Intellectual Property

Are AI Overviews Creating New Risk of Libel for Search Engines?

October 7, 2024
Artificial Intelligence, Intellectual Property, Internet, Product Liability

Eleanor Nagel-Bennett, MJLST Staffer

47 USC § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) protects online service providers from civil liability for content published on their servers by third parties. Essentially, it clarifies that if a Google search for one’s name produced a link to a blog post containing false and libelous content about that person, the falsely accused searcher could pursue a claim of defamation against the publisher of the blog, but not against Google. Under § 230, Google is not considered the speaker or the publisher of the libelous statements on the blog, despite returning the libelous results on the search engine results page. Specifically, § 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” for purposes of civil penalties.[i]

However, in May 2024 Google rolled out an “AI Overview” feature on their search engine. The AI Overview is powered by Gemini, Google’s generative artificial intelligence chatbot.[ii] Gemini generates a response to each google search by combining information from internet sources and writing a complete overview answer to the search query using “multi-step reasoning, planning and multimodality” functions.[iii] After submitting a query, the AI Overview is displayed at the top of the search results. In the first few weeks, Google’s AI Overview suffered from hallucinations producing “odd and erroneous” outputs.[iv] Some of the odd results were obviously false, such as suggesting a user try adhering cheese to their pizza with a glue stick.[v]

Besides going viral online, the silly results were largely inconsequential. However, there were also several more serious reports of Google’s AI Overview feature generating misinformation that presented responses more difficult to identify as false. One such result claimed that President Barack Obama was the first Muslim President, a popular but demonstrably false conspiracy theory that has circulated the internet for years, while another told users that certain poisonous mushrooms were safe for human consumption.[vi] Google has since changed the data pool used to produce AI Overviews, and now rarely produces blatantly false results — but is rarely enough when 8.5 billion searches are run per day on Google?[vii]

This raises the question: can search engines be held liable for libelous content published by their generative AI? A plaintiff will have to prove to the court that § 230 of the Communications Decency Act is not a statutory bar to claims against generative AI. A recent consensus of legal scholars anticipate courts will likely find that the CDA would not bar claims against a company producing libelous content through generative AI because content produced by generative AI is original work, “authored” by the AI itself.[viii]

For an illustrative comparison, consider how defamation claims against journalists work as compared to defamation claims against traditional search engine results. While a journalist may write stories based on interviews, research, and experience, the language she publishes are her own words, her own creation, and she can be held liable for them despite sourcing some pieces from other speakers. Traditional search engines on the other hand historically post the sourced material directly to the reader, so they are not the “speaker” and therefore are insulated from defamation claims.  Enter generative AI, the output of which is likely to be considered original work by courts, and that insulation may erode.[ix] Effectively, introducing an AI Overview feature waives the statutory bar to claims under § 230 of the CDA relied upon by search engines to avoid liability for defamation claims.

But even without an outright statutory bar to defamation claims against a search engine’s libelous AI output, there is disagreement over whether generative AI output in general is relied upon seriously enough by humans to give rise to a defamation claim. Some believe that AI generated text should not be interpreted as a reasonably perceived factual claim, and therefore argue that AI generated content cannot give rise to a claim for defamation.[x] This is where the legitimacy of a result displayed on a popular search engine comes into play. Even if AI generated text is not ordinarily reasonably perceived as a factual claim, when displayed at the top of a search engine’s results page, more weight and authority is given to the result, though users might otherwise be wary of AI outputs.[xi]

While no landmark case law on the liability of an AI machine for libelous output has been developed to date, several lawsuits have already been filed on the question of liability assignment for libelous content produced by generative AI, including at least one case against a search engine for AI generated output displayed on a search engine results page.[xii]

Despite the looming potential for consequences, most AI companies have neglected to give attention to the risk of libel created by the operation of generative AI.[xiii] While all AI companies should pay attention to the risks, search engines previously insulated from civil liability by § 230 of the CDA should be especially wary of just how much liability they may be opening themselves up to by including an AI Overview on their results pages.

 

Notes

[i] 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1).

[ii] Reid, Liz, Generative AI in Search: Let Google do the searching for you, Google (May 14, 2024) https://blog.google/products/search/generative-ai-google-search-may-2024/.

[iii] Id.

[iv] Reid, Liz, AI Overviews: About last week, Google (May 30, 2024) https://blog.google/products/search/ai-overviews-update-may-2024/.

[v] O’Brien, Matt, Google makes fixes to AI-generated search summaries after outlandish answers went viral, The Associated Press (May 30, 2024) https://apnews.com/article/google-ai-overviews-hallucination-33060569d6cc01abe6c63d21665330d8.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Brannon, Jordan, Game-Changing Google Search Statistics for 2024, Coalition, (Apr. 5, 2024) https://coalitiontechnologies.com/blog/game-changing-google-search-statistics-for-2024.

[viii] Joel Simon, Can AI be sued for defamation?, Col. Journalism Rev. (March 18, 2024).

[ix] Id.

[x]  See Eugene Volokh, Large Libel Models? Liability For AI Output, 3 J. Free Speech L. 489, 498 (2023).

[xi] Id.

[xii] In July of 2023, Jeffery Battle of Maryland filed suit against Microsoft for an AI generated search result on BING accusing him of crimes he did not commit. The Plaintiff Jeffery Battle is a veteran, business owner, and aerospace professor. When his name is searched online, however, Bing’s AI overview accuses Battle of crimes committed by a different Jeffrey Battle, Jeffery Leon Battle. The other Jeffery Battle pled guilty to seditious conspiracy and levying war against the United States after he tried to join the Taliban in the wake of 9/11. Bing’s search engine results page overview powered by Chat GPT combines information about the two Jeffery’s into one. See Id. at 492.

[xiii] Id. at 493.

AR/VR/XR: Breaking the Wall of Legal Issues Used to Limit in Either the Real-World or the Virtual-World

February 5, 2024
Data, Data Privacy, Entertainment, Intellectual Property, New Technology, Video Games

Sophia Yao, MJLST Staffer

From Pokémon Go to the Metaverse,[1] VR headsets to XR glasses, vision technology is quickly changing our lives in many aspects. The best-known companies or groups that have joined this market include Apple’s Vision Products Group (VPG), Meta’s Reality Lab, Microsoft, and others. Especially after Apple published its Vision Pro in 2023, no one doubts that this technology will soon be a vital driver for both tech and business. Regardless of why, can this type of technology significantly impact human genes? What industries will be impacted by this technology? And what kinds of legal risks are to come?

Augmented Reality (“AR”) refers to a display of a real-world environment whose elements are augmented by (i.e., overlaid with) one or more layers of text, data, symbols, images, or other graphical display elements.[2] Virtual Reality (“VR”) is using a kind of device (e.g., headsets or multi-projected environments) to create a simulated and immersive environment that can provide an experience either similar to or completely different from the real world,[3] while Mixed Reality/Extended Reality (XR) glasses are relatively compact and sleek, and weigh much less than VR headsets.[4] XR’s most distinguished quality from VR is that individuals can still see the world around them with XR by projecting a translucent screen on top of the real world. Seemingly, the differences between these three vision technologies may soon be eliminated with the possibility of their combination into once device.

Typically, vision technology assists people in mentally processing 2-D information into a 3-D world by integrating digital information directly into real objects or environments. This can improve individuals’ ability to absorb information, make decisions, and execute required tasks quickly, efficiently, and accurately. However, many people report feeling nauseous after using such products, ear pain, and a disconnect between their eyes and body.[5] Even experts who use AR/VR products in emerging psychotherapy treatments admit that there have been adverse effects in AR/VR trials due to mismatching the direct contradiction between the visual system and the motion system.[6] Researchers also discovered that it affects the way people behave in social situations due to feeling less socially connected to others.[7]

In 2022, the global augmented reality market was valued at nearly $32 billion and is projected to reach $88 billion by 2026.[8] As indicated by industry specialists and examiners, outside of gaming, a significant portion of vision technology income will accumulate from e-commerce and retail (fashion and beauty), manufacturing, the education industry, healthcare, real estate, and e-sports, which will further impact entertainment, cost of living, and innovation.[9] To manage this tremendous opportunity, it is crucial to understand potential legal risks and develop a comprehensive legal strategy to address these upcoming challenges.

To expand one’s business model, it is important to maximize the protection of intellectual property (IP), including virtual worlds, characters, and experiences. Doing so also aligns with contractual concerns, service remedies, and liability for infringement of third-party IP. For example, when filing an IP prosecution, it is difficult to argue that the hardware-executing invention (characters or data information) is a unique machine, and that the designated steps performed by the hardware are special under MPEP § 2106.05(d).[10] Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has cautioned the abstraction of inventions – that “[a]t some level, all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas…[T]read carefully in constructing this exclusionary principle lest it swallows all of the patent law.”[11]

From a consumer perspective, legal concerns may include data privacy, harassment, virtual trespass, or even violent attacks due to the aforementioned disconnect between individuals’ eyes and bodies. Courts’ views on virtual trespass created by vision technology devices is ambiguous. It is also unclear whether courts will accept the defense of error in judgment due to the adverse effects of using AR/VR devices. One of the most significant concerns is the protection of the younger generations, since they are often the target consumers and those who are spending the most time using these devices. Experts have raised concerns about the adverse effects of using AR/VR devices, questioning whether they negatively impact the mental and physical health of younger generations. Another concern is that these individuals may experience a decline in social communication skills and feel a stronger connection to machines rather than to human beings. Many other legal risks are hanging around the use of AR/VR devices, such as private data collection without consent by constantly scanning the users’ surrounding circumstances, although some contend that the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) prohibits the collection of personally identifiable information if an operator believes a user to be under the age of thirteen.[12]

According to research trends, combining AR, VR, and MR/XR will allow users to transcend distance, time, and scale, to bring people together in shared virtual environments, enhance comprehension, communication, and decisionmaking efficiency. Once the boundaries between the real-world and virtual-world are eliminated, AR/VR devices will “perfectly” integrate with the physical world, whether or not we are prepared for this upcoming world.

Notes

[1] Eric Ravenscraft, What is the Meteverse, Exactly?, Wired (Jun. 15, 2023, 6:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-the-metaverse/.

[2] Travis Alley, ARTICLE: Pokemon Go: Emerging Liability Arising from Virtual Trespass for Augmented Reality Applications, 4 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 273 (2018).

[3] Law Offices of Salar Atrizadeh, Virtual and Augmented Reality Laws, Internet Law. Blog (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.internetlawyer-blog.com/virtual-and-augmented-reality-laws/.

[4] Simon Hill, Review: Viture One XR Glasses, Wired (Sep. 1, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/review/viture-one-xr-glasses/.

[5] Alexis Souchet, Virtual Reality has Negative Side Effects—New Research Shows That Can be a Problem in the Workplace, The Conversation (Aug. 8, 2023, 8:29 AM), https://theconversation.com/virtual-reality-has-negative-side-effects-new-research-shows-that-can-be-a-problem-in-the-workplace-210532#:~:text=Some%20negative%20symptoms%20of%20VR,nausea%20and%20increased%20muscle%20fatigue.

[6] John Torous et al., Adverse Effects of Virtual and Augmented Reality Interventions in Psychiatry: Systematic Review, JMIR Ment Health (May 5, 2023), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10199391/.

[7] How Augmented Reality Affects People’s Behavior, Sci.Daily (May 22, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/05/190522101944.htm.

[8] Augmented Reality (AR) Market by Device Type (Head-mounted Display, Head-up Display), Offering (Hardware, Software), Application (Consumer, Commercial, Healthcare), Technology, and Geography – Global Forecast, Mkt. and Mkt., https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/augmented-reality-market-82758548.html.

[9] Hill, supra note 4.

[10] Manual of Patent Examining Proc. (MPEP) § 2106.05(d) (USPTO), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2106.html#ch2100_d29a1b_13d41_124 (explaining an evaluation standard on when determining whether a claim recites significantly more than a judicial exception depends on whether the additional elements(s) are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry).

[11] Manual of Patent Examining Proc. (MPEP) § 2106.04 (USPTO), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2106.html#ch2100_d29a1b_139db_e0; see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (2016).

[12] 16 CFR pt. 312.

Brushstroke Battles: Unraveling Copyright Challenges With AI Artistry

October 15, 2023
Artificial Intelligence, Copyrights, Intellectual Property, New Technology

Sara Seid, MJLST Staffer

Introduction

Imagine this: after a long day of thinking and participating in society, you decided to curl up on the couch with your phone and crack open a new fanfiction to decompress.  Fanfiction, a fictional work of writing based on another fictional work, has increased in popularity due to the expansion and increased use of the internet. Many creators publish their works to websites like Archive of Our Own (AO3), or Tumblr. These websites are free and provide a community for creative minds to share their creative works. While the legality of fanfiction in general is debated, the real concern among creators is regarding AI-generated works. Original characters and works are being used for profit to “create” works through the use of Artificial Intelligence. Profits can be generated from fanfiction through the use of paid AI text generators to create written works, or through advertisements on platforms. What was once a celebration of favorite works has become tarnished through the theft of fanfiction by AI programs.

First Case to Address the Issue

Thaler v. Perlmutter is a new and instructive case on the issue of copyright and AI-generated creative works – namely artwork.[1] The action was brought by Stephen Thaler against the Copyright Office for denying his application for copyright due to the lack of human authorship.[2]  The D.C. Circuit court was the first to rule on whether AI-generated art can have copyright protections.[3] The court held that AI-created artwork could not be copyrighted.[4] In considering the plaintiff’s copyright registration application for “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” the Register concluded that this particular work would not support a claim to copyright because the work “lacked human authorship and thus no copyright existed in the first instance.”[5] The plaintiff’s primary contention was that the artwork was produced by the computer program he created, and, through its AI capabilities, the product was his.[6]

The court went on to opine that copyright is designed to adapt with the times.[7] Underlying that adaptability, however, has been a “consistent understanding that human creativity is the sine qua non at the core of copyrightability,” even as that human creativity is channeled through new tools or into new media.[8] Therefore, despite the plaintiff’s creation of the computer program, the painting was not produced by a human, and not eligible for copyright. This opinion, while relevant and clear, still leaves unanswered questions regarding the extent to which humans are involved in AI-generated work.[9] What level of human involvement is necessary for an AI creation to qualify for copyright?[10] Is there a percentage to meet? Does the AI program require multiple humans to work on it as a prerequisite? Adaptability with the times, while essential, also means that there are new, developing questions about the right ways to address new technology and its capabilities.

Implications of the Case for Fanfiction

Artificial Intelligence is a new concern among scholars. While its accessibility and convenience create endless new possibilities for a multitude of careers, it also directly threatens creative professions and creative outlets. Without the consent of or authority from creators, AI can use algorithms that process artwork and fictional literary works created by fans to create its own “original” work. AI has the ability to be used to replace professional and amateur creative writers. Additionally, as AI technological capacity increases, it can mimic and reproduce art that resembles or belongs to a human artist.[11]

However, the main concern for artists is wondering what AI will do to creative human industries in general.[12] Additionally, legal scholars are equally as concerned about what AI means for copyright law.[13] The main type of AI that fanfiction writers are concerned about is Generative AI.[14] Essentially, huge datasets are scraped together to train the AI, and through a technical process the AI is able to devise new content that resembles the training data but isn’t identical.[15] Creators are outraged at what they consider to be theft of their artistic creations.[16] Artwork, such as illustrations for articles, books, or album covers may soon face competition from AI, undermining a thriving area of commercial art as well.[17]

Currently, fanfiction is protected under the doctrine of fair use, which allows creators to add new elements, criticism, or commentary to an already existing work, in a way that transforms it.[18] The next question likely to stem from Thaler will be whether AI creations are subject to the same protections that fan created works are.

The fear of the possible consequences of AI can be slightly assuaged through the reality that AI cannot accurately and genuinely capture human memory, thoughts, and emotional expression. These human skills will continue to make creators necessary for their connections to humanity and the ability to express that connection. How a fan resonates with a novel or T.V. show, and then produces a piece of work based on that feeling, is uniquely theirs. The decision in Thaler reaffirms this notion. AI does not offer the human creative element that is required to both receive copyright and also connect with viewers in a meaningful way.[19]

Furthermore, the difficulty with new technology like AI is that it’s impossible to immediately understand and can cause feelings of frustration or a sense of threat. Change is uncomfortable. However, with knowledge and experience, AI might be a useful tool for fanfiction creators.

The element of creative projects that make them so meaningful to people is the way that they can provide a true insight and experience that is relatable and distinctly human.[20] The alternative to banning AI or completing rendering human artists obsolete is to find a middle ground that protects both sides. The interests of technological innovation should not supersede the concerns of artists and creators.

Ultimately, as stated in Thaler, AI artwork that has no human authorship does not get copyright.[21] However, this still leaves unanswered questions that future cases will likely present before the courts. Are there protections that can be made for online creators’ artwork and fictional writings to prevent their use or presence in AI databases? The Copyright Act exists to be malleable and adaptable with time.[22] Human involvement and creative control will have to be assessed as AI becomes more prominent in personal and professional settings.

Notes

[1] Thaler v. Perlmutter, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145823, *1.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id. at *3.

[7] Id. at *10.

[8] Id.

[9] https://www.natlawreview.com/article/judge-rules-content-generated-solely-ai-ineligible-copyright-ai-washington-report.

[10] Id.

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2023/jan/23/its-the-opposite-of-art-why-illustrators-are-furious-about-ai#:~:text=AI%20doesn%27t%20do%20the,what%20AI%20art%20is%20doing.%E2%80%9D.

[12] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/12/when-ai-can-make-art-what-does-it-mean-for-creativity-dall-e-midjourney.

[13] https://www.reuters.com/legal/ai-generated-art-cannot-receive-copyrights-us-court-says-2023-08-21.

[14] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/12/when-ai-can-make-art-what-does-it-mean-for-creativity-dall-e-midjourney.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] https://novelpad.co/blog/is-fanfiction-legal# (citing Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).

[19] https://www.reuters.com/default/humans-vs-machines-fight-copyright-ai-art-2023-04-01/.

[20] https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2023/08/is-art-generated-by-artificial-intelligence-real-art/.

[21] Thaler v. Perlmutter, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145823, *1.

[22] Id. at *10.

The Inaccessible Cure: the Struggle With Feline Infectious Peritonitis and Thoughts on the Underlying Law

October 10, 2023
FDA, Food and Drug Law, Intellectual Property, Patents, Pharmaceuticals

Lan Gan, MJLST Staffer

For fellow feline fanatics, you may share some of my traits. I care for my cat’s health as I care for my own. Besides giving her nutritiously balanced meals, I take notes when she’s unwell and schedule annual physicals for her, just like I would for myself. I also browse online discussions posts of cats. Some make me laugh, some give me new understanding of cat behaviors, but the ones about feline infectious peritonitis are always grim.

Feline Infectious Peritonitis, or FIP, is a severe disease that typically develops in young cats when they are infected with feline enteric coronavirus (FeCV) which later mutates into FIPV and causes inflammations.[1] The mutations happen about ten percent of the time, and, until recently, have almost always been deadly.[2]

In 2018, researchers at the School of Veterinary Medicine at UC Davis partnered with Gilead Sciences and published an article about the discovery of GS-441524, which, through their experiments with cats that were infected with FIPV in an in vitro process, “caused a rapid reversal of disease signs and return to normality with as little as two weeks of treatment in 10/10 cats and with no apparent toxicity.”[3] Another paper, published in 2019, also by researchers of the two institutions, revealed that GS-441524 was an effective treatment for cats with naturally occurring FIP.[4]

This gave cat rescuers and cat owners hope. But despite promising experiment results, Niels Pederson, who partook in the studies and was a long-time researcher devoted to FIP, warned that the development was “proof-of-concept,” showing possibility in terms of science but not immediately translating into commercially available products.[5] Subsequently, GS-441524 did not move forward to become an FDA-approved drug to treat cats.[6] Instead, it seemed to be set aside as Gilead prioritized another drug, remdesivir, which is identical to GS-441524 in part of its structural formula and has the same mechanism of inhibiting coronavirus.[7] When Gilead failed to obtain FDA approval to use remdesivir to treat Ebola, they changed course to study its effects on the then-rising Covid-19 pandemic.[8] GS-441524, with its studies on animals halted, was also part of the race and was argued by some scientists to have more efficacy in treating Covid-19 than remdesivir.[9]

The much-needed cure became inaccessible. In as early as 2019, anxious people were turning to the black market for help. GS-441524 that circulated on the black market had murky origins: potential leaks from lab orders for research, personnel that synthesized the compound themselves in overseas locations such as China.[10] The benefits of the drug, while still salient, based on surveys of cat owners who utilized them, were potentially compromised by the disparity in quality of the black market drugs, and lack of veterinary expertise involved.[11]

Pharmaceutical companies are more than incentivized to patent their research products. A search on World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s database revealed 66 patents applied for by Gilead, from as early as 2009 to as recently as July 2023.[12] The list of patents documented development in Gilead’s GS-441524 research.[13] Gilead patented GS-441524’s treatment for cats in 2018 and 2020[14], but those accounted for only 3 of the 66 patents they obtained; the rest were regarding human use.[15] Patents benefit their owners by giving them a cause of action against future infringement. They are about owning, not sharing. Patents are the culmination of a strenuous journey of scientific research. But this celebratory landmark might not go any further. Many patents do not make their way onto the market; having one is not itself an incentive for doing so.

Next comes the approval process as stipulated in federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 360b governs the approval process of new animal drugs.[16] The statute lays the burden on pharmaceutical companies – referred to as drug sponsors – of contacting the FDA after initial research of the drug, making the decision to pursue approval for the drug, and conducting tests to ensure the effectiveness and safety of the drug.[17] Additionally, the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act (GADPTRA) of 1988 provides an abbreviated process for generic copies of approved new animal drugs;[18] the Minor Use and Minor Species Animal Health Act (the “Mums Act”) of 2004 paves paths for drugs affecting a small population of major species of animals (defined as horses, dogs, cats, cattle, pigs, turkeys and chickens) and minor species (those that are not major species) that have few drugs available to them.[19] In 2018, the Animal Drug and Animal Generic Drug User Fee Amendments expanded the eligibility for conditional approval of non-MUMS drugs intending to treat a serious or life-threatening disease or condition or address an unmet animal or human health need, for which a demonstration of effectiveness would require a complex or particularly difficult study or studies.[20]

How has GS-441524 escaped the statutory provisions when they have been amended to be more inclusive? There may be various reasons. It may not qualify for conditional approval under 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc(a)(1)(ii) because peer-reviewed articles have already demonstrated the drug’s effectiveness. It may be hard to quantify the FIP-affected cat population to meet the “minor use” threshold set out in the Mums Act because of the difficulty of FIP testing. Current testing cannot differentiate between FeCV and the mutated FIPV, and an FIP diagnosis is often assumed for young cats based on their higher infection rate.[21] Lastly, no matter which approval process GS-441524 is eligible to take, the process wouldn’t start unless Gilead decides to contact the FDA and set forth the drug for approval. Current statutes create paths, but no incentives to do so. The market may provide some monetary incentives, as treatment costs via the black market can be up to $10,000 for 12 weeks[22], but this is singularly held back by the decision to prioritize approval for human treatment, and the presumption that the approval process of an animal drug would negatively impact the approval process of a similar drug for humans.[23]

The black market is not a long-term solution for FIP treatment. Though the U.S. has yet to adjudicate the circulation of unlicensed FIP treatment, in July 2023, a woman in China was sentenced to 15 years in prison and fined with more than $5 million in damages for producing and selling fake, substandard products pursuant to China’s criminal law statutes.[24] Gilead also holds the exclusive patents on feline treatments. Facing unclear prospects for legitimate FIP treatment, subsequent statutory amendments need to create actual incentives to spur innovation in animal drugs, in addition to the creation of paths. The law should also create safeguards to promote transparency and fairness in the application review process in order to reduce bias against animal drugs.

Notes

[1] Feline Infectious Peritonitis, Cornell Feline Health Center, https://www.vet.cornell.edu/departments-centers-and-institutes/cornell-feline-health-center/health-information/feline-health-topics/feline-infectious-peritonitis (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[2] Id.

[3] B.G. Murphy et al., The Nucleoside Analog GS-441524 Strongly Inhibits Feline Infectious Peritonitis (FIP) Virus in Tissue Culture and Experimental Cat Infection Studies, 219 Veterinary Microbology 226, 226 (2018).

[4] Niels C Pedersen, Efficacy and Safety of the Nucleoside Analog GS-441524 for Treatment of cats with Naturally Occurring Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 21(4) J. of Feline Med. & Surgery 271, 271 (2019).

[5] Human Antiviral ‘GS-441524’ Shows Great Promise Against Infectious Disease in Cats, Science Daily (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/02/190213100442.htm.

[6] Sarah Zhang, A Much-Hyped COVID-19 Drug Is Almost Identical to a Black-Market Cat Cure, The Atlantic (May 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/05/remdesivir-cats/611341/.

[7] Id.

[8] Kai Kupferschmidt & Jon Cohen, WHO Launches Global Megatrial of the Four Most Promising Coronavirus Treatments, Science (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.science.org/content/article/who-launches-global-megatrial-four-most-promising-coronavirus-treatments.

[9] E.g., Victoria C. Yan & Florian L. Muller, Advantages of the Parent Nucleoside GS-441524 over Remdesivir for Covid-19 Treatment, 11 ACS Med. Chemistry Letters 1361, 1361 (2020).

[10] See Sarah Zhang, A Much-Hyped COVID-19 Drug Is Almost Identical to a Black-Market Cat Cure, The Atlantic (May 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/05/remdesivir-cats/611341/; see also Sarah Jones et al., Unlicensed GS-441524-Like Antiviral Therapy Can Be Effective for at-Home Treatment of Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 11 Animals 2257, 2258 (2021).

[11] Sarah Jones et al., Unlicensed GS-441524-Like Antiviral Therapy Can Be Effective for at-Home Treatment of Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 11 Animals 2257, 2264–67 (2021).

[12] CHEM:(BRDWIEOJOWJCLU-LTGWCKQJSA-N), WIPO, https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/result.jsf?_vid=P22-LN8EIR-06824 (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[13] Id.

[14] See World Patent No. 169,946 (filed Mar. 13, 2018); see also U.S. Patent No. 0,296,584 (filed Mar. 13, 2018); see also U.S. Patent No. 0,376,014 (filed Apr. 17, 2020).

[15] See CHEM:(BRDWIEOJOWJCLU-LTGWCKQJSA-N), WIPO, https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/result.jsf?_vid=P22-LN8EIR-06824 (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[16] 21 U.S.C. § 360b.

[17] From an Idea to the Marketplace: The Journey of an Animal Drug through the Approval Process, FDA (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/animal-health-literacy/idea-marketplace-journey-animal-drug-through-approval-process.

[18] Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act (GADPTRA), FDA (Apr. 24, 2023), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/guidance-regulations/generic-animal-drug-and-patent-term-restoration-act-gadptra.

[19] Conditional Approval Explained: A Resource for Veterinarians, FDA (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/resources-you/conditional-approval-explained-resource-veterinarians.

[20] 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc (a)(1)(ii).

[21] Feline Infectious Peritonitis, Cornell Feline Health Center, https://www.vet.cornell.edu/departments-centers-and-institutes/cornell-feline-health-center/health-information/feline-health-topics/feline-infectious-peritonitis (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[22] Sarah Jones et al., Unlicensed GS-441524-Like Antiviral Therapy Can Be Effective for at-Home Treatment of Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 11 Animals 2257, 2264–67 (2021).

[23] Id.

[24] Wu Shubin (吴淑斌), Zhishou Maoyao Yishen Huoxing 15 Nian: Maoquan “Jiumingyao” de Yinmi Shengyi (制售猫药一审获刑15年:猫圈“救命药” 的隐秘生意) [Sentenced at Trial for 15 Years for Manufacturing and Selling Medicine for Cats: The Secret Business of Life-Saving Drugs in Cat-loving Communities], Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan (三联生活周刊) [Sanlian Lifeweek] (July 20, 2023), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/VKJO_AIVBy3Hm6GhWUOnWA.

A Manhattan Federal Jury Found Trademark Rights to Extend to the Metaverse. Why Should You Care?

March 4, 2023
Intellectual Property, Internet, Trademark Law

Carlisle Ghirardini, MJLST Staffer

Earlier this month, the federal court in the Southern District of New York issued an opinion regarding a luxury fashion brand’s trademark rights in the Metaverse – the first trial verdict concerning trademarks in non-fungible tokens (NFTs).[1] The suit was brought in January of 2022 by the Parisian fashion giant Hermès when a digital artist created NFTs of the brand’s iconic “Birkin bag” and made a profit selling these “MetaBirkins.”[2]

The key question in the suit came down to whether the NFT was likened to art, which would receive First Amendment protection, or a consumer product, which would be subject to trademark infringement liabilities.[3] A federal grand jury found the artist’s use of the Birkin name and style to be more commercial than artistic in nature, and, therefore, potentially infringing on Hermès’ trademarks depending on public perception.[4]

Trademark infringement is the unauthorized use of a mark in a way that would confuse a consumer as to the source of the product or service connected to the mark.[5] Surveys and social media evidence in this case showed confusion among NFT consumers as to Hermès’ involvement with the MetaBirkins, which led the jury to find the use of the mark to be infringing and a capitalization of the Hermès brand’s goodwill for profit.[6] Hermès was awarded $133,000 in total damages – a small win for the fashion powerhouse, but a huge win for brand owners across many different industries who now know their trademark rights may be protectable in the Metaverse.[7]

I don’t use or understand the Metaverse – why should I care about this decision?

Even for those who don’t know what an NFT is, this decision to extend trademarks rights to the Metaverse is still important. First, it is well known that many brands are now registering trademarks in the Metaverse, so if a consumer sees a brand in this realm, there is a higher likelihood of confusion of association with that virtual good or service. If people assume a connection between a brand and the illegal use of its mark, the brand is at risk of significant damage. For example, if an unauthorized user opened a Metaverse McDonald’s which gave out racy or controversial happy meal prizes, McDonald’s could face serious backlash if its consumers believed McDonald’s to be condoning such activities.[8]Although it seems like this connection may be less convincing or harmful for a big brand like McDonald’s, it was enough to compel Hermès to protect the integrity of their brand and their customers.[9] It is not only big brands that can be victims of such infringement, however. While it is easy to understand why someone would take advantage of a more recognized company due to greater traffic, this could easily happen to smaller brands we know and love. If the little coffee shop chain you frequent is hurt by such virtual infringement, perhaps by a local competitor, it could run them out of business. Connecting a brand in the Metaverse to products or values they are not aligned with could have damaging real world effects.[10]

Just as brand exposure in the Metaverse can cause harm, it also has the potential to benefit businesses. Such virtual brand display, which is cheaper than buying advertising or opening a new brick and mortar store, can translate to more business in the real world.[11] Brands have started creating virtual experiences that have driven in-store sales and served as powerful marketing. Vans shoe and skateboard company, for example, made a Metaverse skatepark in which users could earn points when “boarding” that were redeemable for discounts inside real Vans stores.[12] Chipotle released a burrito-making game that yielded “burrito bucks” for exchange in their actual restaurants.[13] As use of NFTs grows, and as brands recognize the ramifications of the Hermès lawsuit, we will likely continue to see more trademarks used in the Metaverse. Brand owners should keep in mind the dangers of failing to sufficiently protect their trademarks in the virtual space and the potential for benefits if used strategically.

Notes

[1] Reed Clancy and Alexander Curylo, Verdict Reached in MetaBirkin NFT Case, AIPLA NEWSTAND (Feb. 9, 2023), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0faf6e67-38b4-4add-971d-badd08199c0c&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-+Body+-+General+section&utm_campaign=AIPLA+2013+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed+2023-02-13&utm_term=.

[2] Muzamil Abdul Huq et al., Hermès Successfully Defends its Trademark in the Metaverse, AIPLA NEWSTAND (Feb. 9, 2023), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6dba3b12-030d-41ff-98c6-1c2aad6468ce&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-+Body+-+General+section&utm_campaign=AIPLA+2013+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed+2023-02-13&utm_term=.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] About Trademark Infringement, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademark-infringement (last visited Feb. 17, 2023).

[6] Huq et al., Hermès Successfully Defends its Trademark in the Metaverse, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Feb. 9, 2023).

[7] Id.

[8] Joanna Fantozzi, Why Every Restaurant Operator Should Care About NFTs and the Metaverse Right Now, NATION’SRESTAURANT NEWS (Feb. 25, 2022) https://www.nrn.com/technology/why-every-restaurant-operator-should-care-about-nfts-and-metaverse-right-now.

[9] Zachary Small, Hermès Wins MetaBirkins Lawsuit; Jurors Not Convinced NFTs Are Art, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/08/arts/hermes-metabirkins-lawsuit-verdict.html.

[10] Fantozzi, Why Every Restaurant Operator Should Care About NFTs and the Metaverse Right Now, NATION’SRESTAURANT NEWS (Feb. 25, 2022).

[11] Id.

[12] Andrew Hanson, Understanding the Metaverse and its Impact on the Future of Digital Marketing, CUKER (Mar. 29, 2022), https://www.cukeragency.com/understanding-metaverse-and-its-impact-future-digi/.

[13] Dani James, How Retailers are Connecting the Metaverse to real World Sales and Revenues, RETAILDIVE (Nov. 14, 2022), https://www.retaildive.com/news/retailers-connecting-metaverse-roblox-real-world-revenue/636209/.

Who Qualifies for the Patent Bar? Proposed Changes May Mean More Applicants With Computer Science Degrees Soon Will

November 27, 2022
Intellectual Property, Legal Education, Patents

Nina Elder, MJLST Staffer

Last month, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) put out a request for comments on a proposal to amend the admission requirements for the registration examination it administers. Passing this examination, colloquially referred to as the patent bar, is required before an aspiring practitioner can practice patent matters before the USPTO. To qualify for the test, applicants must demonstrate that they have the appropriate scientific and technical training. There are three ways to qualify, but most applicants are automatically admitted under “Category A” which simply requires a degree in an approved topic. The USPTO has historically adhered strictly to its list of approved degrees; for example, “biology” is included on the list, but in the past a degree in “biological sciences” did not qualify.

In 2021, the USPTO made its first major change to the admission requirements in years by expanding the degrees accepted under Category A to include advanced degrees and 14 new undergraduate majors. Though it did not officially announce it, the USPTO also edited its Frequently Asked Questions to reflect that it no longer requires that an applicant’s degree match a Category A degree title exactly, but instead evaluates any degree that is similar to an approved degree to determine if they are equivalent. However, even after these improvements there was still a clear lack of approved computer science-related degrees, and many attorneys felt the USPTO needed to do more. The USPTO’s new proposal at least partially addresses this issue and suggests several more changes, a key one being removing the certification requirement for computer science degrees.

Currently, computer science degrees only qualify under Category A if they are certified by either the Computing Accreditation Commission or the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology. This is the only degree accepted under Category A that requires extra certification. Qualifying under either of the alternative routes—Category B or C—may be nearly impossible for many students with computer science degrees. Category B requires an applicant establish they have the necessary training by showing they have a certain number of credits in particular scientific topics. However, the coursework needed for a computer science degree typically does not align with the subjects required for Category B such as physics, chemistry, and biology. Under Category C an applicant can prove they have practical training by taking the Fundamentals of Engineering test, but once again the information covered for a degree in computer science may not prepare a student for such a test. 

As of November 2022, there are only 368 schools in the US with a qualifying certified computer science program. Many highly respected schools, including Stanford, UC Berkeley, and Carnegie Mellon, do not have the required certification for their computer science programs. Considering there appear to be more than 700 four-year schools that offer computer science degrees, there are likely hundreds of computer science students graduating every year that do not qualify to take the patent bar under Category A and may have difficulty qualifying under Category B or C. Even if a school becomes accredited, any student that received a degree before that accreditation does not qualify.

The certification requirement may be excluding the “best and brightest” computer practitioners, and is contributing to the lack of practitioners with relevant experience in a heavily patented area. There is a huge disconnect between the number of patents related to software and the number of practitioners with a relevant background. As of 2010, less than 5% of patent practitioners trained in a computer science-related field. While decisions such as Alice Corp v CLS Bank International have limited what software can be patented, a growing number of patents at least include some element relating to computers and more than 60% of utility patents issued in 2019 related to software. There is clearly an increasing need for competent patent attorneys with experience in software and, if adopted, the USPTO’s current proposal would increase that pool.

It has also been suggested that altering patent bar requirements may improve diversity in patent law. Despite women making up more than 37% of attorneys in the US, only 17% of patent attorneys are women. Less than 15% of patent practitioners with a background in computer science are women. The picture is even more striking when we examine racial diversity—less than 7% of all patent attorneys and agents are minorities. Shockingly, there are more male patent practitioners named Michael than women of color. The USPTO’s broadening of the accepted degrees last year was spurred by a journal article written by a law student, Mary Hannon, suggesting that changes to patent bar admission may help address the low number of women in patent law. While she acknowledged that removing the computer science certification requirement would not close the gender gap since the majority of computer science graduates are men, she pointed out that by allowing more individuals with computer science degrees to take the patent bar the overall number of women admitted to the exam may increase. 

Many have been pushing for changes to the patent bar admission requirements for years, and while it is promising to see progress being made, there is still more that can be done. Organizations such as the American Intellectual Property Law Association have suggested Category A be broadened even further to include degrees such as data science and mathematics. The USPTO has not only shown willingness to continue updating these requirements, as evidenced by the fact it is proposing to regularly consider and add new Category A degrees, but also that it is responsive to comments. For example, environmental engineering was added to the list of accepted degrees at least partially in response to a comment. Kathi Vidal, USPTO’s current director, explained the goal is to ensure the USPTO remains dynamic by recognizing the new types of degrees being awarded as society and technology evolve. In its recent request for comments, the USPTO asked commenters to weigh in on its new proposals and to submit general suggestions on updating the scientific and technical requirements for admission to the patent bar. Comments close on January 17th, 2023—if you have thoughts about the degrees the USPTO should accept under Category A, go comment!


Only Humans Are Allowed: Federal Circuit Says No to “AI Inventors”

October 26, 2022
Artificial Intelligence, Intellectual Property, Inventions, New Technology, Patents

Vivian Lin, MJLST Staffer

On August 5, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. District for the Eastern Division of Virginia’s decision that artificial intelligence (AI) cannot be an “inventor” on a patent application,[1] joining many other jurisdictions in confirming that only a natural person can be an “inventor”.[2] Currently, South Africa remains the only jurisdiction that has granted Dr. Stephan Thaler’s patent naming DABUS, an AI, as the sole inventor of two patentable inventions.[3] With the release of the Federal Circuit’s opinion refusing to recognize AI as an inventor, Dr. Thaler’s fight to credit AI for inventions reaches a plateau. 

DABUS, formally known as Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience, is an AI-based creativity machine created by Dr. Stephan Thaler, the founder of the software company Imagination Engine Inc. Dr. Thaler claimed that DABUS independently invented two patentable inventions: The Factual Container and the Neural Flame. For the past few years, Dr. Thaler has been in battle with patent offices around the world trying to receive patents for these two inventions. Until this date, every patent office, except one,[4] has refused to grant the patents on the grounds that the applications do not name a natural person as the inventor. 

The inventor of a patent being a natural person is a legal requirement in many jurisdictions. The recent Federal Circuit opinion ruled mainly based on statutory interpretation, arguing that the text is clear in requiring a natural person to be the inventor.[5] Though there are many jurisdictions that have left the term “inventor” undefined, it seems to be a general agreement that an inventor should be a natural person.[6]

Is DABUS the True Inventor?

There are many issues centered around AI inventorship. The first is whether AI can be the true inventor, and subsequently take credit for an invention, even though a human created the AI itself. Here it becomes necessary to inquire into whether there was human intervention during the discovery process, and if so, what type of intervention was involved. It might be the case that a natural human was the actual inventor of a product while AI only assisted in carrying out that idea. For example, when a developer designed the AI with a particular question in mind and carefully selected the training data, the AI is only assisting the invention while the developer is seen as the true inventor.[7] In analyzing the DABUS case, Dr. Rita Matulionyte, a senior lecturer at Macquarie Law School in Australia and an expert in intellectual property and information technology law, has argued that DABUS is not the true inventor because Dr. Thaler’s role in the inventions was unquestionable, assuming he formulated the problem, developed the algorithm, created the training date, etc.[8] 

However, it is a closer question when both AI and human effort are important for the invention. For example, AI might identify the compound for a new drug, but to conclude the discovery, a scientist still has to test the compound.[9] The U.S. patent law requires that the “inventor must contribute to the conception of the invention.”[10] Further defined, conception is “the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.”[11] In the drug discovery scenario, it is difficult to determine who invented the new drug. Neither the AI developers nor the scientists fit the definition of “inventor”: The AI developers and trainers only built and trained the algorithm without any knowledge of the potential discovery while the scientists only confirmed the final discovery without contributing to the development of the algorithm or the discovery of the drug.[12] In this scenario, it is likely the AI did the majority of the work and made the important discovery itself, and should thus be the inventor of the new compound.[13]

The debate on who is the true inventor is important because mislabeling the inventor can cause serious consequences. Legally, improper inventorship attribution may cause a patent application to be denied, or it may lead to the later invalidation of a granted patent. Practically speaking, human inventors are able to take credit for their invention and that honor comes with recognition which may incentive future creative inventions. Thus, a misattribution may harm human inventiveness as true inventors could be discouraged by not being recognized for their contributions. 

Should AI-Generated Inventions be Patentable?

While concluding that AI is the sole inventor of an invention may be difficult as outlined in the previous section, what happens when AI is found to be the true, sole inventor? Society’s discussion on whether AI inventions should be patented focuses mostly on policy arguments. Dr. Thaler and Ryan Abbott, a law professor and the lead of Thaler’s legal team, have argued that allowing patent protection for AI-generated inventions will encourage developers to invest time in building more creative machines that will eventually lead to more inventions in the future.[14] They also argued that crediting AI for inventorship will protect the rights of human inventors.[15] For example, it cuts out the possibility of one person taking credit for another’s invention, which often happens when students participate in university research but are overlooked on patent applications.[16] Without patent applicability, the patent system’s required disclosure of inventions, it is very likely that owners of AI will keep inventions secret and privately benefit from the monopoly for however long it takes the rest of society to figure it out independently.[17] 

Some critics argue against Thaler and Abbott’s view. For one, they believe that AI at its current stage is not autonomous enough to be an inventor and human effort should be properly credited.[18] Even if AI can independently invent, its inventions should not be patentable because once it is, there will be too many patented inventions by AI in the same field owned by the same group of people who have access to these machines.[19] That will prevent smaller companies from entering into this field, having a negative effect on human inventiveness.[20]  Finally, there has been a concern that not granting patents to AI-invented creations will let AI owners keep the inventions as trade secrets, leading to a potential long-term monopoly. However, that might not be a big concern as inventions like the two created by DABUS are likely to be easily reverse engineered once they reach the market.[21]

Currently, Dr. Thaler plans to file appeals in each jurisdiction that has rejected his application and aims to seek copyright protection as an alternative in the U.S. It is questionable that Dr. Thaler will succeed on those appeals, but if he ever does, it will likely result in major changes to patent systems around the world. Even if most jurisdictions today forbid AI from being classified as an inventor, with the advancement of technology the need to address this issue will become more and more pressing as time goes on. 

Notes

[1] Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

[2] Ryan Abbott, July 2022 AIP Update Around the World, The Artificial Inventor Project (July 10, 2022), https://artificialinventor.com/867-2/.

[3] Id.

[4] South Africa’s patent law does not have a requirement on inventors being a natural person. Jordana Goodman, Homography of Inventorship: DABUS And Valuing Inventors, 20 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 1, 17 (2022).

[5] Thaler, 43 F.4th at 1209, 1213.

[6] Goodman, supra note 4, at 10.

[7] Ryan Abbott, The Artificial Inventor Project, WIPO Magazine (Dec. 2019), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2019/06/article_0002.html.

[8] Rita Matulionyte, AI as an Inventor: Has the Federal Court of Australia Erred in DABUS? 12 (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3974219.

[9] Susan Krumplitsch et al. Can An AI System Be Named the Inventor? In Wake Of EDVA Decision, Questions Remain, DLA Piper (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2021/09/can-an-ai-system-be-named-the-inventor/#11

[10] 2109 Inventorship, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2109.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2022).

[11] Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

[12] Krumplitsch et al., supra note 9.

[13] Yosuke Watanabe, I, Inventor: Patent Inventorship for Artificial Intelligence Systems, 57 Idaho L. Rev. 473, 290.

[14] Abbott, supra note 2.

[15] Id.

[16] Goodman, supra note 4, at 21.

[17] Abbott, supra note 2.

[18] Matulionyte, supra note 8, at 10–14.

[19] Id. at 19.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 18.



After Hepp: Section 230 and State Intellectual Property Law

October 13, 2022
Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Internet, Social Media

Kelso Horne IV, MJLST Staffer

Although hardly a competitive arena, Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”) is almost certainly the best known of all telecommunications laws in the United States. Shielding Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and websites from liability for the content published by their users, § 230(c)’s policy goals are laid out succinctly, if a bit grandly, in § 230(a) and § 230(b).[1] These two sections speak about the internet as a force for economic and social good, characterizing it as a “vibrant and competitive free market” and “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”[2] But where §§ 230(a),(b) both speak broadly of a utopian vision for the internet, and (c) grants websites substantial privileges, § 230(e) gets down to brass tacks.[3]

CDA: Goals and Text

The CDA lays out certain limitations on the shield protections provided by § 230(c).[4] Among these is § 230(e)(2) which states in full, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”[5] This particular section, despite its seeming clarity, has been the subject of litigation for over a decade, and in 2021 a clear circuit split was opened between the 9th and 3rd Circuit Courts over how this short sentence applies to state intellectual property laws. The 9th Circuit Court follows the principle that the policy portions of § 230 as stated in §§ 230(a),(b) should be controlling, and that, as a consequence, state intellectual property claims should be barred. The 3rd Circuit Court follows the principle that the plain text of § 230(e)(2) unambiguously allows for state intellectual property claims.

Who Got There First? Lycos and Perfect 10

In Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., the 1st Circuit Court faced this question obliquely; the court assumed that they were not immunized from state intellectual property law by § 230 and the claims were dismissed, but on different grounds.[6] Consequently, when the 9th Circuit released their opinion in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBILL LLC only one month later, they felt free to craft their own rule on the issue.[7] Consisting of a few short paragraphs, the court’s decision on state intellectual property rights is nicely summarized in a short sentence. They stated that “As a practical matter, inclusion of rights protected by state law within the ‘intellectual property’ exemption would fatally undermine the broad grant of immunity provided by the CDA.”[8] The court’s analysis in Perfect 10 was almost entirely based on what allowing state intellectual property claims would do to the policy goals stated in § 230(a) and § 230(b), and did not attempt, or rely on, a particularly thorough reading of § 230(e)(2). Here the court looks at both the policy stated in § 230(a) and § 230(b) and the text of § 230(e)(2) and attempts to rectify them. The court clearly sees the possibility of issues arising from allowing plaintiffs to bring cases through fifty different state systems against websites and ISPs for the postings of their users. This insight may be little more than hindsight, however, given the date of the CDA’s drafting.

Hepp Solidifies a Split

Perfect 10 would remain the authoritative appellate level case on the issue of the CDA and state intellectual property law until 2021, when the 3rd Circuit stepped into the ring.[9] In Hepp v. Facebook, Pennsylvania newsreader Karen Hepp sued Facebook for hosting advertisements promoting a dating website and other services which had used her likeness without her permission.[10] In a much longer analysis, the 3rd Circuit held that the 9th Circuit’s interpretation argued for by Facebook “stray[ed] too far from the natural reading of § 230(e)(2)”.[11] Instead, the 3rd Circuit argued for a closer reading of the text of § 230(e)(2) which they said aligned closely with a more balanced selection of policy goals, including allowance for state intellectual property law.[12] The court also mentions structural arguments relied on by Facebook, mostly examining how narrow the other exceptions in 230(e) are, which the majority states “cuts both ways” since Congress easily cabined meanings when they wanted to.[13]

The dissent in Hepp agreed with the 9th Circuit that the policy goals stated in §§230(a),(b) should be considered controlling.[14] It also noted two cases in other circuits where courts had shown hesitancy towards allowing state intellectual property claims under the CDA to go forward, although both claims had been dismissed on other grounds.[15] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the dissent sees the structural arguments as compelling, and in Facebook’s favor.[16] With the circuits now definitively split on the issue, the text of §§ 230(a),(b) would certainly seem to demand the Supreme Court, or Congress, step in and provide a clear standard.

What Next? Analyzing the CDA

Despite being a pair of decisions ostensibly focused on parsing out what exactly Congress was intending when they drafted § 230, both Perfect 10 and Hepp left out any citation to legislative history when discussing the § 230(e)(2) issue. However, this is not as odd as it seems at first glance. The Communications Decency Act is large, over a hundred pages in length, and § 230 makes up about a page and a half.[17] Most of the content of the legislative reports published after the CDA was passed instead focused on its landmark provisions which attempted, mostly unsuccessfully, to regulate obscene materials on the internet.[18] Section 230 gets a passing mention, less than a page, some of which is taken up with assurances that it would not interfere with civil liability for those engaged in “cancelbotting,” a controversial anti-spam method of the Usenet era.[19] It is perhaps unfair to say that § 230 was an afterthought, but it is likely that lawmakers did not understand its importance at the time of passage. This may be an argument for eschewing the 9th Circuit’s analysis which seemingly imparts the CDA’s drafters with an overly high degree of foresight into § 230’s use by internet companies over a decade later.

Indeed, although one may wish that Congress had drafted it differently, the text of § 230(e)(2) is clear, and the inclusion of “any” as a modifier to “law” makes it difficult to argue that state intellectual property claims are not exempted by the general grant of immunity in § 230.[20] Congressional inaction should not give way to courts stepping in to determine what they believe would be a better Act. Indeed, the 3rd Circuit majority in Hepp may be correct in stating that Congress did in fact want state intellectual property claims to stand. Either way, we are faced with no easy judicial answer; to follow the clear text of the section would be to undermine what many in the e-commerce industry clearly see as an important protection and to follow the purported vision of the Act stated in §§230(a),(b) would be to remove a protection to intellectual property which victims of infringement may use to defend themselves. The circuit split has made it clear that this is a question on which reasonable jurists can disagree. Congress, as an elected body, is in the best position to balance these equities, and they should use their law making powers to definitively clarify the issue.

Notes

[1] 47 U.S.C. § 230.

[2] Id.

[3] 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).

[4] Id.

[5] 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).

[6] Universal v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)(“UCS’s remaining claim against Lycos was brought under Florida trademark law, alleging dilution of the “UCSY” trade name under Fla. Stat. § 495.151. Claims based on intellectual property laws are not subject to Section 230 immunity.”).

[7] 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).

[8] Id. at 1119 n.5.

[9] Kyle Jahner, Facebook Ruling Splits Courts Over Liability Shield Limits for IP, Bloomberg Law, (Sep. 28, 2021, 11:32 AM).

[10] 14 F.4th 204, 206-7 (3d Cir. 2021).

[11] Id. at 210.

[12] Id. at 211.

[13] Hepp v. Facebook, 14 F.4th 204 (3d Cir. 2021)(“[T]he structural evidence it cites cuts both ways. Facebook is correct that the explicit references to state law in subsection (e) are coextensive with federal laws. But those references also suggest that when Congress wanted to cabin the interpretation about state law, it knew how to do so—and did so explicitly.”).

[14] 14 F.4th at 216-26 (Cowen, J., dissenting).

[15] Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).

[16] 14 F.4th at 220 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (“[T]he codified findings and policies clearly tilt the balance in Facebook’s favor.”).

[17] Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137-39.

[18] H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 104-230 at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).

[19] Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: Does the Internet Still Need Section 230 Immunity?, 68 Cath. U. L. Rev. 597, 602 n.27 (2019); see Denise Pappalardo & Todd Wallack, Antispammers Take Matters Into Their Own Hands, Network World, Aug. 11, 1997, at 8 (“cancelbots are programs that automatically delete Usenet postings by forging cancel messages in the name of the authors. Normally, they are used to delete postings by known spammers. . . .”).

[20] 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).

I Think, Therefore I Am: The Battle for Intellectual Property Rights With Artificial Intelligence

March 17, 2022
Artificial Intelligence, Intellectual Property, New Technology, Patents

Sara Pistilli, MJLST Staffer

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a computer or robot that is able to perform tasks that are usually done by humans because they require human judgement and intellect. Some AI can be self-learning, allowing them to learn and progress beyond their initial programming. This creates an issue of inventorship when AI creates patentable subject matter without any contribution from the original inventor of the AI system. This technological advancement has posed the larger question of whether AI qualifies as an “individual” under the United States Patent Act and whether people who create AI machines are able to claim the patent rights when the AI has created the patentable subject matter.

Artificial Intelligence “Inventors”

Patent law is continuously changing as technology expands and advances. While the law has advanced to accommodate innovative technology in the past, the introduction of AI has not been fully articulated. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) opened up for comment on patenting AI inventions in 2019, however, it does not appear they asked for any further purpose other than to gather information from the public. The USPTO again asked for comment about patent eligibility jurisprudence as it related to specific technological areas, including AI in 2021. They gathered this information as a “study” and did not pursue any official action. The first official push to recognize AI as an inventor was by Dr. Stephen Thaler. Thaler built an AI machine called “DABUS,” and sought patent rights for the machine’s inventions. Thaler did not argue for DABUS to be the patent right holder, but rather the machine to be named the inventor with Thaler as the patent owner. Thaler’s insistence to name DABUS as the inventor complies with USPTO’s rulesregarding an inventor’s oath or declaration that accompanies a patent application.

United States’ Rulings

Thaler applied for patent rights over a food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention. Both of these products were invented by his AI machine, DABUS. After applying for a U.S. patent, the USPTO rejected his application stating that U.S. law does not allow for artificial intelligence to be listed as an inventor on a patent application or patent. USPTO cited the Patent Act, stating an inventor must be a person, not a machine. USPTO stated that to allow “inventor” to include machines was too broad. Thaler requested reconsideration from the USPTO which was later denied. In 2021, Thaler appealed his rejection in the Eastern District of Virginia. Thaler failed to obtain patent rights with Judge Brinkema ruling only a human can be an inventor. Judge Brinkema relied heavily on statutory interpretation of the word “individual” which was performed by the Supreme Court in a 2012 case on the Torture Victim Protection Act. The Supreme Court had concluded that an “individual” referred to a “natural person.” Judge Brinkema further stated, that it will be up to Congress’ discretion on how they would like to alter patent law to accommodate for AI in the future. Thaler now has a pending appeal to the Court of Appeals.

International Rulings

While countries’ patent systems are independent of one another, they can be influenced based on technological and regulatory advancement happening in another country. Thaler has sought patent rights for DABUS’ two inventions discussed above in several countries including, but not limited to, the United Kingdom, Australia, and South Africa. Thaler obtained patent rights in South Africa, constituting a first in intellectual property history. Of note, however, is that South Africa’s patent system does not have a substantive patent examination system like other countries, nor do their patent laws define “inventor.” Thaler received a more persuasive ruling in Australia that may be able to effectuate change in other countries.  In 2021, Thaler’s patent application was denied in Australia. The Australian Patent Office (APO) stated that the language of the Patents Act was inconsistent with AI being treated as an inventor. Thaler appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Australia. Justice Beach ordered that this case must be remitted based on his ruling that AI can be a recognized inventor under the Australian Patents Act. Judge Beach further stated that AI cannot, however, be an applicant for a patent or an owner of a patent. It is with these reasons that Judge Beach requested reconsideration and remitted this case back to the Deputy Commissioner of the APO. The APO is now appealing this decision. Similar to the APO, the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) also pushed back against Thaler’s application for patent rights. In 2019, the UKIPO rejected Thaler’s application stating that the listing of DABUS as an inventor did not meet the requirements of the United Kingdom’s Patent Act. They stated a person must be identified as the inventor. Thaler appealed this rejection and was again denied by the UKIPO, who stated that a machine as an inventor does not allow for the innovation desired by patent rights. Thaler appealed again, to the England and Wales Patents Court, and was again denied patent rights. The judge stated that Thaler was using the Patent Act text out of context for his argument, ruling that the Patent Act cannot be construed to allow non-human inventors. In 2021, Thaler appealed this decision in the England and Wales Court of Appeals. He was again denied patent rights with all three judges agreeing that a patent is a right that can only be granted to a person and, that an inventor must be a person.

Future Prospects

Thaler currently has pending applications in several countries including Brazil, Canada, China, and Japan. The outcome of the appeal against the Federal Court of Australia’s decision on whether AI can be an inventor may prove crucial in helping to amend U.S. patent laws. Similarly, if more countries, in addition to South Africa, outright grant Thaler his patent rights, the U.S. may be forced to re-think their policies on AI-invented patentable subject matter.

Social Media Influencers Ask What “Intellectual Property” Means

February 18, 2022
Copyrights, Data, Intellectual Property, Internet, Social Media, Trademark Law

Henry Killen, MJLST Staffer

Today, just about anyone can name their favorite social media influencer. The most popular influencers are athletes, musicians, politicians, entrepreneurs, or models. Ultra-famous influencers, such as Kylie Jenner, can charge over 1 million dollars for a single post with a company’s product. So what are the risks of being an influencer? Tik Tok star Charli D’Amelio has been on both sides of intellectual property disputes. A photo of Charli was included in media mogul Sheeraz Hasan’s video promoting his ability to “make anyone famous.” The video featured many other celebrities such as Logan Paul and Zendaya. Charli’s legal team sent a cease-and-desist letter to Sheeraz demanding that her portion of the promotional video is scrubbed. Her lawyers assert that her presence in the promo “is not approved and will not be approved.” Charli has also been on the other side of celebrity intellectual property issues. The star published her first book In December and has come under fire from photographer Jake Doolittle for allegedly using photos he took without his permission. Though no lawsuit has been filed, Jake posted a series of Instagram posts blaming Charli’s team for not compensating him for his work.

Charli’s controversies highlight a bigger question society is facing, is content shared on social media platforms considered intellectual property? A good place to begin is figuring out what exactly intellectual property is. Intellectual property “refers to creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and symbols, names, and images used in commerce.” Social media platforms make it possible to access endless displays of content – from images to ideas – creating a cultural norm of sharing many aspects of life. Legal teams at the major social media platforms already have policies in place that make it against the rules to take images from a social media feed and use them as one’s own. For example, Bloggers may not be aware what they write may already by trademarked or copyrighted or that the images they get off the internet for their posts may not be freely reposted. Influencers get reposted on sites like Instagram all the time, and not just by loyal fans. These reposts may seem harmless to many influencers, but it is actually against Instagram’s policy to repost a photo without the creator’s consent. This may seem like not a big deal because what influencer doesn’t want more attention? However, sometimes influencers’ work gets taken and then becomes a sensation. A group of BIPOC TikTok users are fighting to copyright a dance they created that eventually became one of biggest dances in TikTok history. A key fact in their case is that the dance only became wildly popular after the most famous TiKTok users began doing it.

There are few examples of social media copyright issues being litigated, but in August 2021, a Manhattan Federal judge ruled that the practice of embedding social media posts on third-party websites, without permission from the content owner, could violate the owner’s copyright. In reaching this decision, the judge rejected the “server test” from the 9th Circuit, which holds that embedding content from a third party’s social media account only violates the contents owner’s copyright if a copy is stored on the defendant’s serves. .  General copyright laws from Congress lay out four considerations when deciding if a work should be granted copyright protection: originality, fixation, idea versus expression, and functionality. These considerations notably leave a gray area in determining if dances or expressions on social media sites can be copyrighted. Congress should enact a more comprehensive law to better address intellectual property as it relates to social media.

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