similarly proposes heightened standards for companies to comply with, more remedies and transparency for consumers, and specific enforcement regimes to ensure requirements are met.

The consumer-friendly CCPA has drawn enormous scrutiny and criticism. While evincing modest support, or perhaps just lip service, tech titans like Facebook and Google are none too pleased with the Act’s potential infringement upon their access to Americans’ data. Since 2018, affected companies have lobbied Washington, D.C. for expansive and modernized federal data privacy laws. One common, though less publicized, element in these proposals is an explicit federal preemption provision, which would nullify the CCPA and other state privacy policies. While nothing has yet emerged, this issue isn’t going anywhere soon.

The Music Modernization Act May Limit Big Name Recording Artists’ Leverage in Negotiations With Music Streaming Companies

October 28, 2018
Business Law, Competition, Copyrights, Economics, Economy, Intellectual Property, Property Law

By: Julia Lisi, MJLST Staffer

Encircled by several supportive recording artists, President Trump signed the Music Modernization Act (“MMA”) into law on October 11, 2018. Supporters laud the MMA as a long overdue update for U.S. copyright law. Federal law governs roughly 75% of recording artists’ compensation, according to some estimates. The federal regulatory scheme for music license fees dates back to 1909, before the advent of music streaming. Though the scheme has been tweaked since 1909, the MMA marks a major regulatory shift to accommodate the large market for music streaming services like Spotify and Apple Music.

Prior to the MMA, streaming services virtually had two options for acquiring music catalogs: (1) either acquire licenses for each individual song or, (2) provide music without licenses and prepare for infringement suits. Apple Music adopted the first strategy and as a result initially suffered from a much leaner music catalog. Spotify went with the second strategy, setting aside funds to weather litigation.

The MMA offers a preexisting mechanism, the mechanical license, on a broader scale. Once the MMA takes full effect, streaming services can receive blanket licenses to entire catalogs of music, all in one transaction. The MMA establishes the Mechanical Licensing Collective (the “Collective”), a board of industry participants, which will set license prices. The MMA is, in part, meant to ensure that more participants in the music industry will be paid for their work. For example, music producers and engineers can expect to receive more compensation under the MMA.

While the MMA may broaden the pool of industry participants who get compensation from streaming, the MMA could weaken big name artists’ bargaining positions with streaming services. Recording artists like Taylor Swift and Adele have struggled to keep their albums off streaming services like Spotify. Swift resisted music streaming based on her conviction that streaming services did not fairly compensate artists, writers, and producers. While Swift may have come to an agreement with Spotify and allowed her albums to be streamed, there are still holdouts. More than two years after its release, Beyoncé’s Lemonade still is not on Spotify.

With the Collective controlling royalty rates, big name artists might not have the holdout power that they wield now. If Swift’s music had been lumped into a collective mechanical license, she may not have had the authority to withdraw or withhold her albums from streaming services. The MMA’s mechanical licenses are compulsory, indicating the lower level of control copyright owners may have. Despite this potential loss of leverage, the MMA is widely supported by artists and industry executives alike. Only time will tell whether the Collective’s set prices will make compensation within the music industry fairer, as proponents suggest.

Judicial Interpretation of Emojis and Emoticons

March 2, 2018
Business Law, New Technology, Social Media

Kirk Johnson, MJLST Staffer

 

In 2016, the original 176 emojis created by Shigetaka Kurita were enshrined in New York’s Museum of Modern Art as just that: art. Today, a smartphone contains approximately 2,000 icons that many use as a communication tool. New communicative tools present new problems for users and the courts alike; when the recipient of a message including an icon interprets the icon differently than the sender, how should a court view that icon? How does it affect the actus reus or mens rea of a crime? While a court has a myriad of tools that they use to decipher the meaning of new communicative tools, the lack of a universal understanding of these icons has created interesting social and legal consequences.

The first of many problems with the use of an emoji is that there is general disagreement on what the actual icon means. Take this emoji for example: 🙏. In a recent interview by the Wall Street Journal, people aged 10-87 were asked what this symbol meant. Responses varied from hands clapping to praying. The actual title of the emoji is “Person with Folded Hands.”

Secondly, the icons can change over time. Consider the update of the Apple iOS from 9 to 10; many complained that this emoji, 💁, lost its “sass.” It is unclear whether the emoji was intended to have “sass” to begin with, especially since the title of the icon is “Information Desk Person.”

Finally, actual icons vary from device to device. In some instances, when an Apple iPhone user sends a message to an Android phone user, the icon that appears on the recipient’s screen is completely different than what the sender intended. When Apple moved from iOS 9 to iOS 10, they significantly altered their pistol emoji. While an Android user would see something akin to this 🔫, an iPhone user sees a water pistol. Sometimes, an equivalent icon is not present on the recipient’s device and the only thing that appears on their screen is a black box.

Text messages and emails are extremely common pieces of evidence in a wide variety of cases, from sexual harassment litigation to contract disputes. Recently, the Ohio Court of Appeals was called upon to determine whether the text message “come over” with a “winky-face emoji” was adequate evidence to prove infidelity. State v. Shepherd, 81 N.E.3d 1011, 1020 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). A Michigan sexual harassment attorney’s client was convinced that an emoji that looked like a horse followed by an icon resembling a muffin meant “stud muffin,” which the client interpreted as an unwelcome advance from a coworker. Luckily, messages consisting entirely of icons rarely determine the outcome of a case on their own; in the sexual harassment arena, a single advance from an emoji message would not be sufficient to make a case.

However, the implications are much more dangerous in the world of contracts. According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1981),

(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and

(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the other; or

(b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the meaning attached by the other.

(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with the meaning attached to them by one of the parties if

(a) that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knows the meaning attached by the first party; or

(b) that party has no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other has reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.

 

Adhering to this standard with emojis would produce varied and unexpected results. For example, if Adam sent Bob a message “I’ll give you $5 to mow my lawn 😉,” would Bob be free to accept the offer? Would the answer be different if Adam used the 😘 emoji instead of the 😉 emoji? What if Bob received a black box instead of any emoji at all? Conversely, if Adam sent Bob the message without an emoji and Bob replied to Adam “Sure 😉,” should Adam be able to rely upon Bob’s message as acceptance? In 2014, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the emoticon “:P” denoted sarcasm and that the text prior to the message should be interpreted with sarcasm. Does this extend to the emoji 😜😝, and 😛, titled “Face with Stuck-Out Tongue And Winking Eye,” “Face With Stuck-Out Tongue And Tightly-Closed Eyes,” and “Face With Stuck-Out Tongue” respectively?

In a recent case in Israel, a judge ruled that the message “✌👯💃🍾🐿☄” constituted acceptance of a rental contract. While the United States does have differing standards for the laws of contracts, it seems that a judge could find that to be acceptance under the Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 20(2). Eric Goldman at the Santa Clara University School of Law hypothesizes that an emoji dictionary might help alleviate this issue. While a new Black’s Emoji Law Dictionary may seem unnecessary to many, without some sort of action it will be the courts deciding what the meaning of an emoji truly is. In a day where courts rule that a jury is entitled to actually see the emoji rather than have a description read to them, we can’t ignore the reality that action is necessary.

Acquisitions of Our Lives

November 22, 2017
Antitrust, Business Law

Zachary Currie, MJLST Staffer

 

Growing up, my mother was an avid consumer of soap operas, which aired during the daily drought of day-time television. I never watched any soap opera closely, but I occasionally stopped in the living room while one was on and caught a glimpse of the whirling melodrama—after all, the characters were beautiful, handsome, and belonged to a realm of luxury far removed from my paltry existence. The story was always the same; it was always about banal, dynastic feuding, resulting in predictable and outrageous tragedies. But never once did I think that the content of a soap opera was accurate, not in the sense of being based on a true story, but in the sense of being as realistic as a story written by Ernest Hemingway about fishing for marlin in the Gulf Stream. My perception of the quality of soap opera writing changed when I was introduced to the melodramatic world of telecommunication corporations, their acquisitions, and anti-trust law, through its latest garish episode: AT&T’s bid for Time Warner.

 

The latest episode of this soap opera involves players as glamorous, foolish, rich, and powerful as any soap opera cast. A takeover of Time Warner by AT&T would create America’s sixth largest firm by pre-tax profits; the Department of Justice has expressed its disapproval of the star-crossed lovers’ plans to elope. Some important socialites in ermine fur have hinted, with winks, that DoJ is motivated by the Donald’s hatred for CNN, a channel owned by Time Warner. Others belonging to the grapevine scoff at the match, deriding it as unsophisticated and gauche; after all, the marriage will cost over a $100 billion, return on capital is egregiously low, and attempting to increase returns by forcing Time Warner content on AT&T consumers would irritate the ever-watchful and puritanical anti-trust regulators.

So, the plot thickens: is the corporate tryst motivated by an intent to commit some dirty illegality? Well, the DoJ was suspicious and nosy enough to file a suit seeking to block the acquisition. The suit claims that after the acquisition, AT&T would be situated to force rivals to pay hundreds of millions of dollars more per year for Time Warner content, and the new formidable couple would dampen technological innovation. But is the DoJ being disingenuous? Perhaps it is motivated more by priggishness, or, maybe, political vengeance, than a concern to foster competition. Remember, this acquisition is vertical integration rather than horizontal integration; there can be good, healthy reasons for vertical integration. One way in which vertical integration can be efficient is through gaining economies of scale, when average total cost decreases with increasing output; surplus from gaining economies of scale may outweigh social costs caused by imperfect competition. Another advantage of vertical integration is the correction of market governance failures: integration allows firms to internalize the costs that arise from strategic and opportunistic behavior. Has the DoJ seriously considered all the consequences of acquisition? One anonymous attorney general claimed that the DoJ has not been forthcoming with any economic analysis helpful to decide whether to sue. Stay tuned to see the end of this Great American Corporate Love Story. Other juicy details include AT&T’s use of one of Trump’s former lawyers and Trump’s tweets about CNN (including an edited wrestling video showing Trump punching a man whose head is replaced by the CNN logo) for litigation.

Policy Proposals for High Frequency Trading

April 21, 2016
Business Law, Competition, Economics, Securities Law

Steven Graziano, MJLST Staffer

In his article, The Law and Ethics of High Frequency Trading, which was published in the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science, and Technology Issue 17, Volume 1, Steven McNamara examines the ethics of high frequency trading. High frequency trading is the use of high-speed algorithms to take advantage of minor inefficiencies in trading technologies, and in doing so gain large market returns. McNamara looks into ethical, economic, and legal aspects of high frequency trading. In the course of his discussion McNamara determines that: high frequency trading is a term that actually describes an assortment of different practices; the amount of dollars involved in high frequency trading is declining, but is still a concern for certain types of investors and regulators; a proper analysis of high frequency trading requires use of expectation-based, deontological moral theory; and that modern technology may call into question the use of the Regulation National Market System regime. McNamara concludes that even though high frequency trading may lower costs to most investors, many practices associated with high frequency trading support the position that high frequency trading is not fair.

Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Mary Jo White has recently commented on the legality, and potential ways to approach, high frequency trading. White, while testifying before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, informed the Congressional Committee that “You don’t paint with the broad brush all high-frequency traders — they have very different strategies.” This sentiment mirrors McNamara’s assertion that the term high-frequency trading actually involves various practices. However, White is seemingly defending some practices, while McNamara has a more negative view.

Differing still from these two views are the results of a study done by United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority. That study concluded with the conclusion that high-frequency trade technologies are not rapidly predicting marketable orders and then trading those orders. However, the study examined practices in Europe, which has less market participants and a slower moving market than the United States.

In conclusion, Steven McNamara offers a very insightful, encompassing look at high frequency trading. His analysis resonates through both White’s testimony, and in the results of the study from the Financial Conduct Authority. Although all three perspectives seemingly stand for somewhat different propositions, what is clear from all three sources is that the practice of high-frequency trading is extremely complex and requires in-depth analysis before making any conclusive policy decisions.

Long-Term Success of Autonomous Vehicles Depends on Its First-Generation Market Share

January 25, 2016
Autonomous Vehicles, Business Law, Competition

Vinita Banthia, MJLST Articles Editor

In its latest technology anticipations, society eagerly awaits a functional autonomous car. However, despite the current hype, whether or not these cars will be ultimately successful remains a question. While autonomous cars promise to deliver improved safety standards, lower environmental impacts, and greater efficiency, their market success will depend on how practical the first generation of autonomous vehicles are, and how fast they are adopted by a significantly large portion of the population. Because their usability and practicality depends inherently on how many people are using them, it will be important for companies to time their first release for when they are sufficiently developed and can infiltrate the market quickly. Dorothy J. Glancy provides a detailed account of the legal questions surrounding autonomous cars in Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars Oh My! First Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem. This blog post responds to Glancy’s article and suggests additional safety and regulation concerns that Glancy’s article does not explicitly discuss. Finally, this post proposes certain characteristics which must be true of the first generation of autonomous vehicles if autonomous vehicles are to catch-on.

Glancy thoroughly covers the expected benefits of autonomous cars. Autonomous cars will allow persons who are not otherwise able to drive, such as visually impaired people, and the elderly, to get around conveniently. All riders will be able to save time by doing other activities such as reading or browsing the internet during their commute. And in the long run, autonomous vehicles will allow roads and parking lots to be smaller and more compact because of the cars’ more precise maneuvering abilities. Once enough autonomous vehicles are on the road, they will be able to travel faster than traditional cars and better detect and react to dangers in their surroundings. This will decidedly lead to fewer crashes.

On the contrary, several other features may discourage the use of autonomous vehicles. First, because of the mapping systems, the cars will likely be restricted to one geographic region. Second, they might be programmed to save the most number of people during a car crash, even if that means killing the occupant. Therefore, many prospective buyers may not buy a car that is programmed to kill him or her in the event of an inevitable crash. In addition, initial autonomous cars may not be as fast as imagined, depending on whether they can detect faster moving lanes, frequently change lanes, and adapt to changing speed limits. Until there are significant numbers of autonomous cars on roads, they may not be able to drive on longer, crowded roads such as highways, because vehicles will need to interact with each other in order to avoid crashes. Some argue that other car-service provides will suffer as taxis, Ubers, busses, and trails become less relevant. However, this change will be gradual because people will long continue to rely on these services as cheap alternatives to car-ownership.

When these cars are available, in order to promote autonomous cars to enter the market rapidly, manufacturers should make the cars most attractive to potential buyers, instead of making them good for society as a whole. For example, instead of programming the car to injure its own occupants, it should be programmed to protect its occupants. This will encourage sales of autonomous cars, reducing the number of car crashes in the long run.

Glancy also states that the first generation of autonomous vehicles will be governed by the same state laws that apply for conventional vehicles, and will not have additional rules of their own. However, this is unlikely to be true, and specific state and possibly even federal laws will most likely affect autonomous vehicles before they may be driven on public roads and sold to private individuals. Because autonomous cars will co-exist with traditional vehicles, many of these laws will address the interaction between autonomous and conventional cars, such as overtaking, changing lanes, and respecting lane restrictions.

In the end, the success of autonomous cars depends widely on how practical the first fleet is, how many people buy into the idea and how fast, as well as the car’s cost. If they are successful, there will be legal and non-legal benefits and consequences, which will only be fully realized after a few decades of operation of the cars.

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