Elections

Will Moody v. NetChoice, LLC End Social Media?

Aidan Vogelson, MJLST Staffer

At first, the concept that social media’s days may be numbered seems outlandish. Billions of people utilize social media every day and, historically, social media companies and other internet services have enjoyed virtually unfettered editorial control over how they manage their services. This freedom stems from 47 U.S.C. § 230.[1] § 230 withholds liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected…”[2]  In other words, if someone makes an obscene post on Facebook and Facebook removes the post, Facebook cannot be held liable for any violation of protected speech. § 230 has long allowed social media companies to self-regulate by removing posts that violate their terms of service, but on September 29, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, a case that may fundamentally change how social media companies operate by allowing the government at the state or federal level to regulate around their § 230 protections.

At issue in Moody is whether the methods social media companies use to moderate their content are permissible under the First Amendment and whether social media companies may be classified as common carriers.[3] Common carriers are services which hold themselves open to the public and transport people or goods.[4] While the term “common carrier” once referred only to public transportation services like railroads and airlines, the definition now encompasses communications services such as radio and telephone companies.[5] Common carriers are subjected to greater regulations, including anti-discrimination regulations, due to their market domination of a necessary public service.[6]  For example, given our reliance on airlines and telephone companies in performing necessary services, common carrier regulations ensure that an airline cannot decline to sell tickets to passengers because of their religious beliefs and a cellular network cannot bar service to customers because it disapproves of the content of their phone conversations. If social media companies are held to be common carriers, the federal government and the state governments could impose regulations on what content those companies restrict.

Moody stems from state efforts to do just that. The Florida legislature passed State Bill 7072 to curtail what it saw as social media censorship of conservative voices.[7] The Florida law allows for significant fines against social media companies that demonstrate “unfair censorship” or “deplatform” political candidates, like X (formerly Twitter) did when it removed former President Trump from its platform for falsely claiming that the 2020 election was stolen.[8] Florida is not the only state to pursue a common carrier designation for social media. Texas passed a similar law in 2021 (which is currently enjoined by NetChoice, LLC  v. Paxton and will be addressed alongside Moody) and the attorney general of Ohio has sued Google, seeking for the court to declare that Google is a common carrier to prevent the company from prioritizing its own products in search results.[9] Ohio v. Google LLC is ongoing, and while the judge partially granted Google’s motion to dismiss, he found that Ohio’s claim that Google is a common carrier is cognizable.[10] Given the increasing propensity with which states are attempting to regulate social media, the Supreme Court’s ruling is necessary to settle this vital issue.

Supporters of classifying social media companies as common carriers argue that social media is simply the most recent advancement in communication and should accordingly be designated a common carrier, just as telephone operators and cellular networks are. They explain that designating social media companies as common carriers is actually consistent with the broad protections of § 230, as regulating speech on a social media site regulates the speech of users, not the speech of the company.[11]

However, they ignore that social media companies rely on First Amendment and § 230 protections when they curate the content on their sites. Without the ability to promote or suppress posts and users, these companies would not be able to provide the personalized content that attracts users, and social media would likely become an even greater hotbed of misinformation and hate speech than it already is. The purpose of § 230 is to encourage the development of a thriving online community, which is why Congress chose to shield internet services from liability for content. Treating social media companies as common carriers would stifle that aim.

It is unclear how the Court will rule. In his concurrence in Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., Justice Thomas indicated he may be willing to consider social media companies as common carriers.[12] The other justices have yet to write or comment on this issue, but whatever their decision may be, the ramifications of this case will be significant. The conservative politicians behind the Florida and Texas laws have specifically decried what they argue is partisan censorship of conservative views about the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2020 election, yet these very complaints demonstrate the need for social media companies to exercise editorial control over their content. Covid-19 misinformation unquestionably led to unnecessary deaths from the Covid-19 pandemic.[13] Misinformation about the 2020 election led to a violent attempted overthrow of our government. These threats of violence and dangerous misinformation are the harms that Congress created § 230 to avoid. Without the ability for social media companies to curate content, social media will assuredly contain more racism, misinformation, and calls for violence. Few would argue given the omnipresence of social media in our modern world, our reliance on it for communication, and the misinformation it spreads that social media does not need some form of regulation, but if the Court allows the Florida and Texas laws implicated in Moody and NetChoice to stand, they will be paving the way for a patchwork quilt of laws in every state which may render social media unworkable

Notes

[1] See 47 U.S.C. § 230.

[2] 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2)(A).

[3] Moody v. Netchoice, LLC, SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/moody-v-netchoice-llc/.

[4] Alison Frankel, Are Internet Companies ‘Common Carriers’ of Content? Courts Diverge on Key Question, REUTERS, (May 31, 2022, 5:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/are-internet-companies-common-carriers-content-courts-diverge-key-question-2022-05-31/.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] David Savage, Supreme Court Will Decide if Texas and Florida Can Regulate Social Media to Protect ‘Conservative Speech’, LA TIMES (Sept. 29, 2023, 8:33 AM), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/supreme-court-will-decide-if-texas-and-florida-can-regulate-social-media-to-protect-conservative-speech/ar-AA1hrE2s.

[8] Id.

[9] AG Yost Files Landmark Lawsuit to Declare Google a Public Utility, OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE (June 8, 2021), https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/June-2021/AG-Yost-Files-Landmark-Lawsuit-to-Declare-Google-a.

[10] Ohio v. Google LLC, No. 21-CV-H-06-0274 (Ohio Misc. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/gdpzyeakzvw/frankel-socialmediacommoncarrier–ohioruling.pdf.

[11] John Villasenor, Social Media Companies and Common Carrier Status: A Primer, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 27, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/social-media-companies-and-common-carrier-status-a-primer/.

[12] Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021),  https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/20-197.

[13] Alistair Coleman, ’Hundreds Dead’ Because of Covid-19 Misinformation, BBC (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-53755067.


Elections? There’s an App for That.

Jacob Hauschild, MJLST Staffer

Clay Aiken won. We true believers don’t care what FOX had to say about it. When the phone systems were allegedly logjammed on that 2003 day, millions of American Idolaters had their faith in the democratic vote shattered. As one author wrote, “Technology is thwarting democracy. . .”

Yet, even as our democracy has been so thwarted by encroaching technology, one Washington district believes there Ain’t No Need to Worry. Instead of protecting voters from technology’s perils, the King Conservation District of Washington is embracing technology in the democratic process, allowing roughly 1.2 million Seattle area voters to vote online, via a smartphone, tablet, or computer, in an election for a board of supervisor position. Last year, the King Conservation District had only a 0.2% participation rate in its Board of Supervisors’ election. By allowing voters to vote this year from their couches, administrators hope more residents will participate, strengthening the district’s democratic capacity.

Of course, such an expansion to voter accessibility is no laughing matter. On one hand, voter turnout in the United States is concerningly low. Of no help are the 24 states who have introduced heightened voting restrictions over the last decade. On the other hand, these kinds of restrictions are, in theory, meant to make our elections more secure, as recent elections have quite notoriously resulted in claims of voter fraud and international interference. And experts have major concerns about the effects of online voting, which include challenges in voter authentication, risks to ballots in transit (i.e. ballots that are manipulated while transferred between the voter and the election office), and the threat of malware infiltrating electoral systems.

Online voting advocates are responsive to these issues. Many believe that blockchain, the technology behind bitcoin, may be the magic key to these security concerns. Others are far more cautious. Plus, in addition to security risks, there is the ever-present possibility that the voting technology fails to function as expected. For its part, the King Conservation District is utilizing a mobile voting platform through Democracy Live, which has FedRAMP certification, providing a government standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and monitoring of cloud services.

For now, other voting districts aren’t exactly lining up to make similar changes to voting accessibility. Washington Secretary of State Kim Wyman recently indicated after consultation with cyber experts from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security that “electronic transmission [is] far too risky for voting and could leave voter information and election infrastructure impaired.” Even Julie King, the Elections Director for King County itself, announced that mobile voting is “not technology [she’ll] be rolling out for King County in upcoming elections.”

Will this technology grow more widespread in the future? And if so, how does that affect the legitimacy of our democracy? For a glimpse of that future, we need only wait until February 16. Or, if you don’t intend to tune into the American Idol premiere, you can opt instead to observe mobile voting’s impact as early as February 11, when the King Conservation District polls close. That election’s success—or failure—could fundamentally change how Americans vote in coming elections.


Election Security: US Lawmakers Concerned “Deepfake” Videos Are the Next Stage of Information Warfare Ahead of 2020 Election

By: Jack Kall

The nation’s attention has turned to the 2020 election with the 2018 midterms in the rear view mirror. Accordingly, an increasing number of US lawmakers are concerned that a form of video manipulation known as “Deepfakes” will be the next stage of information warfare. In short, Deepfake videos are hyper-realistic manipulated videos made using artificial intelligence technology. The videos are often convincing enough that it can be difficult to even tell what has or has not been manipulated. To raise attention, BuzzFeed published this video of Barack Obama delivering a public service announcement regarding dangers of the technology—except it was actually Jordan Peele.

Election security is a more important issue for US voters in the wake of Russian-led election interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. A recent Pew Research poll found that 55% of Americans say they are not too (37%) or not at all (17%) confident that elections systems are secure from hacking and other technological threats. Republicans (59% at least somewhat confident in security) express greater confidence than Democrats (34%), which is a reversal of attitudes from 2016.

While the threat of deepfakes has not garnered the same attention as Russian interference and other forms of “Fake News,” some US legislators are beginning to vocalize concern. This past September, three members of the House of Representatives—including the new chair of the House Intelligence Committee Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA)—sent a letter expressing concern that the “technology could soon be deployed by malicious foreign actors” to the Director of National Intelligence Dan Coates. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) also displayed concern for the technology at a Senate Intelligence Committee by describing a scenario in which a deepfake video is released just before an election and going viral before analysts could determine it was fake.

While concern is rising, there is still a shortage of solutions. In January 2019, House Democrats unveiled several election security measures, but lacked solutions for deepfakes. The same month, Brookings Institute released advice for campaigns to protect against deepfakes. It remains to be seen whether Brooking Institute’s advice to protect infrastructure, add two-factor authentication, film the candidate at speaking engagements, and replicate a classified environment—while important general advice—is enough to protect against this ever-evolving deepfake technology.


While 86% of Americans Oppose Behavioral Targeting of Voters, Campaigns Embrace It

by Bobbi Leal, UMN Law Student, MJLST Articles Editor

Thumbnail-Bobbi-Leal-ii.jpgWith the dramatic 2012 Presidential election behind us, new information about the campaign funds are being released. A recent Huffington Post article outlining the campaign funds allotted toward the mining and analysis of internet data about potential voters. President Obama and Mitt Romney’s campaigns spent a combined total of $13 million dollars on this controversial practice.

The Minnesota Journal of Law Science and Technology’s recent publication, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the Information Age,” points out that campaigns utilize data mining as a way to more effectively target voters. The mined data includes information gleaned or purchased from both public and private sources. To make use of the internet’s information on the individual, the campaigns use algorithms that match the attitudes of voters on specific issues with individual behaviors and tendencies. The individual behaviors they might look at include where you shop, which team you root for, which petitions you sign, who your friends are, and even what mobile device you use.

With a continued decrease in the number of undecided voters, the practice of using digital data to target particular individuals is an effective one. Further, online targeting can reach voters who would normally have no access to traditional campaigning, such as those in remote counties.

A study by the University of Pennsylvania Annenberg School of Communications revealed that a large majority of Americans (86%) are against behavioral targeting and tailored advertising for political or other purposes. However, privacy practices in the political context are not regulated like in the commercial sector due to protections afforded by political speech.


Political Data-Mining and Election 2012

by Chris Evans, UMN Law Student, MJLST Managing Editor

Thumbnail-Chris-Evans.jpgIn “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the Information Age,” I wrote about the compilation and aggregation of voter data by political campaigns and how data-mining can upset the balance of power between voters and politicians. The Democratic and Republican data operations have evolved rapidly and quietly since my Note went to press, so I’d like to point out a couple of recent articles on data-mining in the 2012 campaign.

In August, the AP ran this exclusive: “Romney uses secretive data-mining.” Romney has hired an analytics firm, Buxton Co., to help his fundraising by identifying untapped wealthy donors. The AP reports:

“The effort by Romney appears to be the first example of a political campaign using such extensive data analysis. President Barack Obama’s re-election campaign has long been known as data-savvy, but Romney’s project appears to take a page from the Fortune 500 business world and dig deeper into available consumer data.”

I’m not sure it’s true Buxton is digging any deeper than the Democrats’ Catalist or Obama’s fundraising operation. Campaigns from both parties have been scouring consumer data for years. As for labeling Romney’s operation “secretive,” the Obama campaign wouldn’t even comment on its fundraising practices for the article, which strikes me as equally if not more secretive. Political data-mining has always been nonpartisanly covert; that’s part of the problem. When voters don’t know they’re being monitored by campaigns, they are at a disadvantage to candidates. (And when they do know they’re being monitored, they may alter their behavior.) This is why I argued in my Note for greater transparency of data-mining practices by candidates.

A more positive spin on political data-mining appeared last week, also by way of the AP: “Voter registration drives using data mining to target their efforts, avoid restrictive laws.” Better, cheaper technology and Republican efforts to restrict voting around the country are inducing interest groups to change how they register voters, swapping their clipboards for motherboards. This is the bright side of political data-mining: being able to identify non-voters, speak to them on the issues they care about, and bring them into the political process.

The amount of personal voter data available to campaigns this fall is remarkable, and the ways data-miners aggregate and sort that data is fascinating. Individuals ought to be let in on the process, though, so they know what candidates and groups are collecting what type of personal information, and so they can opt out of the data-mining.


Obama, Romney probably know what you read, where you shop, and what you buy. Is that a problem?

by Bryan Dooley, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Thumbnail-Bryan-Dooley.jpgMost voters who use the internet frequently are probably aware of “tracking cookies,” used to monitor online activity and target ads and other materials specifically to individual users. Many may not be aware, however, of the increasing sophistication of such measures and the increasing extent of their use, in combination with other “data-mining” techniques, in the political arena. In “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the Information Age,” published in the Spring 2012 volume of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science, & Technology, Chris Evans discusses the practice and its implications for personal privacy and voter autonomy.

Both parties rely extensively on data-mining to identify potentially sympathetic voters and target them, often with messages tailored carefully to the political leanings suggested by detailed individual profiles. Technological developments and the widespread commercial collection of consumer data, of which politicians readily avail themselves, allow political operatives to develop (and retain for future campaigns, and share) personal voter profiles with a broad swath of information about online and market activity.

As Evans discusses, this allows campaigns to allocate their resources more efficiently, and likely increases voter turnout by actively engaging those receptive to a certain message. It also has the potential to chill online discourse and violate the anonymity of the voting booth, a central underpinning of modern American democracy. Evans ultimately argues that existing law fails to adequately address the privacy issues stemming from political data-mining. He suggests additional protections are necessary: First, campaigns should be required to disclose information contained in voter profiles upon request. Second, voters should be given an option to be excluded from such profiling altogether.