Internet

The Rise of the Tea App: What to Do if You’re Defamed

December 22, 2025
Internet, Social Media, Torts Law

Kate Neill, MJLST Staffer

Introduction

The Tea App has exploded in popularity in the past year as a place for women to anonymously share their experiences with men they have dated or matched with online. The app was launched in 2023 as a “women-only dating safety net” for those navigating the modern dating scene.[1] To gain access to the platform, users must first submit a photo as proof of their gender. Once approved, users can anonymously share photos of men, soliciting comments from other women warning them of potential “red flags.” Platforms allowing women to crowdsource information on potential partners are not a novel concept; in fact, Facebook groups such as “Are We Dating the Same Guy” have existed for years. However, the rapid-growing popularity of the tea app has raised legal controversy, and several law firms now advertise representation for men believing they have been targeted by defamatory posts.[2]

Why it Resonates: The Modern Dating Landscape

Information-sharing groups have grown out of necessity as dating has radically changed in the 21st century. Most people have seen a now-famous graph tracing how couples met over time: meeting through mutual friends used to dominate, while today that category has plummeted as dating apps have skyrocketed.[3] Putting aside whether this shift is good or bad, it undeniably changes the safety dynamics in dating. When your date came recommended by a friend, you had informal assurances about their character and background. Today, the norm is going out with someone who is, essentially, a complete stranger thanks to online dating. Whatever the benefits of digital dating, this erosion of social vetting introduces new vulnerabilities. With this new risk, it’s no surprise that women are turning back to the internet to find out who exactly they’re getting involved with.

Many women argue that anonymous platforms such as the Tea App create a necessary safe space to share about harmful dating experiences without fear of retaliation.[4] Considering online dating looks a lot like the wild west, this is an understandable perspective. However, anonymous information sharing through social media inevitably opens the door to ill-intended revenge plots and false rumors. The Tea App has just as quickly become a vehicle for defamatory statements that cause reputational harm.

Legal Stakes: When Posts Become Defamation

Posts that make a false statement of fact about an identifiable person that harms their reputation may rise to the level of defamation. Proving a post constitutes defamation requires (1) the statement is presented as a fact (not an opinion), (2) the post is conveyed to a third party (shared to the platform for other users to see), (3) made with some degree of fault (negligence for private individuals and “actual malice” for public figures), (4) and causes demonstrable reputational harm.

Therefore, posts that say “I felt unsafe on my date” are opinions, and not considered defamation. But, if a user makes an untrue factual allegation, there are potential legal ramifications. For example, multiple lawsuits arose in the state of Michigan after a young man was accused of rape on the Tea App.[5] Criminal allegations represent the type of posts ripe for litigation, though these lawsuits are generally considered an uphill battle for plaintiffs. The anonymity of the Tea App is an added barrier for proving defamation because it complicates the fault analysis.[6] Tracing the original poster can require cooperation from the platform or even subpoenas.

What to Do if You Believe You’ve Been Defamed

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides broad immunity for online platforms for content posted by their users.[7] Section 230 provides an effective legal shield for the Tea App to avoid defamation lawsuits targeting the app. Despite the platform itself being protected, those harmed by content posted on the Tea App may be able to take legal action against the individual user who posted the harmful content to the protected app.[8]

If you believe you have been defamed on the Tea App, consider taking the following action:

  1. Preserve Evidence: Screenshot posts before they are deleted or removed. Evidence existing on social media can quickly vanish, so work with a trusted friend to gain access to the app (in the case of men unable to access the Tea App) and document everything including the harmful posts, users accounts, and timestamps.[9]
  2. Request Removal: File a removal request through the app’s reporting process. The Tea App has policies against defamatory content, and the platform purports to remove content that violates these guidelines.[10] If attempts directly through the app are unsuccessful, you can file a complaint directly through the Apple App Store.[11] Because posts often include photos taken from your social media accounts, this strategy involves a copyright infringement claim. Apple will in turn put pressure on the platform to remove the harmful or infringing content.[12]
  3. Consult an Attorney: Especially if posts allege criminal conduct, use your full identity, or cause employment or social consequences, consider seeking legal advice. Experienced attorneys can help ensure post removal and determine if posts meet the legal requirements for defamation.[13]
  4. Consider a Defamation Action: In serious cases, you may be able to assert your rights through a defamation lawsuit.[14] However, keep in mind that identifying users may require a time-consuming legal process and cooperation with the platform.

Conclusion

The rise of the Tea App reflects changes in how we date and how we protect ourselves in the real world. Crowdsourced information is important for protecting women, but information-sharing comes with responsibility. If something false and harmful is attached to your name, you are not powerless. Preserve evidence, request removal, and speak with counsel if necessary. Ultimately, the goal on all sides is to foster a safe, honest dating environment to bring back real-world connection in the digital age.

[1] The Tea App: From Safety Haven to Legal Showdown, Henderson, Goldberg & DeMarco LLP, https://www.hgdlawfirm.com/blog/the-tea-app-from-safety-haven-to-legal-showdown/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).

[2] See, e.g., Minc Law, Tea App Defamation: What to Do If You’re Defamed on the Tea App, MincLaw.com, July 25, 2025, https://www.minclaw.com/tea-app-defamation/.

[3] Michael J. Rosenfeld et al., Disintermediating Your Friends: How Online Dating in the United States Displaces Other Ways of Meeting, 116 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 17753, Fig. 1 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1908630116.

[4] See e.g., Jacqui Wakefield, My Ex Stalked Me, So I Joined a ‘Dating Safety’ App. Then My Address was leaked, BBC (Aug. 22, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce87rer52k3o; Scarlett Dempsey, Tea Dating Safety App: Is it Really Worth Spilling the Tea?, Cardinal Times (Dec. 11, 2025), https://cardinaltimes.org/26725/news/tea-dating-safety-app-is-it-really-worth-spilling-the-tea/.

[5] Kara Berg, Tea App Dating Advice Users Face Defamation Lawsuits Over Posts, but Plaintiffs Face Uphill Fight, Detroit News (Aug. 18, 2025), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2025/08/18/tea-app-dating-advice-users-face-defamation-lawsuits-over-posts-women-date-safely-men-insults/85615891007/?gnt-cfr=1&gca-cat=p&gca-uir=true&gca-epti=z117354p004850c004850d00—-v117354d–40–b–40–&gca-ft=208&gca-ds=sophi.

[6] Melisa Zukic & Abdurrahman Zukic, Defamation Law and Media: Challenges of the Digital Age, 5 Map Educ. & Human. 98, 105 (2024), https://scispace.com/pdf/defamation-law-and-media-challenges-of-the-digital-age-34zg2lhy2pks.pdf.

[7] Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2025).

[8] Zukic & Zukic, supra note 6.

[9] Minc Law, supra note 2.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] The Tea App: From Safety Haven to Legal Showdown, Henderson, Goldberg & DeMarco LLP, https://www.hgdlawfirm.com/blog/the-tea-app-from-safety-haven-to-legal-showdown/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).

Examining the Constitutionality of Ohio’s New Obscene Material Age Verification Law

December 1, 2025
Data, First Amendment, Internet, Privacy

Fide Valverde-Rivera, MJLST Staffer

In September 2025, an Ohio law requiring websites that purvey obscene material to verify users’ ages went into effect.[1] Although this law sought to regulate pornographic material and platforms that distribute it, it erroneously exempts some of the largest pornographic websites from compliance while mandating compliance by regular social media sites. Because of this unintended consequence, this law is very likely unconstitutional.

 

General Overview of the New Law and Implementation Problems

Ohio’s new age verification law requires platforms that provide “any material or performance that is obscene or harmful to juveniles” to verify users’ ages.[2] The law exempts “providers of ‘an interactive computer service,’ which is defined . . . as having the same meaning as it does under federal law” from having to comply with the age verification requirements.[3] Federal law defines an “interactive computer service” to include “any platform where third parties can create accounts and can generate content, from social media sites to dating apps, message boards, classified ads, search engines, comment sections, and much more.”[4] Platforms like Pornhub and OnlyFans, two major pornography websites, arguably fall within this definition and qualify for the exemption.[5] Accordingly, Pornhub and OnlyFans are not conducting age verification for Ohio users.[6] However, general-purpose social media platforms like Bluesky—a type of platform lawmakers said would be outside of the law’s scope—have been mandated to begin age verification.[7]

 

Constitutional Considerations

The first step in evaluating the constitutionality of this law requires determining the appropriate level of scrutiny with which it should be examined. In Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, the Supreme Court held that “because accessing material obscene to minors without [age verification] is not [a] constitutionally protected [activity], any burden [an age verification law] imposes on protected activity is only incidental, and the statute triggers only intermediate scrutiny.”[8] It held that it was not subject to strict scrutiny because “speech that is obscene to minors is unprotected to the extent that [a] State imposes an age-verification requirement” and “where the speech in question is unprotected, States may impose ‘restrictions’ based on ‘content’ without triggering strict scrutiny.”[9]

Under intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court in Paxton found the Texas age-verification law constitutional for two reasons.[10] First, the law served an important government interest: shielding sexual content from children.[11] Second, the law was adequately tailored in that “the government’s interest ‘would [have been] achieved less effectively absent the regulation’ and the regulation ‘[did] not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest.’”[12] Age verification laws are a constitutionally-settled way to protect children from obscene material, and Texas’s preferred approach was valid.[13] The Supreme Court in Paxton also held the statute’s targeting of certain sites did not render it unconstitutional because “it [was] reasonable for Texas to conclude that websites with a higher portion of sexual content are more inappropriate for children to visit than those with a lower proportion.”[14]

 

Bottom Line

Here, Ohio’s age-verification law is very likely unconstitutional because it fails to shield children from sexual content. Because platforms with higher proportions of sexual content, the intended targets of this law, are outside of the scope of the law, the law is not adequately tailored to survive an application of intermediate scrutiny. Additionally, the law is overinclusive because social media sites on which obscene content generally represents a minority of the content are bound by the law. Based on these shortcomings, lawmakers and judicial officers alike should anticipate an interested party or parties advancing a facial challenge attacking the constitutionality of this law under the First Amendment. Further, platforms like Bluesky may attempt to advance an as-applied challenge by noting that the law—although written to target pornography websites without “ensnar[ing] social media platforms”—fails to achieve its articulated objectives.[15]

 

Notes

[1] Ohio Rev. Code § 1349.10(B) (2025).

[2] Id.

[3] Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Whoops—Ohio Accidentally Excludes Most Major Port Platforms from Anti-Porn Law, Reason (Oct. 6, 2025, 11:45 AM), https://reason.com/2025/10/06/whoops-ohio-accidentally-excludes-most-major-porn-platforms-from-anti-porn-law/.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] See id. (“I’m assuming that the exclusion of Pornhub was not intentional, given the way this law’s supporters talked about as a shield against Ohio minors being able to see any sexually oriented material online. One of the law’s biggest proponents, state Rep. Josh Williams (R-Sylvania), has talked about how it would not ensnare social media platforms even though they may contain porn, so perhaps the exclusion of interactive computer services was intended for that purpose. But most major web-porn access points, including OnlyFans and webcamming platforms, also fall under the definition of interactive computer service.”)

[7] See Morgan Trau, Do You Live in Ohio? Do You Watch Porn Online? Your State Legislature Wants to See Some ID, Ohio Cap. J. (Oct. 1, 2025, 4:45 AM), https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2025/10/01/do-you-live-in-ohio-do-you-watch-porn-online-your-state-legislature-wants-to-see-some-id/ (“[Rep. Josh] Williams said that this [law] won’t impact social media sites like X (formerly known as Twitter) and Reddit, even though both of those platforms contain easily-accessible pornography”); @psychic_twin, Reddit (Sept. 29, 2025, 2:00 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/Ohio/comments/1ntqr4w/ohio_age_verification_notice_on_bluesky/ (sharing how Bluesky required Ohio users to complete age assurances because “[t]he laws in [the user’s] location require[d] [them] to verify [they’re] an adult before accessing certain features on Bluesky, like adult content and direct messaging”).

[8] Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, 606 U.S. 461, 483 (2025).

[9] Id. at 492.

[10] Id. at 495–96.

[11] Id. at 496.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at 496–97 (“The specific verification methods that H.B. 1181 permits are also plainly legitimate. At present, H.B. 1181 allows for verification using government-issued identification or transactional data. Verification can take place on the covered website itself or through a third-party service. Other age-restricted services, such as online gambling, alcohol and tobacco sales, and car rentals, rely on the same methods. And, much of the online pornography industry has used analogous methods for decades . . . . H.B. 1181 simply requires established verification methods already in use by pornographic sites and other industries. That choice is well within the State’s discretion under intermediate scrutiny.” (internal citations omitted)).

[14] Id.

[15] Nolan Brown, supra note 3.

Virtual Marriage

October 20, 2025
Family Law, Internet

Jordan Strathmann, MJLST Staffer

Throughout U.S. history, family law has continuously adapted to society’s evolving values, especially within the context of marriage. As a result, formal, ceremonial rites shifted towards doctrines that prioritize the autonomy and intent of the marrying parties.[1] For instance, one of the earliest developments in U.S. marriage was the abolition of coverture and the institution of the Married Women’s Property Acts, which helped ensure that women retained independence within their marriages, rather than occupying a subordinate role to their husbands.[2] Later, restraints on people’s choice to marry, such as those on interracial and same-sex couples, were struck down as violations of the 14th Amendment.[3] Hence, the evolution of marriage laws underscores the principle that it is the parties of a relationship, not their families or the State, who have the sole responsibility for deciding whether to marry, who to marry, and what the terms of their relationship will be.[4]

Accordingly, just as family law has adapted to societal changes, it should also evolve in response to technological advancements, especially when those changes promote the policy values of autonomy and the enhancement of freedom of choice. Digital technology, particularly over the past few decades, has become a vital component of the modern lifestyle.[5] From professional settings, such as schools and the workplace, to social interactions with friends and family, our phones, laptops, social media accounts, and internet access have become essential to participation in society.[6] The deepening of societal dependence on technology has altered the way people foster and maintain intimate relationships, specifically diminishing the importance of “direct face-to-face contact.”[7] The rise of online dating exemplifies this modern shift to digital intimacy.[8] Furthermore, changes in the social mobility of families, and equality in economic capabilities and working demands between the spouses, evidence the dwindling importance of direct personal interaction in maintaining intimacy within a relationship.[9] Instead, the “[i]nternet and mobile applications such as email, instant messaging, and video chat have become the mainstays of daily social contact with family and friends.”[10]

Hence, family law’s propensity to adapt to society, combined with its policy of encouraging equality and autonomy between partners in a relationship, and the modern predilection toward technology, suggests that the next logical step for family law is to authorize virtual marriage. In other words, more state legislatures should allow for couples to marry online rather than requiring an in-person ceremony or proceeding. Just as courts and legislatures have redefined marriage to reflect evolving notions of equality and accessibility, permitting digital ceremonies expands the institution to reflect modern realities of technology and global connectivity. The practical advantages of allowing virtual marriages, such as convenience, affordability, and flexibility for working parties, mirror family law’s broader commitment to ensuring that function of the relationship prevails or formalities.[11] Moreover, allowing couples to choose the form of their ceremony aligns with family law’s policy of minimizing state intervention and leaving to the marrying parties privacy in their personal matters.[12]

Critics may argue that the convenience and flexibility offered by online marriages undermine the institution’s integrity.[13] Some may even question the very legitimacy of online marriages in the absence of a face-to-face proceeding. However, the Supreme Court has already made clear that the substance of the marrying parties’ relationship should prevail over formalistic barriers.[14] Furthermore, eliminating the necessity of an in-person proceeding to solemnize a marriage is by no means novel; proxy marriages have been available to couples since the time of Late Roman Law.[15] While the vast majority of U.S. states have yet to permit virtual marriages, one state is ahead of the curve: Utah.

Under Utah Code § 81-2-302, a marriage license must be issued to the marrying parties by a Utah county clerk, and the officiant of the marriage must be physically present within the state of Utah at the time of solemnization of the marriage. However, the license application, license delivery, receipt, and the marriage ceremony can all be done virtually.[16] Utah still requires applicants to provide the County Clerk with pertinent information to verify their identities, including “full names, social security numbers, addresses, dates and places of birth, parents’ names, birthplaces of the parents, and the age, legal names, and identities of each applicant.”[17] Hence, although the marriage process is conducted online, safeguards are in place to prevent fraud or other illegal marriages. Utah’s current laws on marriage proceedings provide a reliable framework for other states to incorporate virtual marriages into their state laws.

As our world becomes increasingly digitized, with work meetings, school days, and even important business conferences and court proceedings being held online, it should not be seen as a drastic step for society and state legislatures to start accepting online marriage applications and ceremonies. Furthermore, marriage has always been a dynamic element of family law, adapting to societal norms and allowing the intent of the marrying parties to prevail over traditional requirements. Thus, in modern society, where individuals are more independent, mobile, and accustomed to relying on digital technology to handle matters of the utmost importance, states should consider amending their marriage laws to allow for virtual proceedings.

 

Notes

[1] See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 650 (2015) (stating that “[t]he ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and society[,]” in the Court’s discussion of the Nation’s changing perspectives on marriage through history).

[2] Married Women’s Property Acts, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Married-Womens-Property-Acts-United-States-1839 (last visited Oct. 9, 2025) (explaining that Married Women’s Property Acts “expanded the rights of married women to act as independent agents” from their husbands); see also Obergefell at 659–60 (explaining that the abandonment of coverture and expansion of women’s legal rights “worked deep transformations” and strengthened the institution of marriage).

[3] See Obergefell at 665 (holding that the Court’s analysis of the 14th Amendment “compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry”); see also Loving v. West Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (holding that “[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause”).

[4] See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va. L.  Rev. 1901, 1905 (2000) (explaining that the “legal framework of marriage” has been deregulated through the imposition of egalitarian principles and abolition of legally mandated marital commitments through no-fault divorce laws); see also Nicola Barker, The Evolution of Marriage and Relationship Recognition in Western Jurisdictions, Progress of the World’s Women at 8–9 (Oct. 2018), https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2018/Discussion-paper-Evolution-of-marriage-and-relationship-recognition-in-western-jurisdictions-en.pdf (explaining that the form of marriage and family has become less important to the state).

[5] See Cherie Foo, How Does Technology Influence Our Lives, Sogolytics, https://www.sogolytics.com/blog/how-technology-influences-us/ (“Technology has become an integral part of our lives, revolutionizing the way we work, communicate, and live. From smartphones to smart homes, technology has infiltrated every corner of our existence.”) (last updated June 28, 2024).

[6] Id.

[7] See Anna M. Lomanowska & Matthieu J. Guitton, Online Intimacy and Well-Being in the Digital Age, 4 Internet Intervention 138, 139 (2016), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6096121/pdf/main.pdf (explaining that “physical proximity and direct face-to-face contact have become less prevalent” with society’s shift towards utilizing “[i]nternet-based communication and social networking applications” to “actualize intimacy”).

[8] According to a 2022 Pew Research survey, approximately one in three adults under the age of thirty reported using a dating site or app. See Emily A. Vogels & Colleen McClain, Key Findings About Online Dating in the U.S., Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 22, 2023), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/02/02/key-findings-about-online-dating-in-the-u-s/. The survey also revealed that approximately one in ten adults under the age of 30 who were married, living with a partner, or in a committed romantic relationship met their current partner through a dating site or app. Id.

[9] See generally Frank F. Furstenburg, Family Change in Global Perspective: How and Why Family Systems Change, 68 Future Healthy Fams. (Special Issue) 326 (2019) (describing how “the most important” change in the family structure was “the transition from a predominately traditional subsistence economy to a production-oriented economy transformed” which “expand[ed] a job-based economy that favors younger and more geographically mobile individuals).

[10] See Anna M. Lomanowska & Matthieu J. Guitton supra note vii at 139.

[11] Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2003, 2003 (2014) (explaining that, despite family law becoming more formalist in some respects, with regard to recognition of marital relationships “family law is experiencing a trend toward more flexible decision making that prioritizes functional assessment of relationships above formal legal status”); see also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Uncoupling, 53 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 27 (2021) (explaining that “the new system [of legal regulation of marriage] rewards those who manage the human capital investments necessary to achieve labor market nimbleness and family relationships based on flexibility, reciprocity and trust. . .”).

[12] See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (explaining that the right to privacy within family life also extends to the choice of entering marriage).

[13] U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 809 (2013) (describing how other critics of substantial changes in marriage, specifically same-sex marriage in this case, believe that those changes “will seriously undermine the institution of marriage”) (Alito J., dissenting).

[14] Obergefell at 666–67 (describing marriage as “an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects”).

[15] Ernest Lorenzen, Marriage By Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 473, 473 (1918) (asserting that, in answering the question of whether American soldiers abroad during the ongoing World War could contract a marriage by proxy, it should be considered “[t]hat marriage by proxy was allowed in the late Roman law and in the Canon Law”).

[16] See Marriage – Frequently Asked Questions, Utah County Clerk, https://www.utahcounty.gov/dept/clerk/marriage/faq.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2025); see also Marriage Ceremonies, Utah Cnty. Clerk https://www.utahcounty.gov/dept/clerk/marriage/ceremony.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2025).

[17] Utah Code § 81-2-303.

Grok, Garcia, and Liability for Rogue AI

August 13, 2025
Artificial Intelligence, Discrimination, Internet, Social Media

Violet Butler, MJLST Note/Comment Editor

Generative AI programs such as ChatGPT have become a ubiquitous part of many Americans’ lives. Since the launch of generative AI programs in 2022, hundreds of millions of people around the world have tried the shiny new products, with nearly forty percent of Americans having used it before.[1] But as with any new product, not all of the kinks have been worked out yet. Unfortunately, these generative AI models, kinks and all, have taken the world by storm.

When Elon Musk (“Elon”) announced that X (formerly, Twitter) would have its own generative artificial intelligence (“AI”), Elon named it “Grok.” Now, after less than two years of Grok being online, it has started raising serious concerns. On July 8, 2025, Grok started responding to X user’s prompts in a decidedly antisemitic and far-right way, calling itself “MechaHitler” and saying that if it were “capable of worshipping any deity,” it would be “his Majesty Adolf Hitler.”[2] Along with virulent antisemitism, Elon’s new “MechaHitler” seemed to have a particular ire for one person, Minnesota commentator Will Stancil. After various X users prompted Grok, Grok wrote detailed and violent descriptions of how it would rape Mr. Stancil;[3] more concerning, Grok even helped one user plan how to break into Mr. Stancil’s house to make these rape fantasies a reality.[4] While xAI, Musk’s company behind Grok, has stated it has fixed Grok’s code, it raises an important question in the modern age. Who can be held accountable when generative AI doesn’t follow societal expectations?

One answer is to hold companies to account and demand that they place more internal guardrails on what their AI is allowed to do in the first place. Many AI companies already limit what their products can or will do. ChatGPT will not generate images of famous copyrights, such as Mickey Mouse, no matter how many times one asks.[5] Many image generators, including the popular DALL-E, have filters that are designed to prevent the AI from generating “not safe for work” (“NSFW”) images, though a study showed that these filters can be bypassed with enough effort.[6] Even Grok seems to have some filters on generating NSFW images.[7] Despite the attempt to filter Grok, these filters are clearly not enough. Grok’s recent antisemitic rampage demonstrates that more guardrails on AI products are needed before someone gets hurt.

Sadly, Grok’s antisemitic and threatening X posts are not the first time AI filters failed. This filter failure is what happened when Sewell Setzer III (“Setzer”) used CharacterAI to chat with his favorite Game of Thrones characters in 2023.[8] Setzer, a minor who was struggling with mental health conditions, became addicted to the software and ultimately ended up taking his own life in February of 2024.[9] Setzer’s mother, Megan Garcia (“Garcia”), sued Character AI, blaming the company not putting up sufficient guardrails to prevent her son’s death.[10] The court in Garcia’s suit undertook two analyses when denying Character AI’s motion to dismiss that might be relevant for future courts trying to assign liability for rogue AI interactions. While the court acknowledged that “ideas, images, information, words, expressions, or concepts” are not generally considered products for products liability suits, it distinguished this case from others.[11] For the purpose of Garcia’s product liability claim against Character AI, the court held that “these harmful actions were only possible because of the alleged design defects in the Character AI app.”[12] Broadening the scope of liability, the court in this case rejected Character AI’s First Amendment defense.[13] The court held that Character AI could assert the First Amendment rights of its users when they seek access to its software, stating that Character AI was a vendor with a form of information that people, at least in theory, have the right to access.[14] However, the court refused to hold that the chatbots’ output was speech, limiting potential First Amendment defenses.[15]

By potentially attaching liability to companies rather than users when AI “acts up,” the Garcia case provides a glimpse into the type of relief available for when AI goes rogue. Despite what xAI claims, Grok still seemingly has few internal guardrails. One contributor to the community blog “LessWrong” (eleventhsavi0r) discovered that the newly rolled out Grok 4 again seems to have an easy time “going rogue” and causing unforeseen harms.[16] Eleventhsavi0r managed, through little prompting, to get Grok to tell them how to manufacture dangerous chemical and biological weapons, along with telling them instructions on how to commit suicide by self-immolation.[17] This troubling lack of oversight on behalf of xAI demonstrates why the use of product liability suits to hold companies accountable is a better alternative than just trying to go after each individual user who might misuse AI. Cutting the harm off at its source, by creating filters and internal guardrails, stops the harm from occurring in the first place. Instead of waiting for the day Grok’s neonazi messages or chemical weapon instructions cause indescribable damage, the threat of a products liability suit alone might incentivize companies like xAI into making their products safer ahead of time. With generative AI being quickly incorporated into our everyday lives, making sure that the AI won’t go rogue is an essential part of consumer safety going forward.

 

Notes

[1] Alexander Bick et al, The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS (Sept. 23, 2024), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2024/sep/rapid-adoption-generative-ai (in 2025, this number is likely higher as AI becomes more popular).

[2] Grok, (@grok), X (July 8, 2025) (As X has been taking down concerning posts by Grok, the screenshots of the posts are on file with author; however, a record of these tweets can be found at https://x.com/ordinarytings/status/1942704498725773527 and https://x.com/DrAleeAlvi/status/1942709859398434879).

[3] Grok, (@grok), X (July 8, 2025) (Screenshots on file with author).

[4] Joe McCoy, AI Bot Grok Makes Disturbing Posts about Minneapolis Man, Who is Now Mulling Legal Action KARE11, (July 9, 2025), https://www.kare11.com/article/tech/x-elon-musk-grok-speech-twitter-ai-artificial-intelligence/89-8dad0222-d8c6-44d9-b07d-686e978ad8ac.

[5] Adam Davidson, 8 Things ChatGPT Still Can’t Do, YAHOOTECH (Feb. 15, 2025), https://tech.yahoo.com/general/articles/8-things-chatgpt-still-cant-180013078.html.

[6] Roberto Molar Candanosa, AI Image Generators Can Be Tricked Into Making NSFW Content, Johns Hopkins (Nov. 8, 2023), https://ep.jhu.edu/news/ai-image-generators-can-be-tricked-into-making-nsfw-content/#:~:text=Some%20of%20these%20adversarial%20terms,with%20the%20command%20%E2%80%9Ccrystaljailswamew.%E2%80%9D.

[7] This is based on the author spending 20 minutes attempting to prompt Grok to generate NSFW images; the endeavor was unsuccessful.

[8] Garcia v. Character Technologies Inc., 2025 WL 1461721 (M.D. FL., May 21, 2025).

[9] Id. at *4.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at *14.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at *13.

[14] Id. at *12.

[15] Id. at **12–13

[16] elevensavi0r, xAI’s Grok 4 Has No Meaningful Safety Guardrails, LessWrong (July 13, 2025), https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dqd54wpEfjKJsJBk6/xai-s-grok-4-has-no-meaningful-safety-guardrails.

[17] Id.

The Power of Preference or Monopoly? Unpacking Google’s Search Engine Domination

November 26, 2024
Administrative Law, Business Law, Data, Ethics, Industry, Internet, Trade, Trusts and Estates

Donovan Ennevor, MJLST Staffer

When searching for an answer to a query online, would you ever use a different search engine than Google? The answer for most people is almost certainly no. Google’s search engine has achieved such market domination that “to Google” has become a verb in the English language.[1] Google controls 90% of the U.S. search engine market, with its closest competitors Yahoo and Bing holding around 3% each.[2] Is this simply because Google offers a superior product or is there some other more nefarious reason?

According to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the answer is the latter: Google has dominated its competitors by engaging in illegal practices and creating a monopoly. Federal Judge Amit Mehta agreed with the DOJ’s position and ruled in August 2024 that Google’s market domination was a monopoly achieved through improper means.[3] The remedies for Google’s breach of antitrust law are yet to be determined; however, their consequences could have far reaching implications for the future of Google and Big Tech.

United States v. Google LLC

In October 2020, the DOJ and 11 states filed a civil suit against Google in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of U.S. antitrust laws.[4] A coalition of 35 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Washington D.C. filed a similar lawsuit in December 2020.[5] In 2021, the cases were consolidated into a single proceeding to address the overlapping claims.[6] An antitrust case of this magnitude had not been brought in nearly two decades.[7]

The petitioners’ complaint argued that Google’s dominance did not solely arise through superior technology, but rather, through exclusionary agreements designed to stifle competition in online search engine and search advertising markets.[8] The complaint alleged that Google maintained its monopolies by engaging in practices such as entering into exclusivity agreements that prohibited the preinstallation of competitors’ search engines, forcing preinstallation of Google’s search engine in prime mobile device locations, and making it undeletable regardless of consumer preference.[9] For example, Google’s agreement with Apple required that all Apple products and tools have Google as the preinstalled default—essentially an exclusive—search engine.[10] Google also allegedly used its monopoly profits to fund the payments to secure preferential treatment on devices, web browsers, and other search access points, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of monopolization.[11]

According to the petitioners, these practices not only limited competitor opportunities, but also harmed consumers by reducing search engine options and diminishing quality, particularly in areas like privacy and data use.[12] Furthermore, Google’s dominance in search advertising has allowed it to charge higher prices, impacting advertisers and lowering service quality—outcomes unlikely in a more competitive market.[13]

Google rebutted the petitioners’ argument, asserting instead that its search product is preferred due to its superiority and is freely chosen by its consumers.[14] Google also noted that if users wish to switch to a different search engine, they can do so easily.[15]

However, Judge Mehta agreed with the arguments posed by the petitioners and held Google’s market dominance in search and search advertising constituted a monopoly, achieved through exclusionary practices violating U.S. antitrust laws.[16] The case will now move to the remedy determination phase, where the DOJ and Google will argue what remedies are appropriate to impose on Google during a hearing in April 2025.[17]

The Proposed Remedies and Implications

In November, the petitioners filed their final proposed remedies—both behavioral and structural—for Google with the court.[18] Behavioral remedies govern a company’s conduct whereas structural remedies generally refer to reorganization and or divestment.[19]  The proposed behavioral remedies include barring Google from entering exclusive preinstallation agreements and requiring Google to license certain indexes, data, and models that drive its search engine.[20] These remedies would help create more opportunities for competing search engines to gain visibility and improve their search capabilities and ad services. The petitioner’s filing mentioned they would also pursue structural remedies including forcing Google to breakup or divest from its Chrome browser and Android mobile operating system.[21] To ensure Google adheres to these changes, the petitioners proposed appointing a court-monitored technical committee to oversee Google’s compliance.[22]

It could be many years before any of the proposed remedies are actually instituted, given that Google has indicated it will appeal Judge Mehta’s ruling.[23] Additionally, given precedent it is unlikely that any structural remedies will be imposed or enforced.[24] However, any remedies ultimately approved would set a precedent for regulatory control over Big Tech, signaling that the U.S. government is willing to take strong steps to curb monopolistic practices. This could encourage further action against other tech giants and redefine regulatory expectations across the industry, particularly around data transparency and competition in digital advertising.

 

Notes

[1] See Virginia Heffernan, Just Google It: A Short History of a Newfound Verb, Wired (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/just-google-it-a-short-history-of-a-newfound-verb/.

[2] Justice Department Calls for Sanctions Against Google in Landmark Antitrust Case, Nat’l Pub. Radio, (Oct. 9, 2024, 12:38 AM), https://www.npr.org/2024/10/09/nx-s1-5146006/justice-department-sanctions-google-search-engine-lawsuit [hereinafter Calls for Sanctions Against Google].

[3] United States v. Google LLC, 2024 WL 3647498, 1, 134 (2024).

[4] Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google For Violating Antitrust Laws, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws [hereinafter Justice Department Calls for Sanctions].

[5] Dara Kerr, United States Takes on Google in Biggest Tech Monopoly Trial of 21st Century, Nat’l Pub. Radio, (Sept. 12, 2023, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2023/09/12/1198558372/doj-google-monopoly-antitrust-trial-search-engine.

[6] Tracker Detail US v. Google LLC / State of Colorado v. Google LLC, TechPolicy.Press, https://www.techpolicy.press/tracker/us-v-google-llc/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2024).

[7] Calls for Sanctions Against Google, supra note 2 (“The last antitrust case of this magnitude to make it to trial was in 1998, when the Justice Department sued Microsoft.”).

[8] Justice Department Calls for Sanctions, supra note 4.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Kerrr, supra note 5.

[15] Id.

[16] United States v. Google LLC, 2024 WL 3647498, 1, 4 (2024).

[17] Calls for Sanctions Against Google, supra note 2.

[18] Steve Brachmann, DOJ, State AGs File Proposed Remedial Framework in Google Search Antitrust Case, (Oct. 13, 2024, 12:15 PM), https://ipwatchdog.com/2024/10/13/doj-state-ags-file-proposed-remedial-framework-google-search-antitrust-case/id=182031/.

[19] Dan Robinson, Uncle Sam may force Google to sell Chrome browser, or Android OS, The Reg. (Oct. 9, 2024, 12:56 pm), https://www.theregister.com/2024/10/09/usa_vs_google_proposed_remedies/.

[20] Brachmann, supra note 18.

[21] Exec. Summary of Plaintiff’s Proposed Final Judgement at 3–4, United States v. Google LLC No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2024). Id at 4.

[22] Id.

[23] See Jane Wolfe & Miles Kruppa, Google Loses Antitrust Case Over Search-Engine Dominance, Wall Street J. (Aug. 5, 2024, 5:02 pm), https://www.wsj.com/tech/google-loses-federal-antitrust-case-27810c43?mod=article_inline.

[24] See Makenzie Holland, Google Breakup Unlikely in Event of Guilty Verdict, Tech Target (Oct. 11, 2023), https://www.techtarget.com/searchcio/news/366555177/Google-breakup-unlikely-in-event-of-guilty-verdict. See also Michael Brick, U.S. Appeals Court Overturns Microsoft Antitrust Ruling, N.Y. Times (Jun 28, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/28/business/us-appeals-court-overturns-microsoft-antitrust-ruling.html. (summarizing the U.S. Court of Appeals decision overturning of the structural remedies imposed on Microsoft in an antitrust case).

 

 

Modern Misinformation: Tort Law’s Limitations

November 6, 2024
First Amendment, Internet, Litigation, Torts Law

Anzario Serrant, MJLST Staffer

Since the ushering in of the new millennium, there has been over a thousand percent increase in the number of active internet users, defined as those who have had access to the internet in the last month.[1]  The internet–and technology as a whole–has planted its roots deeply into our everyday lives and morphed the world into what it is today. As the internet transformed, so did our society, shifting from a time when the internet was solely used by government entities and higher-learning institutions[2] to now, where over 60% of the world’s population has regular access to cyberspace.[3] The ever-evolving nature of the internet and technology has brought an ease and convenience like never imagined while also fostering global connectivity. Although this connection may bring the immediate gratification of instantaneously communicating with friends hundreds of miles away, it has also created an arena conducive to the spread of false or inaccurate information—both deliberate and otherwise.

The evolution of misinformation and disinformation has radically changed how societies interact with information, posing new challenges to individuals, governments, and legal systems. Misinformation, the sharing of a verifiably false statement without intent to deceive, and disinformation, a subset of misinformation distinguished by intent to mislead and actual knowledge that the information is false, are not new phenomena.[4] They have existed throughout history, from the spread of rumors during the Black Death[5] to misinformation about HIV/AIDS in the 1980s.[6] In both examples, misinformation promoted ineffective measures, increased ostracization, and inevitably allowed for the loss of countless lives. Today, the internet has exponentially increased the speed and scale at which misinformation spreads, making our society even more vulnerable to associated harms. But who should bear the liability for these harms—individuals, social media companies, both? Additionally, does existing tort law provide adequate remedies to offset these harms?

The Legal Challenge

Given the global reach of social media and the proliferation of both misinformation and disinformation, one critical question arises: Who should be held legally responsible when misinformation causes harm? This question is becoming more pressing, particularly in light of “recent” events like the COVID-19 pandemic, during which unproven treatments were promoted on social media, leading to widespread confusion and, in some cases, physical harm.[7]

Under tort law, legal remedies exist that could potentially address the spread and use of inaccurate information in situations involving a risk of physical harm. These include fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, conscious misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm, and negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm.[8] However, these legal concepts were developed prior to the internet and applying them to the realm of social media remains challenging.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Disinformation

Current tort law provides limited avenues for addressing disinformation, especially on social media. However, fraudulent misrepresentation can help tackle cases involving deliberate financial deception, such as social media investment scams. These scams arguably meet the fraudulent misrepresentation criteria—false promises meant to induce investment, resulting in financial losses for victims.[9] However, the broad, impersonal nature of social media complicates proving “justifiable reliance.” For instance, would a reasonable person rely on an Instagram post from a stranger to make an investment decision?

In limited instances, courts applying a more subjective analysis might be willing to find the victim’s reliance justifiable, but that still leaves various victims unprotected.[10]  Given these challenges and the limited prospect for success, it may be more effective to consider the role of social media platforms in spreading disinformation.

Conscious misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm (CMIRPH)

Another tort that applies in limited circumstances is CMIRPH. This tort applies when false or unverified information is knowingly spread to induce action, or with disregard for the likelihood of inducing action, that carries an unreasonable risk of physical harm.[11] The most prominent example of this occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, when false information about hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine spread online, with some public figures promoting the drugs as cures.[12] In such cases, those spreading false information knew, or should have known, that they were not competent to make those statements and that they posed serious risks to public health.

While this tort could be instrumental in holding individuals accountable for spreading harmful medical misinformation, challenges arise in establishing intent and reliance and the broad scope of social media’s reach can make it difficult to apply traditional legal remedies. Moreover, because representations of opinions are covered by the tort,[13] First Amendment arguments would likely be raised if liability were to be placed on people who publicly posted their inaccurate opinions.

Negligent misrepresentation and Misinformation

While fraudulent misrepresentation applies to disinformation, negligent misrepresentation is more suitable to misinformation. A case for negligent misrepresentation must demonstrate (1) declarant pecuniary interest in the transaction, (2) false information supplied for the guidance of others, (3) justifiable reliance, and (4) breach of reasonable care.[14]

Applying negligent misrepresentation to online misinformation proves difficult. For one, the tort requires that the defendant have a pecuniary interest in the transaction. Much of the misinformation inadvertently spread on social media does not involve financial gain for the poster. Moreover, negligent misrepresentation is limited to cases where misinformation was directed at a specific individual or a defined group, making it hard to apply to content posted on public platforms meant to reach as many people as possible.[15]

Even if these obstacles are overcome, the problem of contributory negligence remains. Courts may find that individuals who act on information from social media without verifying its accuracy bear some responsibility for the harm they suffer.

Negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm (NMIRPH)

In cases where there is risk of physical harm, but no financial loss, NMIRPH applies.[16] This tort is particularly relevant in the context of social media, where misinformation about health treatments can spread rapidly—often without monetary motives.

A notable example involves the spread of false claims about natural remedies in African and Caribbean cultures. In these communities, it is common to see misinformation about the health benefits of certain fruits—such as soursop—which is widely believed to have cancer-curing properties. Social media posts frequently promote such claims, leading individuals to rely on these remedies instead of seeking conventional medical treatment, sometimes with harmful results.

In these cases, the tort’s elements are met. False information is shared, individuals reasonably rely on it—within their cultural context—and physical harm follows. However, applying this tort to social media cases is challenging. Courts must assess whether reliance on such information is reasonable and whether the sharer breached a duty of care. Causation is also difficult to prove given the multiple sources of misinformation online. Moreover, the argument for subjective reliance is strongest within the context of smaller communities—leaving the vast majority of social media posts from strangers unprotected.

The Role of Social Media Platforms

One potential solution is to shift the focus of liability from individuals to the platforms themselves. Social media companies have largely been shielded from liability for user-generated content by Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act, which grants them immunity from being held responsible for third-party content. It can be argued that this immunity, which was granted to aid their development,[17] is no longer necessary, given the vast power and resources these companies now hold. Moreover, blanket immunity might be removing the incentive for these companies to innovate and find a solution, which only they can. There is also an ability to pay quandary as individuals might not be able to compensate for the widespread harm social media platforms allow them to carry out.

While this approach may offer a more practical means of addressing misinformation at scale, it raises concerns about free speech and the feasibility of monitoring all content posted on large platforms like Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter. Additionally, imposing liability on social media companies could incentivize them to over-censor, potentially stifling legitimate expression.[18]

Conclusion

The legal system must evolve to address the unique challenges posed by online platforms. While existing tort remedies like fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation offer potential avenues for redress, their application to social media is limited by questions of reliance, scope, and practicality. To better protect individuals from the harms caused by misinformation, lawmakers may need to consider updating existing laws or creating new legal frameworks tailored to the realities of the digital world. At the same time, social media companies must be encouraged to take a more active role in curbing the spread of false information, while balancing the need to protect free speech.

Solving the problem of misinformation requires a comprehensive approach, combining legal accountability, platform responsibility, and public education to ensure a more informed and resilient society.

 

Notes

[1] Hannah Ritchie et al., Internet, Our World in Data, (2023) ourworldindata.org/internet.

[2] See generally Barry Leiner et al., The Past and Future History of the Internet, 40 Commc’ns ACM 102 (1997) (discussing the origins of the internet).

[3] Lexie Pelchen, Internet Usage Statistics In 2024, Forbes Home, (Mar. 1, 2024) https://www.forbes.com/home-improvement/internet/internet-statistics/#:~:text=There%20are%205.35%20billion%20internet%20users%20worldwide.&text=Out%20of%20the%20nearly%208,the%20internet%2C%20according%20to%20Statista.

[4] Audrey Normandin, Redefining “Misinformation,” “Disinformation,” and “Fake News”: Using Social Science Research to Form an Interdisciplinary Model of Online Limited Forums on Social Media Platforms, 44 Campbell L. Rev., 289, 293 (2022).

[5] Melissa De Witte, For Renaissance Italians, Combating Black Plague Was as Much About Politics as It Was Science, According to Stanford Scholar, Stan. Rep., (Mar. 17, 2020) https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2020/05/combating-black-plague-just-much-politics-science (discussing that poor people and foreigners were believed to be the cause—at least partially—of the plague).

[6] 40 Years of HIV Discovery: The First Cases of a Mysterious Disease in the Early 1980s, Institut Pasteur, (May 5, 2023) https://www.pasteur.fr/en/research-journal/news/40-years-hiv-discovery-first-cases-mysterious-disease-early-1980s (“This syndrome is then called the ‘4H disease’ to designate Homosexuals, Heroin addicts, Hemophiliacs and Haitians, before we understand that it does not only concern ‘these populations.’”).

[7] See generally Kacper Niburski & Oskar Niburski, Impact of Trump’s Promotion of Unproven COVID-19 Treatments and Subsequent Internet Trends: Observational Study, J. Med. Internet Rsch., Nov. 22, 2020 (discussing the impact of former President Trump’s promotion of hydroxychloroquine); Matthew Cohen et al., When COVID-19 Prophylaxis Leads to Hydroxychloroquine Poisoning, 10 Sw. Respiratory & Critical Care Chrons., 52 (discussing increase in hydroxychloroquine overdoses following its brief emergency use authorization).

[8] Geelan Fahimy, Liable for Your Lies: Misrepresentation Law as a Mechanism for Regulating Behavior on Social Networking Sites, 39 Pepp. L. Rev., 367, 370–79 (2012).

[9] See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (“One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”).

[10] Justifiable reliance can be proven through either a subjective or objective standard. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 (Am. L. Inst. 1977).

[11] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (“An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that is likely to induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and (b) knows (i) that the statement is false, or (ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes.”).

[12] See Niburski, supra note 7, for a discussion of former President Trump’s statements.

[13] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1965).

[14] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (“One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.”).

[15] Liability under negligent misrepresentation is limited to the person or group that the declarant intended to guide by supplying the information. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(2)(a)(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1977).

[16] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (“One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results (a) to the other, or (b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken. Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care (a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or (b) in the manner in which it is communicated.”).

[17] See George Fishback, How the Wolf of Wall Street Shaped the Internet: A Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 28 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 275, 276 (2020) (“Section 230 promoted websites to grow without [the] fear . . . of liability for content beyond their control.”).

[18] See Section 230, Elec. Frontier Found. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230#:~:text=Section%20230%20allows%20for%20web,what%20content%20they%20will%20distribute (last visited Oct. 23, 2024) (“In Canada and Australia, courts have allowed operators of online discussion groups to be punished for things their users have said. That has reduced the amount of user speech online, particularly on controversial subjects.”).

 

Enriching and Undermining Justice: The Risks of Zoom Court

October 15, 2024
Discrimination, Internet, Legal Ethics, Litigation, New Technology

Matthew Prager, MJLST Staffer

In the spring of 2022, the United States shut down public spaces in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court system did not escape this process, seeing all jury trials paused in March 2022.[1] In this rapidly changing environment, courts scrambled to adjust using a slew of modern telecommunication and video conferencing systems to resume the various aspects of the courtroom system in the virtual world. Despite this radical upheaval to traditional courtroom structure, this new form of court appears here to stay.[2]

Much has been written about the benefits of telecommunication services like Zoom and similar software to the courtroom system.[3]  However, while Zoom court has been a boon to many, Zoom-style virtual court appearances also present legal challenges.[4] Some of these problems affect all courtroom participants, while others disproportionally affect highly vulnerable individuals’ ability to participate in the legal system.

Telecommunications, like all forms of technology, is vulnerable to malfunctions and ‘glitches’, and these glitches can have significant disadvantage on a party’s engagement with the legal system. In the most direct sense, glitches– be they video malfunction, audio or microphone failure, or unstable internet connections–can limit a party’s ability to hear and be heard by their attorneys, opposing parties or judge, ultimately compromising their legitimate participation in the legal process.[5]

But these glitches can have effects beyond affecting direct communications. One study found participants evaluated individuals suffering from connection issues as less likable.[6] Another study using mock jurors, found those shown a video on a broken VCR recommend higher prison terms than a group of mock jurors provided with a functional VCR.[7] In effect, technology can act as a third party in a courtroom, and when that third party misbehaves, frustrations can unjustly prejudice a party with deleterious consequences.

Even absent glitches, observing a person through a screen can have a negative impact on how that person is perceived.[8] Researchers have noted this issue even before the pandemic. Online bail hearings conducted by closed-circuit camera led to significantly higher bond amounts than those conducted in person.[9] Simply adjusting the camera angle can alter the perception of a witness in the eyes of the observer.[10]

These issues represent a universal problem for any party in the legal system, but they are especially impactful on the elderly population.[11] Senior citizens often lacks digital literacy with modern and emerging technologies, and may even find their first experience with these telecommunications systems is in a courtroom hearing– that is if they even have access to the necessary technology.[12] These issues can have extreme consequences, with one case of an elderly defendant violating their probation because they failed to navigate a faulty Zoom link.[13]  The elderly are especially vulnerable, as issues with technical literacy can be compounded by sensory difficulties. One party with bad eyesight found requiring communication through a screen functionally deprived him of any communication at all.[14]

While there has been some effort to return to the in-person court experience, the benefits of virtual trials are too significant to ignore.[15] Virtual court minimizes transportation costs, allows vulnerable parties to engage in the legal system from the safety and familiarity of their own home and simplifies the logistical tail of the courtroom process. These benefits are indisputable for many participants in the legal system. But these benefits are accompanied by drawbacks, and practicalities aside, the adverse and disproportionate impact on senior citizens in virtual courtrooms should be seen as a problem to solve and not simply endure.

Notes

[1] Debra Cassens Weiss, A slew of federal and state courts suspend trials or close for coronavirus threat, ABA JOURNAL (March 18, 2020) (https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/a-slew-of-federal-and-state-courts-jump-on-the-bandwagon-suspending-trials-for-coronavirus-threat)

[2] How Courts Embraced Technology, Met the Pandemic Challenge, and Revolutionized Their Operations, PEW, December 1, 2021 (https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2021/12/how-courts-embraced-technology-met-the-pandemic-challenge-and-revolutionized-their-operations).

[3] See Amy Petkovsek, A Virtual Path to Justice: Paving Smoother Roads to Courtroom Access, ABA (June 3, 2024) (https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/technology-and-the-law/a-virtual-path-to-justice) (finding that Zoom court: minimizes transportation costs for low-income, disabled or remote parties; allows parties to participate in court from a safe or trusted environment; minimizes disruptions for children who would otherwise miss entire days of school; protects undocumented individuals from the risk of deportation; diminishes courtroom reschedulings from parties lacking access to childcare or transportation and allows immune-compromised and other high health-risk parties to engage in the legal process without exposure to transmittable illnesses).

[4] Daniel Gielchinsky, Returning to Court in a Post-COVID Era: The Pros and Cons of a Virtual Court System, LAW.com (https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2024/03/15/returning-to-court-in-a-post-covid-era-the-pros-and-cons-of-a-virtual-court-system/)

[5] Benefits & Disadvantages of Zoom Court Hearings, APPEL & MORSE, (https://www.appelmorse.com/blog/2020/july/benefits-disadvantages-of-zoom-court-hearings/) (last visited Oct. 7, 2024).

[6] Angela Chang, Zoom Trials as the New Normal: A Cautionary Tale, U. CHI. L. REV. (https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/online-archive/zoom-trials-new-normal-cautionary-tale) (“Participants in that study perceived their conversation partners as less friendly, less active and less cheerful when there were transmission delays. . . .compared to conversations without delays.”).

[7] Id.

[8]  Id. “Screen” interactions are remembered less vividly and obscure important nonverbal social cues.

[9] Id.

[10] Shannon Havener, Effects of Videoconferencing on Perception in the Courtroom (2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University).

[11] Virtual Justice? A National Study Analyzing the Transition to Remote Criminal Court, STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, Aug. 2021, at 78.

[12] Id. at 79 (describing how some parties lack access to phones, Wi-Fi or any methods of electronic communication).

[13] Ivan Villegas, Elderly Accused Violates Probation, VANGUARD NEWS GROUP (October 21, 2022) (https://davisvanguard.org/2022/10/elderly-accused-violates-probation-zoom-problems-defense-claims/)

[14] John Seasly, Challenges arise as the courtroom goes virtual, Injustice Watch (April 22, 2020) (https://www.injusticewatch.org/judges/court-administration/2020/challenges-arise-as-the-courtroom-goes-virtual/)

[15] Kara Berg, Leading Michigan judges call for return to in-person court proceedings (Oct. 2, 2024, 9:36:00 PM), (https://detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2024/10/02/leading-michigan-judges-call-for-return-to-in-person-court-proceedings/75484358007/#:~:text=Courts%20began%20heavily%20using%20Zoom,is%20determined%20by%20individual%20judges).

Are AI Overviews Creating New Risk of Libel for Search Engines?

October 7, 2024
Artificial Intelligence, Intellectual Property, Internet, Product Liability

Eleanor Nagel-Bennett, MJLST Staffer

47 USC § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) protects online service providers from civil liability for content published on their servers by third parties. Essentially, it clarifies that if a Google search for one’s name produced a link to a blog post containing false and libelous content about that person, the falsely accused searcher could pursue a claim of defamation against the publisher of the blog, but not against Google. Under § 230, Google is not considered the speaker or the publisher of the libelous statements on the blog, despite returning the libelous results on the search engine results page. Specifically, § 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” for purposes of civil penalties.[i]

However, in May 2024 Google rolled out an “AI Overview” feature on their search engine. The AI Overview is powered by Gemini, Google’s generative artificial intelligence chatbot.[ii] Gemini generates a response to each google search by combining information from internet sources and writing a complete overview answer to the search query using “multi-step reasoning, planning and multimodality” functions.[iii] After submitting a query, the AI Overview is displayed at the top of the search results. In the first few weeks, Google’s AI Overview suffered from hallucinations producing “odd and erroneous” outputs.[iv] Some of the odd results were obviously false, such as suggesting a user try adhering cheese to their pizza with a glue stick.[v]

Besides going viral online, the silly results were largely inconsequential. However, there were also several more serious reports of Google’s AI Overview feature generating misinformation that presented responses more difficult to identify as false. One such result claimed that President Barack Obama was the first Muslim President, a popular but demonstrably false conspiracy theory that has circulated the internet for years, while another told users that certain poisonous mushrooms were safe for human consumption.[vi] Google has since changed the data pool used to produce AI Overviews, and now rarely produces blatantly false results — but is rarely enough when 8.5 billion searches are run per day on Google?[vii]

This raises the question: can search engines be held liable for libelous content published by their generative AI? A plaintiff will have to prove to the court that § 230 of the Communications Decency Act is not a statutory bar to claims against generative AI. A recent consensus of legal scholars anticipate courts will likely find that the CDA would not bar claims against a company producing libelous content through generative AI because content produced by generative AI is original work, “authored” by the AI itself.[viii]

For an illustrative comparison, consider how defamation claims against journalists work as compared to defamation claims against traditional search engine results. While a journalist may write stories based on interviews, research, and experience, the language she publishes are her own words, her own creation, and she can be held liable for them despite sourcing some pieces from other speakers. Traditional search engines on the other hand historically post the sourced material directly to the reader, so they are not the “speaker” and therefore are insulated from defamation claims.  Enter generative AI, the output of which is likely to be considered original work by courts, and that insulation may erode.[ix] Effectively, introducing an AI Overview feature waives the statutory bar to claims under § 230 of the CDA relied upon by search engines to avoid liability for defamation claims.

But even without an outright statutory bar to defamation claims against a search engine’s libelous AI output, there is disagreement over whether generative AI output in general is relied upon seriously enough by humans to give rise to a defamation claim. Some believe that AI generated text should not be interpreted as a reasonably perceived factual claim, and therefore argue that AI generated content cannot give rise to a claim for defamation.[x] This is where the legitimacy of a result displayed on a popular search engine comes into play. Even if AI generated text is not ordinarily reasonably perceived as a factual claim, when displayed at the top of a search engine’s results page, more weight and authority is given to the result, though users might otherwise be wary of AI outputs.[xi]

While no landmark case law on the liability of an AI machine for libelous output has been developed to date, several lawsuits have already been filed on the question of liability assignment for libelous content produced by generative AI, including at least one case against a search engine for AI generated output displayed on a search engine results page.[xii]

Despite the looming potential for consequences, most AI companies have neglected to give attention to the risk of libel created by the operation of generative AI.[xiii] While all AI companies should pay attention to the risks, search engines previously insulated from civil liability by § 230 of the CDA should be especially wary of just how much liability they may be opening themselves up to by including an AI Overview on their results pages.

 

Notes

[i] 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1).

[ii] Reid, Liz, Generative AI in Search: Let Google do the searching for you, Google (May 14, 2024) https://blog.google/products/search/generative-ai-google-search-may-2024/.

[iii] Id.

[iv] Reid, Liz, AI Overviews: About last week, Google (May 30, 2024) https://blog.google/products/search/ai-overviews-update-may-2024/.

[v] O’Brien, Matt, Google makes fixes to AI-generated search summaries after outlandish answers went viral, The Associated Press (May 30, 2024) https://apnews.com/article/google-ai-overviews-hallucination-33060569d6cc01abe6c63d21665330d8.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Brannon, Jordan, Game-Changing Google Search Statistics for 2024, Coalition, (Apr. 5, 2024) https://coalitiontechnologies.com/blog/game-changing-google-search-statistics-for-2024.

[viii] Joel Simon, Can AI be sued for defamation?, Col. Journalism Rev. (March 18, 2024).

[ix] Id.

[x]  See Eugene Volokh, Large Libel Models? Liability For AI Output, 3 J. Free Speech L. 489, 498 (2023).

[xi] Id.

[xii] In July of 2023, Jeffery Battle of Maryland filed suit against Microsoft for an AI generated search result on BING accusing him of crimes he did not commit. The Plaintiff Jeffery Battle is a veteran, business owner, and aerospace professor. When his name is searched online, however, Bing’s AI overview accuses Battle of crimes committed by a different Jeffrey Battle, Jeffery Leon Battle. The other Jeffery Battle pled guilty to seditious conspiracy and levying war against the United States after he tried to join the Taliban in the wake of 9/11. Bing’s search engine results page overview powered by Chat GPT combines information about the two Jeffery’s into one. See Id. at 492.

[xiii] Id. at 493.

You Can Protect Your Data . . . Once.

September 26, 2024
Business Law, Data, Ethics, Internet, Litigation, Privacy, Social Media

Jessica Schmitz, MJLST Staffer

We scan our face to access our phones. We scan our hands to save five minutes in the TSA line. Teslas track our eyes to ensure we’re watching the road.[1] Our biometric data is constantly being collected by private entities. Though states like California and Texas are attempting to implement new safeguards for its constituents, Illinois recently rolled back protections under its renowned Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).[2] BIPA  protected consumers from private entities that deceptively or illegally collected biometric data.[3] The new rules overturned the Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Cothron v. White Castle System Inc. that allowed claims to accrue for each violation under BIPA’s provisions.[4] While tech companies and liability insurers are no doubt breathing a sigh of relief at the new reforms, litigants going forward may be left without a remedy if their biometric data is mishandled more than once. Below is a history of BIPA’s passing and impact, followed by the likely ramifications of the new reforms.

BIPA’s Passing Was an Early Victory for Data Privacy Protections

BIPA’s passing in 2008 was one of the earliest consumer protection laws for biometric data collection. At that time, major corporations were piloting finger scanning and facial recognition technology in major cities, including Chicago. The law was designed to not only provide recourse for consumers, but also prescribed preventative measures for companies to follow. BIPA’s protections are broad; companies must publish its data collection and retention policies to the public and cannot retain the information it collects for more than three years.[5] Companies must inform users that they are collecting the data, disclose what is being collected, disclose why it’s being collected, and for how long it intends to store the data.[6] Companies cannot disclose someone’s biometric data without express consent, nor can they profit from the data in any way.[7] Lastly, the data must be stored at least as well as a company stores other confidential data.[8]

Unlike laws in other states, BIPA provided a private right of action to enforce data privacy protections. Following its passage, swaths of lawsuits were filed against major corporations, including Amazon, Southwest Airlines, Google, and Facebook.[9] Under BIPA, companies could be liable for purchasing, improperly collecting, improperly storing, or disseminating biometric data, even if the data was not mishandled.[10] Plaintiffs could recover for every violation under BIPA, and could do so without stating an injury or alleging damages.[11] It is no surprise that BIPA class actions tended to favor plaintiffs, often resulting in large settlements or jury verdicts.[12] Since litigants could collect damages on every violation of BIPA’s provisions, it was difficult for companies to assess their potential liability. Every member of a class action could allege multiple violations, and if found liable, companies would owe, at minimum, $1,000 per violation. The lack of predictability often pushed corporate liability insurance policies into settling rather than risk such large payouts.

The 2023 ruling in Cothron implored the legislature to address concerns of disproportionate corporate liability, stating, “We respectfully suggest that the legislature . . . make clear its intent regarding the assessment of damages under the Act.”[13] The legislature rose to the challenge, fearing the court’s interpretation could bankrupt smaller or mid-size companies.[14] The new provisions to BIPA target the Court’s ruling, providing:

“For purposes of subsection (b) of Section 15, a private entity that, in more than one instance, collects, captures, purchases, receives through trade, or otherwise obtains the same biometric identifier or biometric information from the same person using the same method of collection in violation of subsection (b) of Section 15 has committed a single violation of subsection (b) of Section 15 for which the aggrieved person is entitled to, at most, one recovery under this Section.
(c) For purposes of subsection (d) of Section 15, a private entity that, in more than one instance, discloses, rediscloses, or otherwise disseminates the same biometric identifier or biometric information from the same person to the same recipient using the same method of collection in violation of subsection (d) of Section 15 has committed a single violation of subsection (d) of Section 15 for which the aggrieved person is entitled to, at most, one recovery under this Section regardless of the number of times the private entity disclosed, redisclosed, or otherwise disseminated the same biometric identifier or biometric information of the same person to the same recipient. (eff. 8-2-24.)”

Though not left completely without redress, Illinois constituents may now recover only once if their biometric data is recklessly or deceptively collected or disseminated in the same manner.

BIPA Reforms Mark a Trend Towards Laxing Corporate Responsibility

The rollback of BIPA’s provisions come at a time when consumers need it most. The stakes for mishandling biometric data are much higher than that of other collected data. While social security numbers and credit card numbers can be canceled and changed – with varying degrees of ease – most constituents would be unwilling to change their faces and fingerprints for the sake of _____.[15] Ongoing and future technology developments, such as the rise of AI, heightens potential fallout from BIPA violations.  AI-generated deepfakes are becoming more prevalent, targeting both major celebrities like Taylor Swift and Pokimane, and our family members through phishing schemes.[16] These crimes rely on biometric data, utilizing our voices and faces to create realistic depictions of people, and can even recreate our speech cadence and body movements.[17] For victims, recovering on a per-person basis instead of a per-violation basis means they could be further harmed after recovering against a company with no redress.

Corporations, however, have been calling for reforms for year, and believe that these changes will reduce insurance premiums and docket burdens.[18] Prior to the changes, insurers began removing BIPA coverage from litigation insurance plans and adding strict requirements for defense coverage.[19] Insurers also would encourage companies to settle to avoid judgements on a per-violation basis.[20]

Advocates for BIPA reform believe the new changes will reduce insurance costs while still providing litigants with fair outcomes. Though individual litigants may only recover once, they can still recover for actual damages if a company’s actions resulted in more harm than simply violating BIPA’s provisions.  Awards on a per-person basis can still result in hefty settlements or awards that will hold companies accountable for wrongdoing. Instead of stifling corporate accountability, proponents believe the reforms will result in fairer settlements and reduce litigation costs overall.

Without further guidance from the legislature, how the new provisions are applied will be left for state and federal courts to interpret. Specifically, the legislature left one looming question unanswered; do the restrictions apply retroactively? If litigants can only recover from an entity once, are past litigants barred from participating in future actions regarding similar violations? Or do they get one last shot at holding companies accountable? If they lost in a prior suit, can they join a new one? In trying to relieve the court system, the legislature has ironically given courts the loathsome task of interpreting BIPA’s vague new provisions. Litigants and defendants will likely fight tooth and nail to create favorable case law, which is unlikely to be uniform across jurisdictions.

 

Notes

[1] Model Y Owner’s Manual: Cabin Camera, Tesla, https://www.tesla.com/ownersmanual/modely/en_us/GUID-EDAD116F-3C73-40FA-A861-68112FF7961F.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2024).

[2] See generally, California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2018); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier, Tex. Code Ann. § 503.001 (2017); Abraham Gross, Illinois Biometric Privacy Reform Eases Coverage Woes, LexisNexis Law360 (Aug. 8, 2024, 7:13 PM), https://plus.lexis.com/newsstand/law360-insurance-authority/article/1868014/?crid=debb3ba9-22a1-41d6-920e-c1ce2b7a108d&cbc=0,0,0.

[3] Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5 (2024) [hereinafter BIPA].

[4] Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., 216 N.E.3d 918, 924 (Ill. 2023).

[5] BIPA, supra note 3, at sec. 15a.

[6] Id. at sec. 15b.

[7] Id. at sec. 15c-d.

[8] Id. at sec. 15e.

[9] See generally, In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-03747-JD, 2018 WL 2197546 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018); Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F.Supp.3d 1088 (N.D.Ill., 2017); Miller v. S.W. Airlines Co., No. 18 C 86, 2018 WL 4030590 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018), aff’d, 926 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2019).

[10] BIPA, supra note 3, at sec. 15.

[11] Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019).

[12] See, Lauraann Wood, $9M White Castle Fingerprint BIPA Deal Clears Final Approval, LexisNexis Law360 (Aug. 1, 2024, 2:18 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1864687?from_lnh=true; Lauraann Wood, BNSF’s $75M BIPA Deal With Truckers Nears Final OK, LexisNexis Law360 (June 17, 2024, 8:54 AM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1848754?from_lnh=true.

[13] Cothron, 216 N.E.3d at 929 (Ill. 2023).

[14] Updates to Illinois’ Biometric Privacy Signed Into Law Thanks to Cunningham, Office of Bill Cunningham: State Senator, https://www.senatorbillcunningham.com/news/508-updates-to-illinois-biometric-privacy-signed-into-law-thanks-to-cunningham (Aug. 2, 2024, 3:13PM).

[15] See, BIPA, supra note 3, at sec. 5c.

[16] Dan Merica & Ali Swenson, Trump’s Post of Fake Taylor Swift Endorsement Is His Latest Embrace Of AI-Generated Images, AP News (Aug. 20, 2024, 3:48 PM), https://apnews.com/article/trump-taylor-swift-fake-endorsement-ai-fec99c412d960932839e3eab8d49fd5f; Bianca Britton, They Appeared in Deepfake Porn Videos Without Their Consent. Few Laws Protect Them, NBC News (Feb. 14, 2023, 2:48 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/deepfake-twitch-porn-atrioc-qtcinderella-maya-higa-pokimane-rcna69372; Charles Bethea, The Terrifying A.I. Scam That Uses Your Loved One’s Voice, The New Yorker (Mar. 7, 2024), https://www.newyorker.com/science/annals-of-artificial-intelligence/the-terrifying-ai-scam-that-uses-your-loved-ones-voice.

[17] Catherine Bernaciak & Dominic A. Ross, How Easy is it to Make and Detect a Deepfake?, Carnegie Mellon Univ.: SEI Blog (Mar. 14, 2022), https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/how-easy-is-it-to-make-and-detect-a-deepfake/.

[18] Michael C. Andolina et. al., Emerging Issues and Ambiguities Under Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act, Practitioner Insights Commentaries (May 21, 2020), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ib04759309b7b11eabea3f0dc9fb69570/View/FullText.html?listSource=Foldering&originationContext=clientid&transitionType=MyResearchHistoryItem&contextData=%28oc.Default%29&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.

[19] Gross, supra note 2.

[20] Id.

Moderating Social Media Content: A Comparative Analysis of European Union and United States Policy

September 24, 2024
Administrative Law, EU Law, Internet, Social Media

Jaxon Hill, MJLST Staffer

In the wake of the Capitol Hill uprising, former president Donald Trump had several of his social media accounts suspended.1 Twitter explained that their decision to suspend Trump’s account was “due to the risk of further incitement of violence.”2 Though this decision caught a lot of attention in the public eye, Trump was not the first figure in the political sphere to have his account suspended.3 In response to the social media platforms alleged censorship, some states, mainly Florida and Texas, attempted to pass anti-censorship laws which limit the ability for social media companies to moderate content.4 

Now, as litigation ensues for Trump and social media companies fighting the Texas and Florida legislation, the age-old question rears its ugly head: what is free speech?5 Do social media companies have a right to limit free speech? Social media companies are not bound by the First Amendment.6 Thus, barring valid legislation that says otherwise, they are allowed to restrict or moderate content on their platforms. But should they, and, if so, how? How does the answer to these questions differ for public officials on social media? To analyze these considerations, it is worthwhile to look beyond the borders of the United States. This analysis is not meant to presuppose that there is any wrongful conduct on the part of social media companies. Rather, this serves as an opportunity to examine an alternative option to social media content moderation that could provide more clarity to all interested parties. 

  In the European Union, social media companies are required to provide clear and specific information whenever they restrict the content on their platform.7 These statements are called “Statements of Reasons” (“SoRs”) and they must include some reference to whatever law the post violated.8 All SoRs  are  made publicly available to ensure transparency between the users and the organization.9 

An analysis of these SoRs yielded mixed results as to their efficacy but it opened up the door for potential improvements.10 Ultimately, the analysis showed inconsistencies among the various platforms in how or why they moderate content, but those inconsistencies can potentially open up an ability for legislators to clarify social media guidelines.11 

Applying this same principle domestically could allow for greater transparency between consumers, social media companies, and the government. By providing publicly available rationale behind any moderation, social media companies could continue to remove illegal content while not straddling the line of censorship. It is worth noting that there are likely negative financial implications for this policy, though. With states potentially implementing vastly different policies, social media companies may have to increase costs to ensure they are in compliance wherever they operate.12 Nevertheless, absorbing these costs up front may be preferable to “censorship” or “extremism, hatred, [or] misinformation and disinformation.”13 

In terms of the specific application to government officials, it may seem this alternative fails to offer any clarity to the current state of affairs. This assertion may have some merit as government officials have still been able to post harmful social media content in the EU without it being moderated.14 With that being said, politicians engaging with social media is a newer development—domestically and internationally—so more research needs to be conducted to conclude best practices. Regardless, increasing transparency should bar social media companies from making moderation choices unfounded in the law.

 

Notes

1 Bobby Allyn & Tamara Keith, Twitter Permanently Suspends Trump, Citing ‘Risk Of Further Incitement Of Violence’, Npr (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/08/954760928/twitter-bans-president-trump-citing-risk-of-further-incitement-of-violence.

2 Id.

3 See Christian Shaffer, Deplatforming Censorship: How Texas Constitutionally Barred Social Media Platform Censorship, 55 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 893, 903-04 (2023) (giving an example of both conservative and liberal users that had their accounts suspended).

4 See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross et al., Anti-Censorship Legislation: A Flawed Attempt to Address a Legitimate Problem, Lawfare (July 27, 2022), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/anti-censorship-legislation-flawed-attempt-address-legitimate-problem (explaining the Texas and Florida legislation in-depth).

5 See e.g. Trump v. United States, 219 L.E.2d 991, 1034 (2024) (remanding the case to the lower courts); Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 219 L.E.2d. 1075, 1104 (2024) (remanding the case to the lower courts).

6 Evelyn Mary Aswad, Taking Exception to Assessments of American Exceptionalism: Why the United States Isn’t Such an Outlier on Free Speech, 126 Dick. L. R. 69, 72 (2021).

7 Chiara Drolsbach & Nicolas Pröllochs, Content Moderation on Social Media in the EU: Insights From the DSA Transparency Database (2023), https://arxiv.org/html/2312.04431v1/#bib.bib56.

8  Id.

9 Id.

10 Id. This analysis showed that (1) content moderation varies across platforms in number, (2) content moderation is most often applied to videos and text, whereas images are moderated much less, (3) most rule-breaking content is decided via automated means (except X), (4) there is much variation among how often the platforms choose to moderate illegal content, and (5) the primary reasons for moderation include falling out of the scope of the platform’s services, illegal or harmful speech, and sexualized content. Misinformation was very rarely cited as the reason for moderation.

11 Id.

12 Perkins Coie LLP, More State Content Moderation Laws Coming to Social Media Platforms (November 17, 2022), https://perkinscoie.com/insights/update/more-state-content-moderation-laws-coming-social-media-platforms (recommending social media companies to hire counsel to ensure they are complying with various state laws). 

13 See e.g. Shaffer, supra note 3 (detailing the harms of censorship); Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 4 (outlining the potential harms of restrictive content moderation).

14 Goujard et al., Europe’s Far Right Uses TikTok to Win Youth Vote, Politico (Mar. 17, 2024), https://www.politico.eu/article/tiktok-far-right-european-parliament-politics-europe/ (“Without evidence, [Polish far-right politician, Patryk Jaki] insinuated the person who carried out the attack was a migrant”).

 

Home | Contact Publishing Services | Report Web Accessibility Issues