Criminal Law

21st Century Problem: Authentication of Prisoner Facebook Status Updates

by Eric Maloney, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Thumbnail-Eric-Maloney.jpgFacebook has become a part of everyday life for people around the world. According to Mark Zuckerberg and Co., over one billion people (yes, with a “B”) are active on Facebook every month, with an average of more than 600 million active users every day in December 2012. Disregarding bogus or duplicate accounts, that means roughly one-seventh of the entire human population is active on Facebook every month (with the world population currently sitting somewhere in the neighborhood of seven billion people).

Apparently, Facebook has become so commonplace and ingrained in the daily routine of some that they feel the need to use the social networking service from the privacy of their prison cells.

A Harlem gang member named Devin Parsons has decided to cooperate with the government against fellow members of his gang, and is currently incarcerated while trial is pending. Instead of having the usual prison contraband smuggled in, he obtained a mobile phone and used it to post Facebook status updates under an assumed name. According to Trial Judge William H. Pauley III:

In some posts, Parsons reflected on his life in jail:

“everybody wanna live but don’t wanna die”;
“Life is crazy thay only miss yu ifyu dead or in jail”; and
“G.o.n.e”

In others, Parsons posted about his cooperation:

“I’m not tellin on nobody from HARLEM but I can give up some bx n****s that got bodys”; and
“be home sooner then yaH hereing 101[.]”

While not exactly “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” Parsons was surprisingly bold about disclosing the fact of his cooperation and about the risk of getting caught with a banned cell phone by the prison administration. The gang against which Parsons is testifying is charged with multiple counts of narcotics trafficking and murder, among other things.

One of the defendants in the case, Melvin Colon, sought to compel the disclosure of these postings under the Brady rule, which requires the government to release evidence to the defense before trial if the evidence is favorable to the defendant. Judge Pauley held that the government was not obligated to turn these postings over to Colon; for various reasons, the government was never in actual possession of the Facebook statuses and therefore had no duty to disclose under Brady.

This case highlights the continually growing relevance that Facebook and other social media data has in legal proceedings. In fact, this is not even the first ruling about Facebook in this case; the defendant Colon had earlier moved to suppress his own Facebook postings which the prosecution sought to introduce. Judge Pauley denied this motion as well, holding that Colon’s sharing of the postings with his Facebook “friends” meant he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in them.

A background issue in this case was the idea of authenticity of the Facebook poster; because Parsons was posting under a fake name, both sides were unaware of his conduct until after the account had already been deactivated. While not contested here, ensuring that the Facebook information originated from the user is an increasingly important evidentiary consideration as more and more of this data is used in both civil and criminal contexts.

Professor Ira P. Robbins laid out a possible framework for authenticating social networking evidence in his Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology article “Writings on the Wall: The Need for an Authorship-Centric Approach to the Authentication of Social-Networking Evidence.” While voicing significant concerns about the current lack of a required nexus between the online content and its real-life poster, he proposed detailed admissions criteria for social network postings. He offered several factors to be examined by judges in making rulings about such data, including who owns the account, how secure the account is, and how / when the post in question was created.

As Facebook and other social networking information becomes increasingly important to the outcomes of legal cases, a framework like this is essential to bring our procedures in line with the nature of 21st century evidence and to ensure our system continues to meet Due Process standards. Digital evidence is largely unexplored territory for jurists and scholars alike, and it’s my hope that evidentiary standards like those proposed by Professor Robbins are seriously considered by the legal community.


Chimeras in DNA Forensic Testing: What to Do?

by Ryan J. Connell, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Thumbnail-Ryan-Connell.jpgThe answer as suggested in an essay titled Chimeric Criminals by David H. Kaye in the current issue of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology is not to worry about it too much.

The article criticizes the book Genetic Justice: DNA Databanks, Criminal Investigations, and Civil Liberties by Sheldon Krimsky and Tania Simoncelli. The book has latched on to a particular genetic anomaly referred to as chimerism. Chimerism denotes the presence of two genetically distinct cell lines in the human body. The authors of Genetic Justice want to use this rare condition to show that the supposed assumption that DNA profiling is infallible is incorrect.

Think for a moment about what DNA evidence has done in criminal law. Do not just think of the convictions, but think of the acquittals, and think of those freed from incarceration by innocence projects around the country that can be attributed to the use of DNA evidence. To call DNA evidence into question over such a rare and insignificant condition such a chimerism stretches the confines of reasonableness. Genetic Justice proffers that there is a 1/2400, 1/10, 1/8, and 1/1 incidence of chimerism. Other estimates are no better. A 2010 article in the Globe and Mail entitled “The Dark Side of DNA” called DNA evidence into question and offered that chimerism may be present in anywhere from a tiny population to ten percent of the population. If an entire science is going to be called into question some better statistics might be advisable first.

This book and other sources, such as “Expert evidence: the genetic chimerism and its implications for the world of law” by Daniel Bezerra Bevenuto assume that if genetic evidence is gathered and then does not match the defendant’s DNA that the courts and lawyers will simply dismiss the case. I think courts can handle whatever problems chimerism presents. If DNA is recovered at a crime scene and identifies person X and said person is chimeric and the reference sample he provides doesn’t match the sample recovered at the crime scene the court will rightly be concerned. The natural and simple remedy to this solution is just to test again. Normally chimeric cells are isolated so a second reference sample taken from the suspect should resolve the anomaly.

Chimerism does not preset the problem that the authors of Genetic Justice suggest. It is a rare occurrence that a DNA sample recovered at a crime scene doesn’t match the DNA of the suspect it identifies. And even in those rare circumstances where the DNA doesn’t match it is an easy fix. For a more detailed analysis of this issue please read the article by David H. Kaye in the Minnesota Journal of Law Science and Technology.

The full issue of MJLST in which David Kaye’s article appears can be found here.