Psychology

I Feel the Rush: Chemsex and Consent Laws

Violet Butler, MJLST Note/Comment Editor

Sex and drugs don’t mix. Or do they? A scroll on the popular LGBTQ+ hookup and dating app Grindr will show many users looking to have a good time (in more ways than one). Chemsex, more commonly known as “Party and Play” in the United States, is the practice of using psychoactive drugs as a part of having sex.[1] Chemsex became more popular amongst queer men in recent years, with over ten percent of queer men in the United States reporting engaging in chemsex in a 2021 study. The same study found it was more popular in the global community.[2] With the surging prevalence of chemsex across the world, is our legal system capable of handling chemsex?

The practice may seem odd—or even dangerous—to some, but there are a variety of reasons why queer men might engage in chemsex. A study out of Kazakhstan found that people commonly engage in chemsex for self-empowerment, sexual liberation, detachment, and as part of social dynamics.[3] Whatever their personal reason for doing so, the men who engage in chemsex acknowledge its risks. The men in the aforementioned Kazakh study described risks associated with mental health, physical health, and the risk of violence.[4] One of the largest risks is how psychoactive substances such as GHB or meth—some of the drugs commonly used in chemsex—renders users mentally incapacitated.[5]

Because the law is not currently set up to handle the voluntary intoxication associated with chemsex, it is helpful to understand how those who choose to participate in chemsex create their own subcultural understanding of consent when they can no longer rely on the law. A gay male from Chicago said that consent in chemsex is often based on the ability to read body language or facial expressions instead of verbal affirmations of consent.[6] This can make ensuring consent in a chemsex encounter more difficult, and he said that “people give somewhat more grace to anyone who initiates unwanted contact” during a chemsex encounter because of these fuzzy lines of consent.[7] Additionally, chemsex participants report that people can change behavior and preferences when under the influence of drugs, which can create feelings of remorse after becoming sober.[8] In order to navigate these messy lines of consent, some chemsex participants give forward-looking consent to “whatever happens … (within reason).”[9] More concerningly, some chemsex participants have reported feeling as if they have “relinquished any version of consent” when drugs become involved.[10] Although many individual chemsex encounters may be perfectly consensual, it seems that chemsex does not have the same clear culture of consent found in other sexual subcultures, such as kink (or BDSM) culture.

But can the law fix this problem? Considering the heavy risks involved in chemsex and a possibly fuzzy culture of consent, this question doesn’t have a clear answer. One possible solution is the use of sexual advance directives. More commonly seen in the healthcare world, advanced directives can either be instructive directives (giving or blocking consent for future actions) or proxy directives (authorizing a third party to give consent in the person’s stead).[11] The use of sexual advanced directives could clear up the issues of fuzzy, “in the moment,” consent that is common in chemsex, providing guardrails for people who are at high risk of sexual exploitation. Instructive sexual advanced directives could provide a list of “dos and don’ts” or “yesses and noes” that all parties sign onto in advance. The primary benefit of these instructive directives is that they would set out clear expectations for all participants, hopefully reducing any crossing of lines. However, using substances such as meth can have a strong impact on one’s behavior and there is no guarantee that the boundaries signed onto while sober will still be respected once the participants start using drugs. Chemsex users have reported violence associated with drug use as a major concern in the chemsex community.[12] If an accusation of consent being crossed arises after the fact, an instructive sexual advanced directive could help clarify what was and was not consented to before drugs got involved.

The use of proxy sexual advanced directives could provide another layer of protection for chemsex encounters. Participants would have one or more, depending on the size of the chemsex encounter, people be their proxies, giving these proxies the power to step in and make consent decisions for them in situations where it might seem like consent has gotten fuzzy.[13] While it may seem awkward for a sober third party to just be sitting and watching someone have sex, the use of consent proxies can prevent a situation from going too far when chemsex participants can no longer advocate for themselves in a situation.

Ultimately, even if legal systems can be set up to protect chemsex participants, it will take both public health campaigns and community buy-in to create a stronger and clearer culture of consent in the chemsex scene. Absent legal guardrails, some steps can be taken to ensure a safer chemsex encounter, such as only participating in it with a trusted partner and being familiar with the drug being used.

 

Notes

[1] Viiv Healthcare, Chemsex: Navigating Pleasure, Safety, and Health, 2021,https://viivhealthcare.com/ending-hiv/stories/community-engagement/chemsex/#:~:text=In%20the%20USA%2C%2010.3%25%20of,in%20the%20past%2012%20months.

[2] Id.

[3] Lunchenkov et al., “A Way to Liberate Myself”: A Qualitative Study of Perceived Benefits and Risks of Chemsex Among Gay, Bisexual, and Other Men Who Have Sex with Men in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Drug & Alcohol Dependence 1, 5–6 (Oct. 10. 2024).

[4] Id. at 7.

[5] Viiv Healthcare, supra note i. See also, Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 Ohio State L.J., 1201, 1212 (2015) (giving intoxication as an example of “temporary transient incapacity”).

[6] Interview with a Gay Man Living in Chicago (Feb. 11, 2025) (on file with author).

[7] Id.

[8] Healy-Cullen et. al., Understanding How Gay Men Construct ‘Good’ Chemsex Participation Using Critical Discursive Psychology,15 Psych. & Sexuality 539, 548 (2024).

[9] Interview with a Gay Man Living in Chicago, supra note viii.

[10] Zachary Zane, It’s Time to Talk About Chemsex and Consent, Advoc., (Sept. 11, 2017 7:00 AM) , https://www.advocate.com/current-issue/2017/9/11/its-time-talk-about-chemsex-and-consent#toggle-gdp.

[11] Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2016).

[12] Lunchenkov et al., supra note iii at 7.

[13] It is also possible to have some combination of written instructive and proxies to ensure the most clarity in sexual encounters. See, Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, supra note xii at 12–13 for a brief introduction to hybrid directives.


Tomorrow’s Originalism: Would a Time Machine Solve Originalism’s Implementation Problem?

Solomon Park, MJLST Staffer

I. Tomorrow’s Originalism: After Original Public Meaning Originalism & the Implementation Problem

When interpreting the Constitution, the threshold question is what “meaning [did] the text ha[ve] for competent speakers of American English at the time [the relevant] provision of the text was framed and ratified?”[1] This philosophy—known as Public Meaning Originalism (“PMO”)—has become the predominant way judges approach Constitutional questions.[2] But PMO hasn’t always been the majority methodology.[3] Contrary to the prevalence of PMO in the Roberts Court, it was only relatively recently in District of Columbia v. Heller, that PMO really found its footing. As Justice Scalia then wrote: “in interpreting [the Constitution] we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’”[4] This passage in Heller— and subsequent cases involving constitutional challenges—would usher in a new age of originalism and solidify the prevalence of PMO in modern constitutional jurisprudence.[5]

Although today’s originalism has been defined by PMO as the initial starting point, significant debate persists with how originalism should be implemented. Known as the “implementation problem,” legal scholars have critiqued originalism for its inability to “address how practicing judges and attorneys should apply originalist theories.”[6] This concern over implementation—and workability writ large[7]—has proven to be a significant point of contention in recent Supreme Court cases. And no case better exemplifies these challenges than United States v. Rahimi—a Second Amendment case decided just last term. In five separate concurring opinions, and a single dissent, the Justices took originalism to task—engaging with each other to express their support and concerns with PMO.[8]

This current discord preludes tomorrow’s originalism. But unlike the shift from Original Intent to Original Public Meaning, tomorrow’s originalism will likely not be one of substantive form—but rather of content (i.e. not whether PMO is the correct starting point, but rather what tools should be permissible/given more weight to conduct PMO analysis). Foreshadowing the future, we might consider the wealth of literature that surrounds textualism (i.e. rules surrounding semantic/substantive canons, as well as legislative history) as an indicator of the rigor that originalist jurisprudence might eventually arrive at.

This blog post suggests that before we arrive at tomorrow’s originalism, it may be helpful to take a step back. At its core, PMO has a simple premise: competent speakers of American English around ratification had an idea of what the Constitution meant, and it is this meaning that lawyers, judges, and Justices should now strive to locate.

Focusing on the fundamentals, what if we could literally go back in time and ask these speakers of American English? How exactly would we go about doing so? What sort of parameters would shape the questions we ask? Who would we seek out? This very brief blog post, proposes and shows how the following Mondale Time Machine hypothetical could: concretize ongoing discussions about implementation, and provide a way to clarify, and evaluate, existing originalist tools.

II. The Mondale Time Machine (“MTM”) Hypothetical: Core Capabilities & Limitations

The Mondale Time Machine (“MTM”) Hypothetical—Somewhere in the depths of Minnesota Law’s library, there is a time machine…

This very real device has yet to have been activated but can teleport willing “speakers of American English” to the present. The current plan is to then survey these speakers about the Original Public Meaning of a specific provision of the Constitution.

MTM possesses the following initial capabilities, it can teleport any number of people: from anywhere (i.e. geographic area); from anytime (i.e. can limit the search to a specific range of years); and can even teleport people possessing any permutation of specific characteristics or demographics (i.e. of a certain socioeconomic class, race, or gender). Note: this list of capabilities is non-exhaustive and additional capabilities can be added/subtracted by the reader.

MTM requires researchers—meaning the reader—to actually make these decisions. In preparation for the first round of time travel, and in order to best reflect PMO’s objectives, the reader has been asked to provide parameters—and their rationale—to the list of the above capabilities.

III. MTM Raises Two Core Questions/Opportunities:

This hypothetical raises at least two core questions. First, as a procedural matter how much of an issue is the implementation problem—as well as other problems that have been leveled against PMO? Afterall, if we conclude that not even asking a thousand people from the founding era would be sufficient, then the implementation problem is indeed serious. Some of the best arguments for this side could be that: any number of time travelers are probably under inclusive; the selected time travelers would not be representative of the founding era as a population; and evaluation problems could arise when there is disagreement amongst the time travelers.

Second, the hypothetical provides an opportunity to clarify and evaluate desirable features in current/future originalist tools. For example, if we conclude that teleporting an expert linguist from the founding era would be sufficient—then tools like dictionaries (which reflect the opinion of a small but highly educated group of people) should also receive an elevated status. Answering the hypothetical provides a clear platonic ideal for originalism. For example, if we decide that the time machine should transport people possessing various demographics, then the tools we use for originalist analysis should also reflect this ideal. For this reason, a tool which fails to capture these perspectives lacks a signature quality—perhaps even a necessary one—which should demote the persuasive weight given to the tool.

IV. Conclusion: Would a Time Machine Solve Originalism’s Implementation Problem?

 “Discerning what the original meaning of the Constitution requires in this or that case may sometimes be difficult… Faithful adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning may be an imperfect guide, but I can think of no more perfect one for us to follow.”—Justice Gorsuch, United States v. Rahimi[9]

This passage from Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Rahimi captures two simultaneous truths. Originalism is, and likely will remain, the “imperfect guide” used to interpret the Constitution. But at the same time, originalism has challenging flaws which arise out of its implementation.

Ultimately, my hypothetical highlights these two realities. On the one hand, a gut feeling tells us that a time machine should be able to solve the implementation problem. Afterall, if not even a thousand people from the founding era could resolve the issue, then what could? On the other hand, working through the hypothetical shows the line drawing problems created by the implementation critique. In the face of that difficulty—and as Justice Gorsuch reminds us—that doesn’t mean the inquiry is over.

I hope this blog post presents an interesting, and entertaining, thought experiment. My answer to the hypothetical would take too many words to write. However, I do think that the hypothetical probably strengthens tools that are capable of more holistically representing communities—such as Corpus Linguistics.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Theory of Constitutional Meaning, 101 B. U. L. Rev. 1953, 1957 (2022).

[2] See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Original Public Meaning, 807 Mich. St. L. Rev. 897, 810 n. 5-7 (2024) (providing an in-depth analysis of the use of PMO in: the Supreme Court, various federal courts of appeal, and state supreme courts); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: a New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751, 761 (2009) (“Original public meaning is now the predominant originalist theory”); see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our law?, 115 Colum L. Rev. 2349, 2391 (2015) (concluding that “originalism seems to best describe our law”). But see Justice Stephen Breyer, Pragmatism or Textualism, 138 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 722 (2025) (“While the Court may well be in the midst of a paradigm shift toward textualism and originalism, the unworkability of these approaches in practice will push the Court back toward the traditional approach — gradually and with time”).

[3] See generally Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 599, 599-613 (2004) (describing and explaining the shift from Original Intent Originalism to Original Public Meaning Originalism).

[4] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008).

[5] See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. Rev.  1095, 1095 (2009) (“District of Columbia v. Heller has been hailed by its supporters as a model of ‘new originalism,’ a methodology that focuses on original public meaning and eschews any concern for original intent.”).

[6] Michael L. Smith and Alexander S. Hiland, Originalism’s Implementation Problem, 30 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1063, 1064 (2022).

[7] See generally Kurt Eggret et al., Chapman Law Review Debate: Does Originalism Work?, 26 CHAP. L. REV. 237, 244 (2023) (manuscript of a debate between Professor Kurt Eggert and Professor Lee Strang over Originalism’s workability issue); see also Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 2, at 722.

[8] Compare United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024) (“the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition) (citing N.Y. ST. Rifle and Pistol Ass’n., Inc v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26-31 (2022), with Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702-703 (Sotomayor, J. & Kagan, J. concurring) (critiquing the dissent as being “so exacting as to be useless”), with id. at 711-712 (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (writing to emphasize the importance of originalism. “Faithful adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning may be an imperfect guide, but I can think of no more perfect one for us to follow”), with id. at 714, 719, 719-731 (Kavanaugh, J. concurring) (clearly supporting original public meaning originalism, and examining the role of “pre-ratification history, post-ratification history, and precedent when analyzing vague constitutional text”), with id. at 737-738, 739-740 (Barrett, J. concurring) (explaining the “basic premises of originalism,” and explaining the problem of “level[s] of generality”), with id. at 744, 745-747 (Jackson, J. concurring) (explaining that Bruen’s test has led to serious workability issues for lower courts, and that significant questions remain with originalism’s scope), with id. at 753-763 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (explaining why “[t]he Government does not offer a single historical regulation that is relevantly similar to [the applicable statute]”).

[9] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 711 (2024) (Gorsuch, J. concurring).