Family Law

The Dark Reality of Family Vlogging: Minnesota’s Legislative Attempt to Combat Child Labor in Content Creation

October 28, 2025
Entertainment Law, Family Law, Social Media

Shayla Miller, MJLST Staffer

Minnesota joins a short list of states to pass specific laws protecting children featured in social media content (“kidfluencers”) from exploitation. Effective July 1st, 2025, through an addition to the Minnesota “Child Labor Standards Act,” lawmakers set out requirements for payment of minors featured in social media content.[1]

The Rise of “Kidfluencers”

Social media content creation has quickly become a lucrative career for many individuals—with over 200 million content creators worldwide.[2] While the number of followers, source of income, and profits made from such creations vary greatly, millions of individuals have taken to social media for work.[3] One particular area that has grown exponentially in recent years is “family vlogging,” or content that features families’ daily lives, including the lives of their children.[4] On its face, this content appears to be harmless, family-friendly, and fun for the children involved. Unfortunately, in many cases, the work of these “kidfluencers” amounts to a new form of child labor, with family members exploiting and overworking young children to make a profit.[5] In addition to children working for no pay, in many cases, children are too young to consent to their personal lives being spread online.[6] Severe cases of child exploitation have sparked major media platforms such as Netflix and Hulu to produce documentaries detailing these particularly horrific cases.[7]

State Legislative Response

As a result of the continued growth of the content creation industry and the increased media scrutiny of “kidfluencers,” several state legislatures, including California and Illinois, have considered the adoption of protective legislation. These statutes often create a minimum threshold for a minor’s presence in a video, as well as a minimum threshold for following/engagement with content, before those minors must be compensated. If a particular account meets the threshold, and a particular minor is present in enough content to meet that threshold, said minor must be compensated for their presence.

In California, a minor is considered to be “engaged in the work of vlogging” if they are in at least thirty percent of the content showcased on an account in one year.[8] Any minor who is considered “engaged in the work of vlogging” on accounts that receive $1,250 a month or more must be compensated for their participation.[9] Their compensation should be proportioned based on the percentage of content they are in, thus if a child is in forty percent of the content for the month, forty percent of the profits should be set aside for them in a trust to be accessed once they reach the age of majority.[10] Illinois and Utah have very similar statutes requiring a trust to be created for “qualifying minors.”[11] The goal of such statutes is to ensure that minors who are engaging in the labor of content creation, and helping to turn profits for the adults running their accounts, are adequately compensated for their time and presence in content.

Most recently, Minnesota added language to the “Child Labor Standards Act” addressing “kidfluencers” by creating a framework for their compensation. Under the new law, a minor is considered “engaged in the work on content creation” if the number of views generated by the content meets the threshold for compensation by the platform and the minor is present in 30% or more of the compensated videos within a thirty-day period.[12] Minors who are deemed to be engaged in content creation must be compensated for their work via a trust created for them by the adult content creator, the structure of compensation being dependent on their age. Children under fourteen who are considered engaged in content creation must be given 100% of the proceeds from any video they appear in.[13] Alternatively, for minors between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, content creators must set aside the percentage of their gross income from a video that corresponds to the percentage of that video that includes the minors’ “likeness, name, or photograph.”[14] The main goal of this addition to the “Child Labor Standards Act” is to address concerns with digital age exploitatio,n including the accessibility and the permanent nature of internet content.[15]

Potential Issues with Current Statutory Structure

While the new statute was a step in a positive direction for protecting minors featured in social media content, there are a few pitfalls that may result in the statute failing to effectuate its intended purpose. These include concerns regarding enforcement and a lack of definition of key terms.

Enforcement Concerns

The new Minnesota statute provides a few different mechanisms for enforcement. First, a minor may commence a civil action against a content creator who fails to provide them with a trust account as required by the statute.[16] Second, the state attorney general may bring an enforcement action against a creator whom they determine is not satisfying the requirements outlined above.[17] While both mechanisms appear useful, practicality questions whether a minor will have the requisite knowledge and impetus to bring an enforcement action against a content creator, particularly given that these content creators tend to be parents or other family members. Similarly, apart from the particularly public cases, query as to whether the attorney general will bring an enforcement action against a content creator without the implicated minor first doing so.

Given the recency of the statute’s passage, it is too soon to tell whether the existence of the statute alone will be sufficient to motivate content creators to compensate minors present in their content without enforcement actions. Should the statute itself fail to change influencers’ behavior, a close look at whether the attorney general or minors themselves utilize the enforcement mechanisms will be instructive as to its effectiveness at stopping the exploitation of minors on social media.

Lack of Definition for “Gross Income”

A second potential issue with the new statute is the lack of definition for “gross income.” Content creators are instructed to pay qualifying minors a percentage of the gross income earned from their videos; however, the additions to the definition section of Minnesota’s Child Labor Standards Act do not include a definition for gross income.[18] Alternate portions of the Minnesota code provide a definition of gross income.[19] However, none adequately cover the vast ways in which content creators are compensated.[20] An addition to the definition section indicating that gross income shall include, but is not limited to, all income from; affiliate marketing, platform payouts, licensing content, monetizing expertise, digital products, and all other social media income sources that may develop, would be useful to effectuate the purpose of ensuring minors are adequately compensated for their presence in social media content.[21] Without a specific definition tailored to the income sources for content creators, it is easy to imagine a reluctant content creator cutting corners by only setting aside income for minors from some of the sources through which they are paid for their online content.

Ultimately, the addition of language to Minnesota’s Child Labor Standards Act addressing child content creators was necessary to ensure the Act keeps up with changes to the child employment space. It provides a great step in the direction of protecting minors from exploitation in the content creation space, but it may need some revision to ensure the statutory scheme is enforceable.

 

Notes

[1] Minn. Stat. § 181A.03 (2025).

[2] Nicholas Bouchard, 40 Creator Economy Statistics You Need to Know in 2025, The Leap (last updated Jan. 29, 2025), https://www.theleap.co/blog/creator-economy-statistics/.

[3] Id.

[4] Communications, Turning Play into Profit: The Dark Reality of Kidfluencing, Ivey (Apr. 29, 2025), https://www.ivey.uwo.ca/impact/read/2025/04/turning-play-into-profit-the-dark-reality-of-kidfluencing/.

[5] Daniel R. Clark & Alisa B. Jno-Charles, The Child Labor in Social Media: Kidfluencers, Ethics of Care, and Exploitation, J. Bus. Ethics 35, 36 (2024).

[6] Ariana Dell, Growing Up in Front of a Camera: The Worrying Trend of Family Influencers Documenting Every Second of Their Children’s Upbringings, Lancaster Univ. (June 10, 2024), https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/richardson-institute/blogs/growing-up-in-front-of-a-camera-the-worrying-trend-of-family-influencers-documenting-every-second-of-their-childrens-upbringings.

[7]Are There Laws About Child Influencers in Minnesota?, White & Assocs. (last accessed Oct. 15, 2025), https://www.whiteandassociateslaw.com/2025/09/30/are-there-laws-about-child-influencers-in-minnesota/.

[8] Cal. Fam. Code § 6651 (Deering 2025).

[9] Id.

[10] Cal. Fam. Code § 6653 (Deering 2025).

[11] See 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 206/95 (LexisNexis 2025); see also Utah Code Ann. §34-23-501 (LexisNexis 2025).

[12] Minn. Stat. § 181A.13 (2025).

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Lincoln Roch, New Minnesota Law Regulates Minors’ Roles in Social Media Content, TCA News Serv., (July 18, 2025), https://www.proquest.com/docview/3231134098?accountid=14586&parentSessionId=JlPr4S9uchgDcvN7A%2BdCHqSf05dj5Rfi6wc04Ot5nP0%3D&sourcetype=Wire%20Feeds.

[16] Minn. Stat. § 181A.13 (2025).

[17] Id.

[18] Minn. Stat. § 181A.03 (2025).

[19] See Minn. R. 9505.0015 (defining gross income as “all earned income before any deduction, disregard, or exclusion”); see also Minn. Stat. § 290.01 (citing to the Internal Revenue Code definition of gross income, which is as follows: “compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items”).

[20] How Much Do Content Creators Make? Insights from 250 Creators for 2025, Blavity Inc. (Dec. 17, 2024), https://blavityinc.com/how-much-do-content-creators-make/#:~:text=Platform%20Payouts:%20Programs%20like%20TikTok,tailored%20to%20their%20audience%27s%20needs.

[21] Id.

Virtual Marriage

October 20, 2025
Family Law, Internet

Jordan Strathmann, MJLST Staffer

Throughout U.S. history, family law has continuously adapted to society’s evolving values, especially within the context of marriage. As a result, formal, ceremonial rites shifted towards doctrines that prioritize the autonomy and intent of the marrying parties.[1] For instance, one of the earliest developments in U.S. marriage was the abolition of coverture and the institution of the Married Women’s Property Acts, which helped ensure that women retained independence within their marriages, rather than occupying a subordinate role to their husbands.[2] Later, restraints on people’s choice to marry, such as those on interracial and same-sex couples, were struck down as violations of the 14th Amendment.[3] Hence, the evolution of marriage laws underscores the principle that it is the parties of a relationship, not their families or the State, who have the sole responsibility for deciding whether to marry, who to marry, and what the terms of their relationship will be.[4]

Accordingly, just as family law has adapted to societal changes, it should also evolve in response to technological advancements, especially when those changes promote the policy values of autonomy and the enhancement of freedom of choice. Digital technology, particularly over the past few decades, has become a vital component of the modern lifestyle.[5] From professional settings, such as schools and the workplace, to social interactions with friends and family, our phones, laptops, social media accounts, and internet access have become essential to participation in society.[6] The deepening of societal dependence on technology has altered the way people foster and maintain intimate relationships, specifically diminishing the importance of “direct face-to-face contact.”[7] The rise of online dating exemplifies this modern shift to digital intimacy.[8] Furthermore, changes in the social mobility of families, and equality in economic capabilities and working demands between the spouses, evidence the dwindling importance of direct personal interaction in maintaining intimacy within a relationship.[9] Instead, the “[i]nternet and mobile applications such as email, instant messaging, and video chat have become the mainstays of daily social contact with family and friends.”[10]

Hence, family law’s propensity to adapt to society, combined with its policy of encouraging equality and autonomy between partners in a relationship, and the modern predilection toward technology, suggests that the next logical step for family law is to authorize virtual marriage. In other words, more state legislatures should allow for couples to marry online rather than requiring an in-person ceremony or proceeding. Just as courts and legislatures have redefined marriage to reflect evolving notions of equality and accessibility, permitting digital ceremonies expands the institution to reflect modern realities of technology and global connectivity. The practical advantages of allowing virtual marriages, such as convenience, affordability, and flexibility for working parties, mirror family law’s broader commitment to ensuring that function of the relationship prevails or formalities.[11] Moreover, allowing couples to choose the form of their ceremony aligns with family law’s policy of minimizing state intervention and leaving to the marrying parties privacy in their personal matters.[12]

Critics may argue that the convenience and flexibility offered by online marriages undermine the institution’s integrity.[13] Some may even question the very legitimacy of online marriages in the absence of a face-to-face proceeding. However, the Supreme Court has already made clear that the substance of the marrying parties’ relationship should prevail over formalistic barriers.[14] Furthermore, eliminating the necessity of an in-person proceeding to solemnize a marriage is by no means novel; proxy marriages have been available to couples since the time of Late Roman Law.[15] While the vast majority of U.S. states have yet to permit virtual marriages, one state is ahead of the curve: Utah.

Under Utah Code § 81-2-302, a marriage license must be issued to the marrying parties by a Utah county clerk, and the officiant of the marriage must be physically present within the state of Utah at the time of solemnization of the marriage. However, the license application, license delivery, receipt, and the marriage ceremony can all be done virtually.[16] Utah still requires applicants to provide the County Clerk with pertinent information to verify their identities, including “full names, social security numbers, addresses, dates and places of birth, parents’ names, birthplaces of the parents, and the age, legal names, and identities of each applicant.”[17] Hence, although the marriage process is conducted online, safeguards are in place to prevent fraud or other illegal marriages. Utah’s current laws on marriage proceedings provide a reliable framework for other states to incorporate virtual marriages into their state laws.

As our world becomes increasingly digitized, with work meetings, school days, and even important business conferences and court proceedings being held online, it should not be seen as a drastic step for society and state legislatures to start accepting online marriage applications and ceremonies. Furthermore, marriage has always been a dynamic element of family law, adapting to societal norms and allowing the intent of the marrying parties to prevail over traditional requirements. Thus, in modern society, where individuals are more independent, mobile, and accustomed to relying on digital technology to handle matters of the utmost importance, states should consider amending their marriage laws to allow for virtual proceedings.

 

Notes

[1] See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 650 (2015) (stating that “[t]he ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and society[,]” in the Court’s discussion of the Nation’s changing perspectives on marriage through history).

[2] Married Women’s Property Acts, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Married-Womens-Property-Acts-United-States-1839 (last visited Oct. 9, 2025) (explaining that Married Women’s Property Acts “expanded the rights of married women to act as independent agents” from their husbands); see also Obergefell at 659–60 (explaining that the abandonment of coverture and expansion of women’s legal rights “worked deep transformations” and strengthened the institution of marriage).

[3] See Obergefell at 665 (holding that the Court’s analysis of the 14th Amendment “compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry”); see also Loving v. West Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (holding that “[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause”).

[4] See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va. L.  Rev. 1901, 1905 (2000) (explaining that the “legal framework of marriage” has been deregulated through the imposition of egalitarian principles and abolition of legally mandated marital commitments through no-fault divorce laws); see also Nicola Barker, The Evolution of Marriage and Relationship Recognition in Western Jurisdictions, Progress of the World’s Women at 8–9 (Oct. 2018), https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2018/Discussion-paper-Evolution-of-marriage-and-relationship-recognition-in-western-jurisdictions-en.pdf (explaining that the form of marriage and family has become less important to the state).

[5] See Cherie Foo, How Does Technology Influence Our Lives, Sogolytics, https://www.sogolytics.com/blog/how-technology-influences-us/ (“Technology has become an integral part of our lives, revolutionizing the way we work, communicate, and live. From smartphones to smart homes, technology has infiltrated every corner of our existence.”) (last updated June 28, 2024).

[6] Id.

[7] See Anna M. Lomanowska & Matthieu J. Guitton, Online Intimacy and Well-Being in the Digital Age, 4 Internet Intervention 138, 139 (2016), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6096121/pdf/main.pdf (explaining that “physical proximity and direct face-to-face contact have become less prevalent” with society’s shift towards utilizing “[i]nternet-based communication and social networking applications” to “actualize intimacy”).

[8] According to a 2022 Pew Research survey, approximately one in three adults under the age of thirty reported using a dating site or app. See Emily A. Vogels & Colleen McClain, Key Findings About Online Dating in the U.S., Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 22, 2023), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/02/02/key-findings-about-online-dating-in-the-u-s/. The survey also revealed that approximately one in ten adults under the age of 30 who were married, living with a partner, or in a committed romantic relationship met their current partner through a dating site or app. Id.

[9] See generally Frank F. Furstenburg, Family Change in Global Perspective: How and Why Family Systems Change, 68 Future Healthy Fams. (Special Issue) 326 (2019) (describing how “the most important” change in the family structure was “the transition from a predominately traditional subsistence economy to a production-oriented economy transformed” which “expand[ed] a job-based economy that favors younger and more geographically mobile individuals).

[10] See Anna M. Lomanowska & Matthieu J. Guitton supra note vii at 139.

[11] Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2003, 2003 (2014) (explaining that, despite family law becoming more formalist in some respects, with regard to recognition of marital relationships “family law is experiencing a trend toward more flexible decision making that prioritizes functional assessment of relationships above formal legal status”); see also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Uncoupling, 53 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 27 (2021) (explaining that “the new system [of legal regulation of marriage] rewards those who manage the human capital investments necessary to achieve labor market nimbleness and family relationships based on flexibility, reciprocity and trust. . .”).

[12] See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (explaining that the right to privacy within family life also extends to the choice of entering marriage).

[13] U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 809 (2013) (describing how other critics of substantial changes in marriage, specifically same-sex marriage in this case, believe that those changes “will seriously undermine the institution of marriage”) (Alito J., dissenting).

[14] Obergefell at 666–67 (describing marriage as “an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects”).

[15] Ernest Lorenzen, Marriage By Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 473, 473 (1918) (asserting that, in answering the question of whether American soldiers abroad during the ongoing World War could contract a marriage by proxy, it should be considered “[t]hat marriage by proxy was allowed in the late Roman law and in the Canon Law”).

[16] See Marriage – Frequently Asked Questions, Utah County Clerk, https://www.utahcounty.gov/dept/clerk/marriage/faq.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2025); see also Marriage Ceremonies, Utah Cnty. Clerk https://www.utahcounty.gov/dept/clerk/marriage/ceremony.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2025).

[17] Utah Code § 81-2-303.

Reconsidering Roe: Has the Line of Fetal Viability Moved?

December 18, 2021
Constitutional Law, Family Law, Health Law, Privacy, Reproductive Health

Claire Colby, MJLST Staffer

After the Supreme Court heard arguments in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health on December 1, legal commentatorsbegan to speculate the case could be a vehicle for overturning Roe v. Wade. The Mississippi statute at issue in Dobbs bans nearly all abortions after 15 weeks. In questioning Mississippi Solicitor General Scott Stewart, Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked about the “advancements in medicine” that have changed the lines of viability since the Court last considered a major challenge to Roe with Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992. “What has changed in science to show that the viability line is not a real line…?” she asked.

Roe v. Wade was a 1973 landmark decision in which the Supreme Court adopted a trimester framework for abortion. During the first trimester, the Court held that “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgement of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.” The court held that states could adopt regulations “reasonably related to maternal health” for abortions after the first trimester, and held that in the third trimester, upon viability, states may “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgement for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” In 1992, the Court rejected this “rigid trimester” framework in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In Casey, the Court turned to a viability framework and found that pre-viability, states may not prohibit abortion or impose “a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.” The Court adopted an “undue burden” standard to determine whether state regulations of pre-viability abortion are unconstitutional.

In Casey, the court defined viability as “the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb.” So when do medical professionals consider a fetus viable? The threshold has moved to earlier in the gestation period since the 1970s, but experts disagree on where to draw the line. According to a journal articlepublished in 2018 in Women’s Health Issues, in 1971, fetal age of approximately 28 weeks was “widely used as the criterion of viability.” The article said that until recently, 24 weeks of gestation was the “widely accepted cutoff for viability in the highest acuity neonatal intensive care units.” According to the article, babies born as early as 22 weeks of gestation had an “overall survival rate of 23%” with “the most aggressive medical management available.” The article rebuked the idea of tying abortion restrictions to viability at all: “Tying abortion provisions to the word viability today is as misguided as it was to tie it to a specific trimester in 1973,” the article stated. “There was no true definition of viability then, and as long as medicine strives to treat every patient uniquely, there will never be one.”

A 2017 practice alert published in the official journal of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists defined “periviable” births —births occurring “near the limit of viability” —as births occurring between 20 and 26 weeks gestation.

According to a 2020 New York Times article, determinations on the gestational age at which a baby is likely to survive outside of the womb are “in a complex moment of transition.” Though technology has improved, “even top academic institutions disagree about the right approach to treating 22- and 23-week babies.” The article reported that the University of California, San Francisco “a top-tier, high resource hospital,” is “transparent about its policy of offering only comfort care for babies that are born up to the first day of the 23rd week, down to the hour.”

In June 2020, a baby born at the Children’s Hospital and Clinics of Minnesota set the world record for the world’s most premature baby to survive, the Washington Post reported. He was born at 21 weeks and two days gestation.

Several medical developments help to explain this earlier period of viability.

According to a 2020 Nature article, “the biggest difference to survival came in the early 1990s with surfactant treatment.” Surfactant is a “slippery substance” that prevents airways from collapsing upon exhalation. According to Kaiser, premature babies with underdeveloped lungs often lack the substance. “When premature lungs are treated with surfactant after birth, the infant’s blood oxygen levels usually improve within minutes.”

A 2018 study published by the Journal of the American Medical Association, administering prenatal steroids to mothers between 22 and 25 weeks gestation prior to delivery led to a “significantly higher” survival rate, but “survival without major morbidities remains low at 22 and 23 weeks.”

The Dobbs ruling is not expected until this summer, when the Court tends to release its major decisions. Even if the Court maintains the viability standard set forth in Casey, recent medical advances may warrant more consideration about where to draw this line.

Changing Families: Time for a Change in Family Law?

February 12, 2018
Administrative Law, Family Law, Healthcare, Reproductive Health

MJLST Staffer, Hannah Mosby

 

Reproductive technology allows individuals to start families where it may not otherwise have been possible. These technologies range from relatively advanced procedures—those using assisted reproductive technology (or “ART,” for short)—to less invasive fertility treatments. ART encompasses procedures like in vitro fertilization—in fact, the CDC defines ART as including “all fertility treatments in which both eggs and embryos are handled” (Link to: https://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html)—while other kinds of reproductive assistance range from artificial insemination to self-administered fertility drugs. In a study published by the CDC, the number of ART procedures completed in 2014 in the U.S. alone was almost 170,000. As scientific knowledge grows and new procedures develop, that number will undoubtedly increase.

Individuals choosing to utilize these reproductive technologies, however, can find themselves in legal limbo when it comes to determining parentage. In instances where an individual uses a donor gamete (a sperm or an egg) to conceive, that donor could be a legal parent of the offspring produced—even if that result wasn’t intended by the any of the parties involved. For example, the 2002 version of the Uniform Parentage Act—variations of which have been adopted by many states—provides for the severance of the parental rights of a sperm donor in the event of consent by the “woman,” as well as consent or post-birth action by the “man” assuming paternal rights. If statutory conditions aren’t met, the donor could retain his parental rights over any offspring produced by the procedure. To further complicate things, the use of gendered terms makes it unclear how these statutes apply to same-sex couples. A new version of the Act was proposed in 2017 to comply with the Supreme Court’s recognition of marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges, but it has yet to be adopted by any state . Even murkier than the laws governing donor gametes are those governing surrogacy contracts, which some states still refuse to legally recognize. Overall, these laws create an environment where even the most intentional pregnancies can have unintended consequences when it comes to establishing legal parentage.

For further illustration, let’s revisit artificial insemination. Jane and John, a Minnesotan couple, decide to undergo an artificial insemination procedure so that Jane can become pregnant. However, they aren’t married. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. 257.56, the couple’s marriage is a necessary condition for the automatic severance of the sperm donor’s parental status—therefore, since Jane and John aren’t married, the sperm donor retains his parental rights. The statute also requires that the procedure be performed “under the supervision of a licensed physician” in order for severance to occur. If there was no doctor present, then the sperm donor—and not John—would have legal parental status over the offspring produced. The example becomes more complicated if the couple is same-sex rather than heterosexual, because the statute requires the consent of the “husband” to the procedure. Further still, if Jane lived in a different state, the sperm donor might be able to establish parental rights after the fact—even if they were initially severed—by maintaining a relationship with the child. As one can imagine, this makes the use of known donors (rather than anonymous donors) particularly complicated.

Ultimately, ART and related procedures provide opportunities for individuals to create the families they want, but could not otherwise have—an enormously impactful medical development. However, utilization of these procedures can produce legal consequences that are unforeseen—and, often, unwanted—by the parents of children born using these procedures. The state law that exists to govern these procedures is varied and lagging. In the age of marriage equality and donor gametes, such laws are highly inadequate. . . In order for society to reap the biggest benefit from these life-creating technologies, the legal world will have to play a serious game of catch-up.

 

Home | Contact Publishing Services | Report Web Accessibility Issues