Constitutional Law

Are Trademark’s a Medium for Free Speech?: Federal Circuit Considers Whether Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Violates the First Amendment

Michael Laird, MJLST Staffer

The Federal Circuit recently heard arguments en banc in a case considering the relationship between intellectual property regimes, specifically trademark law, and freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The long-term rule comes from the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—the predecessor to the Federal Circuit—in the case In re McGinley. 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981). There, the court held: “with respect to appellant’s First Amendment rights, it is clear that PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark [as a trademark] does not affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed.” Id. at 484. Under that traditional rule, trademark law was held consistent with the first amendment because an applicant is still permitted to use a mark, whether or not it is trademark eligible. However, that precedent may be at risk.

On Friday, October 3, the Federal Circuit heard arguments for In re Tam on the question of whether § 2(a) of the Lanham Act is consistent with the right of free speech. Section 2(a) bars trademark eligibility for a mark that “consists of or comprises of immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 28 U.S.C. § 1052(a). In Tam, § 2(a) was the basis for denying trademark registration for “The Slants”, the name of an Asian-American band because of its disparagement of those of Asian descent.

The court appeared to latch on to concerns that the logic of McGinley would be applicable in the copyright regime since rejection of a copyright would also not inhibit the applicant’s right to use that material. The court asked: “would [it] be constitutional and not a first amendment violation if Congress enacted a statute that said, ‘we’re going to regulate Copyrights and not allow copyright registration to issue to scandalous, immoral, or disparaging copyrights?’” Recording of Oral Arguments, In re Tam, No. 2014-1203 at 39:13 (Fed. Cir. October 2, 2015). The Government conceded, and Court appeared to agree that Congress could not bar disparaging art from copyright registration, as it does with trademarks. See id. at 39:33.

If a work cannot be denied copyright registration because the government concludes the work is disparaging, then some distinction between a copyright and trademark must exist for the government to reject a trademark on that basis. The Government was mostly unsuccessful in providing a means to distinguish the two regimes. The court, however, discussed a few possibilities.

First, the nature of speech in copyrighted material differs from the marks which are eligible for trademark protection. Copyrightable material may involve fundamental political speech and other private speech, which is protected under a heightened scrutiny by the first amendment. Id. at 41:30. Conversely, trademarks, as a means to associate the producer of goods and a brand or logo, constitutes commercial speech.

Second, as one judge stated: “the distinction that could be made is that in copyright, if the government has these limitations it’s so coercive that it essentially…prevents you from [certain] speech. Whereas the trademark realm, although it takes away some benefits of federal registration…it’s not so coercive that the restriction is a burden on free speech.” Id. at 44:30. This argument relates to McGinley, since independent of whether a trademark is granted or denied, the mark owner has the right to use his or her mark in public. In the copyright realm however, the logic of McGinley fails because the denial of a copyright might actually chill speech because of the risk that it will be misappropriated by someone else.

Third, the court differentiated the purpose of the copyright and trademark regimes: “isn’t a copyright a forum for the expression of the arts…whereas a trademark goes to the very heart of stability in the marketplace?” Id. at 5:23. Like a distinction between the nature of a trademark and copyright, the purpose of the systems diverge. Copyright is inherently protective of speech generally. Yet, most trademarks do not concern traditional speech, but protecting an association between the producer of a good and a brand or other mark.

Whether any argument will persuade the court that trademark law is distinct from copyright in some way that permits a disparagement bar to trademark registration remains to be seen. Notably, the court need not resolve the issue, if it were to determine that § 2(a) should be upheld or rejected based on the whether a trademark constitutes private, public, or commercial speech. Either way, the implications of the court’s ruling could impact another major ongoing disparagement case concerning the Washington Redskins’ trademark which is being appealed in the Fourth Circuit. If you are interested in listening to the argument in full, you can find a copy here.


Digital Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles

Steven Groschen, MJLST Managing Editor

The introduction of autonomous vehicles is likely to have a widespread effect on laws related to road travel. Theoretically, a well-functioning driverless car will never speed or run a red light. Thus, driverless cars are less likely to be pulled over. But what if an autonomous vehicle is pulled over and the officer wishes to perform a search of the automated system? Clues to how a court might handle this scenario are contained in Riley v. California.

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014), explored the amount of protection digital content residing on an electronic device receives from unreasonable searches and seizures during a lawful arrest. The Supreme Court examined two independent fact patterns involving police officers searching an arrestee’s cellphone without a warrant. In the first fact pattern, an officer seized an individual’s cellphone in the course of an arrest and proceeded to electronically search through the contact list and pictures on the device. This search yielded evidence of gang related activity which was later used to convict the individual. In the second fact pattern, a police officer searched the phone of an individual, whom was also under arrest, and located a contact entry titled “my house.” The police used the phone number in the contact entry to discover the arrestee’s address. This information and a few other pieces of evidence taken from the phone helped the police secure a warrant to search the arrestee’s home.

The Riley decision made two holdings potentially relevant to autonomous cars. First, the court held that during a lawful arrest a warrant is generally required before searching the digital content on a cellphone. Second, the court suggested this protection is for the digital content and not necessarily the cellphone itself. These holdings can be interpreted as providing protection for digital content contained within automated driving systems. As a result, a plausible argument exists that, in the future, an officer will need a warrant before searching the digital content of an autonomous vehicle.

Predicting with any level of certainty how a court will handle digital content on an autonomous vehicle is difficult. Nonetheless, the discussion is important because autonomous vehicles are likely to become ubiquitous on the roadways in the next few decades. These vehicles will contain sensitive information such as route history and a log of the car’s actions. It is important to continue debating what privacy rights owners can and should expect regarding their future cars.

For an in-depth look at Riley and its implications for digital content contained in autonomous vehicles, see Sarah Aue Palodichuk’s article entitled “Driving into the Digital Age: How SDVs Will Change the Law and Its Enforcement.”


Fourth Circuit Revives Circuit Split Over Cell Site Data

Mickey Stevens, MJLST Note & Comment Editor

In August, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit revived the dispute over whether the use of historical cell site location data constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, and whether obtaining that cell site data requires a warrant. That court’s decision in United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2015 WL 4637931 (4th Cir. 2015), now conflicts with the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits on how to treat the use of cell site data in criminal investigations.

A September 2014 MJLST blog post discussed the then-existing circuit split between the Eleventh Circuit holding that a warrant was required to obtain cell site data and the Fifth and Third Circuits holding that a warrant was not necessary to do so. Since the time of that post, the legal landscape regarding cell site data has undergone significant changes.

First, the Eleventh Circuit vacated their initial decision in United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), and granted a rehearing. Upon rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit came to the exact opposite conclusion, holding that the government did not conduct a “search” by obtaining cell site data, and that no warrant was necessary even if that conduct did constitute a search. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015). The Eleventh Circuit’s decision upon rehearing agreed with previous decisions from the Third and Fifth Circuits and eliminated the circuit split that was created by the initial decision.

Then, the Fourth Circuit decided Graham. The Graham opinion closely mirrors the Eleventh Circuit’s initial Davis decision, holding that the government conducts a “search” when it obtains and inspects cell site data and that a warrant is necessary to obtain cell site data. The court reasoned that the third-party doctrine, which says that information provided to third-parties such as cell phone service providers is no longer protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy, should not be applied to cell site data because cell phone users do not voluntarily share their location. This is the same approach that the initial Davis court took, thus renewing the debate over how to apply this doctrine to modern cell site data.

In July, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court of the United States asking for review of the Eleventh Circuit’s rehearing decision in Davis. The Eleventh Circuit’s own flip-flopping on these issues, combined with Graham’s revival of a circuit split, provides good reason for the Supreme Court to resolve these open questions regarding the gathering and use of cell site data in criminal investigations.