Patent Law

The Inaccessible Cure: the Struggle With Feline Infectious Peritonitis and Thoughts on the Underlying Law

Lan Gan, MJLST Staffer

For fellow feline fanatics, you may share some of my traits. I care for my cat’s health as I care for my own. Besides giving her nutritiously balanced meals, I take notes when she’s unwell and schedule annual physicals for her, just like I would for myself. I also browse online discussions posts of cats. Some make me laugh, some give me new understanding of cat behaviors, but the ones about feline infectious peritonitis are always grim.

Feline Infectious Peritonitis, or FIP, is a severe disease that typically develops in young cats when they are infected with feline enteric coronavirus (FeCV) which later mutates into FIPV and causes inflammations.[1] The mutations happen about ten percent of the time, and, until recently, have almost always been deadly.[2]

In 2018, researchers at the School of Veterinary Medicine at UC Davis partnered with Gilead Sciences and published an article about the discovery of GS-441524, which, through their experiments with cats that were infected with FIPV in an in vitro process, “caused a rapid reversal of disease signs and return to normality with as little as two weeks of treatment in 10/10 cats and with no apparent toxicity.”[3] Another paper, published in 2019, also by researchers of the two institutions, revealed that GS-441524 was an effective treatment for cats with naturally occurring FIP.[4]

This gave cat rescuers and cat owners hope. But despite promising experiment results, Niels Pederson, who partook in the studies and was a long-time researcher devoted to FIP, warned that the development was “proof-of-concept,” showing possibility in terms of science but not immediately translating into commercially available products.[5] Subsequently, GS-441524 did not move forward to become an FDA-approved drug to treat cats.[6] Instead, it seemed to be set aside as Gilead prioritized another drug, remdesivir, which is identical to GS-441524 in part of its structural formula and has the same mechanism of inhibiting coronavirus.[7] When Gilead failed to obtain FDA approval to use remdesivir to treat Ebola, they changed course to study its effects on the then-rising Covid-19 pandemic.[8] GS-441524, with its studies on animals halted, was also part of the race and was argued by some scientists to have more efficacy in treating Covid-19 than remdesivir.[9]

The much-needed cure became inaccessible. In as early as 2019, anxious people were turning to the black market for help. GS-441524 that circulated on the black market had murky origins: potential leaks from lab orders for research, personnel that synthesized the compound themselves in overseas locations such as China.[10] The benefits of the drug, while still salient, based on surveys of cat owners who utilized them, were potentially compromised by the disparity in quality of the black market drugs, and lack of veterinary expertise involved.[11]

Pharmaceutical companies are more than incentivized to patent their research products. A search on World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s database revealed 66 patents applied for by Gilead, from as early as 2009 to as recently as July 2023.[12] The list of patents documented development in Gilead’s GS-441524 research.[13] Gilead patented GS-441524’s treatment for cats in 2018 and 2020[14], but those accounted for only 3 of the 66 patents they obtained; the rest were regarding human use.[15] Patents benefit their owners by giving them a cause of action against future infringement. They are about owning, not sharing. Patents are the culmination of a strenuous journey of scientific research. But this celebratory landmark might not go any further. Many patents do not make their way onto the market; having one is not itself an incentive for doing so.

Next comes the approval process as stipulated in federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 360b governs the approval process of new animal drugs.[16] The statute lays the burden on pharmaceutical companies – referred to as drug sponsors – of contacting the FDA after initial research of the drug, making the decision to pursue approval for the drug, and conducting tests to ensure the effectiveness and safety of the drug.[17] Additionally, the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act (GADPTRA) of 1988 provides an abbreviated process for generic copies of approved new animal drugs;[18] the Minor Use and Minor Species Animal Health Act (the “Mums Act”) of 2004 paves paths for drugs affecting a small population of major species of animals (defined as horses, dogs, cats, cattle, pigs, turkeys and chickens) and minor species (those that are not major species) that have few drugs available to them.[19] In 2018, the Animal Drug and Animal Generic Drug User Fee Amendments expanded the eligibility for conditional approval of non-MUMS drugs intending to treat a serious or life-threatening disease or condition or address an unmet animal or human health need, for which a demonstration of effectiveness would require a complex or particularly difficult study or studies.[20]

How has GS-441524 escaped the statutory provisions when they have been amended to be more inclusive? There may be various reasons. It may not qualify for conditional approval under 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc(a)(1)(ii) because peer-reviewed articles have already demonstrated the drug’s effectiveness. It may be hard to quantify the FIP-affected cat population to meet the “minor use” threshold set out in the Mums Act because of the difficulty of FIP testing. Current testing cannot differentiate between FeCV and the mutated FIPV, and an FIP diagnosis is often assumed for young cats based on their higher infection rate.[21] Lastly, no matter which approval process GS-441524 is eligible to take, the process wouldn’t start unless Gilead decides to contact the FDA and set forth the drug for approval. Current statutes create paths, but no incentives to do so. The market may provide some monetary incentives, as treatment costs via the black market can be up to $10,000 for 12 weeks[22], but this is singularly held back by the decision to prioritize approval for human treatment, and the presumption that the approval process of an animal drug would negatively impact the approval process of a similar drug for humans.[23]

The black market is not a long-term solution for FIP treatment. Though the U.S. has yet to adjudicate the circulation of unlicensed FIP treatment, in July 2023, a woman in China was sentenced to 15 years in prison and fined with more than $5 million in damages for producing and selling fake, substandard products pursuant to China’s criminal law statutes.[24] Gilead also holds the exclusive patents on feline treatments. Facing unclear prospects for legitimate FIP treatment, subsequent statutory amendments need to create actual incentives to spur innovation in animal drugs, in addition to the creation of paths. The law should also create safeguards to promote transparency and fairness in the application review process in order to reduce bias against animal drugs.

Notes

[1] Feline Infectious Peritonitis, Cornell Feline Health Center, https://www.vet.cornell.edu/departments-centers-and-institutes/cornell-feline-health-center/health-information/feline-health-topics/feline-infectious-peritonitis (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[2] Id.

[3] B.G. Murphy et al., The Nucleoside Analog GS-441524 Strongly Inhibits Feline Infectious Peritonitis (FIP) Virus in Tissue Culture and Experimental Cat Infection Studies, 219 Veterinary Microbology 226, 226 (2018).

[4] Niels C Pedersen, Efficacy and Safety of the Nucleoside Analog GS-441524 for Treatment of cats with Naturally Occurring Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 21(4) J. of Feline Med. & Surgery 271, 271 (2019).

[5] Human Antiviral ‘GS-441524’ Shows Great Promise Against Infectious Disease in Cats, Science Daily (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/02/190213100442.htm.

[6] Sarah Zhang, A Much-Hyped COVID-19 Drug Is Almost Identical to a Black-Market Cat Cure, The Atlantic (May 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/05/remdesivir-cats/611341/.

[7] Id.

[8] Kai Kupferschmidt & Jon Cohen, WHO Launches Global Megatrial of the Four Most Promising Coronavirus Treatments, Science (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.science.org/content/article/who-launches-global-megatrial-four-most-promising-coronavirus-treatments.

[9] E.g., Victoria C. Yan & Florian L. Muller, Advantages of the Parent Nucleoside GS-441524 over Remdesivir for Covid-19 Treatment, 11 ACS Med. Chemistry Letters 1361, 1361 (2020).

[10] See Sarah Zhang, A Much-Hyped COVID-19 Drug Is Almost Identical to a Black-Market Cat Cure, The Atlantic (May 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/05/remdesivir-cats/611341/; see also Sarah Jones et al., Unlicensed GS-441524-Like Antiviral Therapy Can Be Effective for at-Home Treatment of Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 11 Animals 2257, 2258 (2021).

[11] Sarah Jones et al., Unlicensed GS-441524-Like Antiviral Therapy Can Be Effective for at-Home Treatment of Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 11 Animals 2257, 2264–67 (2021).

[12] CHEM:(BRDWIEOJOWJCLU-LTGWCKQJSA-N), WIPO, https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/result.jsf?_vid=P22-LN8EIR-06824 (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[13] Id.

[14] See World Patent No. 169,946 (filed Mar. 13, 2018); see also U.S. Patent No. 0,296,584 (filed Mar. 13, 2018); see also U.S. Patent No. 0,376,014 (filed Apr. 17, 2020).

[15] See CHEM:(BRDWIEOJOWJCLU-LTGWCKQJSA-N), WIPO, https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/result.jsf?_vid=P22-LN8EIR-06824 (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[16] 21 U.S.C. § 360b.

[17] From an Idea to the Marketplace: The Journey of an Animal Drug through the Approval Process, FDA (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/animal-health-literacy/idea-marketplace-journey-animal-drug-through-approval-process.

[18] Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act (GADPTRA), FDA (Apr. 24, 2023), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/guidance-regulations/generic-animal-drug-and-patent-term-restoration-act-gadptra.

[19] Conditional Approval Explained: A Resource for Veterinarians, FDA (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/resources-you/conditional-approval-explained-resource-veterinarians.

[20] 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc (a)(1)(ii).

[21] Feline Infectious Peritonitis, Cornell Feline Health Center, https://www.vet.cornell.edu/departments-centers-and-institutes/cornell-feline-health-center/health-information/feline-health-topics/feline-infectious-peritonitis (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).

[22] Sarah Jones et al., Unlicensed GS-441524-Like Antiviral Therapy Can Be Effective for at-Home Treatment of Feline Infectious Peritonitis, 11 Animals 2257, 2264–67 (2021).

[23] Id.

[24] Wu Shubin (吴淑斌), Zhishou Maoyao Yishen Huoxing 15 Nian: Maoquan “Jiumingyao” de Yinmi Shengyi (制售猫药一审获刑15年:猫圈“救命药” 的隐秘生意) [Sentenced at Trial for 15 Years for Manufacturing and Selling Medicine for Cats: The Secret Business of Life-Saving Drugs in Cat-loving Communities], Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan (三联生活周刊) [Sanlian Lifeweek] (July 20, 2023), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/VKJO_AIVBy3Hm6GhWUOnWA.


Patent Venue and the Western District of Texas: Will Randomly Assigning Judges Really Change Anything?

Nina Elder, MJLST Staffer

According to the 2023 Patent Litigation Report Lex Machina released last month, Judge Alan Albright, of the Western District of Texas, heard more patent cases than any other judge in the nation. This is largely because historically Judge Albright has heard nearly all patent cases filed in his district—a district which has maintained its position as the most popular patent venue  for several years. Last July, to address concerns about Judge Albright’s monopoly over patent cases the Western District of Texas implemented a new rule requiring that judges be randomly assigned to patent cases. Some expected that patent filings in the district would “fall off a cliff” after this change, but the Lex Machine report showed that so far there hasn’t been a major decrease in the number of patent cases filed in the district. However, the question remains: will randomization have a significant effect on the distribution of patent cases in the long term?

Why Texas?

Until relatively recently, the Western District of Texas was not a particularly popular patent venue. Judge Albright’s appointment in 2018 changed that. Before becoming a judge, Albright practiced as a patent litigator for decades. He enjoys patent cases and on multiple occasions encouraged parties to file them in his court. And his efforts succeeded—the Western District of Texas had a meteoric rise in popularity after Albright was appointed, and only two years after he took the bench it went from receiving only 2.5% of patent cases filed nationwide to around 22%.

Plaintiffs have flocked to the Western District of Texas to take advantage of Judge Albright’s plaintiff friendly practices. Plaintiffs prefer his fast-moving schedules because they drive settlement negotiations and limit the time defendants have to develop their case. His patent-specific standing orders provide predictability and his years of patent experience allow for efficient resolution of issues. Albright’s procedures also make it harder for defendants to initiate inter partes review to invalidate plaintiff patents with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which has been called a patent death squad.

Because of the way cases are distributed in the Western District of Texas, plaintiffs can almost guarantee they will be assigned to Judge Albright if they file in the Waco division, where he is the sole judge. The district is organized into nine divisions, most with one or two judges. Federal district courts are not required to randomly assign cases and, barring unique circumstances, a case filed in a Western Texas division with only one judge will be assigned to that judge. This ability to choose provides plaintiffs with certainty as to the judge that will preside over their case – something not available in most districts. As a result, nearly all patent cases in the Western District of Texas have been handled by Judge Albright. Albright also transfers cases infrequently, meaning it is unlikely a given case will be transferred to a more defendant-friendly forum.

New Rule Requires Random Assignment

Concerns have been expressed about the monopoly Albright has on patent cases. General concerns revolve around judge shopping as it may undermine fairness and public trust in the judicial system and there is a worry that cases may be won based on procedural advantage rather than the merits. In Judge Albrights case there is unease about non-practicing entities (NPEs). NPEs, or patent trolls as they are often called, generate revenue by suing for infringement, often using abusive litigation tactics. There have been concerns that Judge Albright’s practices benefit patent trolls as after he took the bench more than 70% of new patent cases in the Western District of Texas were brought by NPEs.

In response to this issue, in November 2021 several members of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s intellectual property subcommittee wrote a letter to Chief Justice John Roberts and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s Judicial Conference. While they did not name Albright, they alluded to him by noting “unseemly and inappropriate conduct in one district.” They also sent a letter to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office expressing concern that Judge Albright repeatedly ignored binding case law and abused his direction by denying transfer motions. The Judicial Conference director, Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf, said the office would conduct a study and noted that random case assignment safeguards judicial autonomy and prevents judge shopping.  Justice Roberts addressed the issue in his annual report and said that patent venue was one of the top issues facing the judiciary.

As a result, last July the Chief Judge of the Western District of Texas, Orlando Garcia, instituted a random assignment of patent cases filed in Waco. Under the new rule, patent cases filed in Waco are no longer automatically assigned to Judge Albright, but instead are randomly distributed to one of the 13 judges in the district.

Impacts of the New Rule

Initial reports suggested there was a decrease in patent case filings in the Western District of Texas after the new rule, but more recent Lex Machina data show that there was limited change. Though the number of patent cases on Judge Albright’s docket did decrease, it was not as great a decrease as some expected, and he still received around 50% of all patent cases filed in the district. However, this is largely because Albright is still being assigned any newly filed cases that relate to those currently on his docket. Though randomization hasn’t significantly decreased the patent cases on Albright list yet, the number of cases assigned to him over time should decrease. What remains to be seen however is whether there will be an overall decrease in patent cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas.

What Will Happen in the Future?

It is unclear how this new way of assigning cases in the Western District of Texas will impact the distribution of patent cases. Uncertainty about the behaviors of other judges in the district likely will cause a decrease in filings. There are 12 “new” judges which can preside over patent cases in the district and only five have significant intellectual property experience. Until it is clearer how the other judges in the district handle patent cases, litigants may go elsewhere. However, it is possible that the other judges will follow Albright’s lead. Two judges in the district, Kathleen Cardone and David Counts, have already adopted Albrights’ patent procedures. It is also possible litigants will simply begin targeting judges with patent experience in the district. The new rule does not require random assignment for all patent cases—only those filed in Waco. Plaintiffs can still select their desired judge, as long as it is not Albright.

Even if the Western District loses its spot at the top, Texas will likely remain a popular patent venue. Before the Western District began its rise, the Eastern District of Texas was a patent litigation epicenter. At least for the near future it seems like the Western District of Texas will remain among one of the most popular patent forums; only time will tell the larger effects of the new rule.


Akamai Provides a New Induced Infringement Standard, but How Do We Use It?

Ryan J. Connell, MJLST Lead Articles Editor

In the spring 2013 issue of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology Mr. Roy D. Gross examined the use of circumstantial evidence to prove inducement of infringement. Mr. Gross’s article is titled Can an Inference of Intent to Induce Infringement of a Patent Be Drawn Where Other Reasonable Inferences Exist? An Examination of the Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Inducement of Infringement. Mr. Gross ultimately argues that that the doctrine of specific intent to infringe in patent cases should be harmonized with the standard used for inequitable conduct.

It is important to discern the boundaries of specific intent to infringe in light of the recent Akamai case. Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In Akamai the Federal Circuit arguably made it easier for a patent owner to hold a person liable for induced infringement of a method claim when no single person performed all the steps of the method. The Akamai decision still requires the alleged inducer to have the specific intent to induce infringement. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308. The results of Akamai are mixed then, on one hand patent owners can now go after those who induced infringement but never induced a single party to infringe the patent. On the other hand the patent owner must still provide evidence of a specific intent to induce infringement.

Proving induced infringement is a difficult task. Direct evidence of inducement is often hard to come by and the patent owner must often resort to using circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent. Mr. Gross suggests courts to weigh the following three factors, in light of circumstantial evidence, when determining if the requisite intent is present: (1) nexus; (2) control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe.

Akamai has closed an undesirable loophole in patent law. For Akamai to reach its full potential however, courts and litigators need to understand how to weigh circumstantial evidence that may be more strained in cases where a patent is collectively infringed as opposed to directly infringed by one actor. Articles such as this can help the legal community understand how to use circumstantial evidence in light of the new induced infringement standard.


Akamai Provides a New Induced Infringement Standard, but How Do We Use It?

Ryan J. Connell, MJLST Lead Articles Editor

In the spring 2013 issue of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology Mr. Roy D. Gross examined the use of circumstantial evidence to prove inducement of infringement. Mr. Gross’s article is titled Can an Inference of Intent to Induce Infringement of a Patent Be Drawn Where Other Reasonable Inferences Exist? An Examination of the Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Inducement of Infringement. Mr. Gross ultimately argues that that the doctrine of specific intent to infringe in patent cases should be harmonized with the standard used for inequitable conduct.

It is important to discern the boundaries of specific intent to infringe in light of the recent Akamai case. Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In Akamai the Federal Circuit arguably made it easier for a patent owner to hold a person liable for induced infringement of a method claim when no single person performed all the steps of the method. The Akamai decision still requires the alleged inducer to have the specific intent to induce infringement. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308. The results of Akamai are mixed then, on one hand patent owners can now go after those who induced infringement but never induced a single party to infringe the patent. On the other hand the patent owner must still provide evidence of a specific intent to induce infringement.

Proving induced infringement is a difficult task. Direct evidence of inducement is often hard to come by and the patent owner must often resort to using circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent. Mr. Gross suggests courts to weigh the following three factors, in light of circumstantial evidence, when determining if the requisite intent is present: (1) nexus; (2) control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe.

Akamai has closed an undesirable loophole in patent law. For Akamai to reach its full potential however, courts and litigators need to understand how to weigh circumstantial evidence that may be more strained in cases where a patent is collectively infringed as opposed to directly infringed by one actor. Articles such as this can help the legal community understand how to use circumstantial evidence in light of the new induced infringement standard.


Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze? Fighting Patent Trolls With Fee-Shifting

Troll Warning

by Eric Maloney, UMN Law Student, MJLST Lead Managing Editor

It’s a bad time to be a patent troll in the United States. Both the Supreme Court and Congress are taking aim at these widely disparaged “trolls” who buy up a portfolio of patents and proceed to file lawsuits against anyone who may be using or selling inventions covered by those patents, often with a disregard for the merits of such suits.

Critics see these patent trolls as contributing nothing but a waste of time and resources to an already-burdened court system. President Obama has echoed this sentiment, accusing these trolls of “hijack[ing] somebody else’s idea and see[ing] if they can extort some money out of them.” On the other hand, legitimate patent holders are concerned that their ability to sue infringers may be limited in this mad rush to curb the patent troll problem.

The Patent Act does already have a mechanism in place to deal with frivolous patent lawsuits–35 U.S.C. § 285. This statute allows courts to award patent suit winners with “reasonable attorney fees.” There’s a catch, though–this fee-shifting isn’t available for just any winner. It can only be awarded in “exceptional cases.”

The Federal Circuit hears all patent appeals and sets patent precedent that is followed by district courts throughout the country. So far, their interpretation of “exceptional case” has required losing parties to misbehave quite flagrantly; the patent holder’s suit must have been “objectively baseless,” and the loser must have known it was baseless. Failing that, fees can only be shifted if the loser committed misconduct in the course of the suit or in obtaining the patent. MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This high standard makes it tough for those sued by patent trolls to recover fees spent defending against a frivolous suit.

Two branches of government are taking aim at potentially easing this standard and making fee-shifting more commonplace, or even mandatory. The Supreme Court has decided to hear two appeals for fee-shifting cases, and may be looking to change how courts evaluate what is an “exceptional case” to make it easier for courts to punish frivolous plaintiffs. Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA) introduced the Innovation Act last week, which would change § 285 to mandate that patent suit losers pay fees to the winner, with some exceptions.

This would bring patent suits more in line with how English courts treat losing parties. The American legal system typically does not add insult to injury by forcing losing parties to reimburse the winners. While all the concern about patent trolls may not be misplaced, it may be worthwhile for policymakers (be they Congressional or judicial) to step back and consider the effect this may have on legitimate patent holders, such as inventors wishing to protect their patented products. Is mandatory fee-shifting the answer? All those involved should tread carefully before making groundbreaking changes to the patent litigation system.


Myriad Genetics: A Look at Recent Developments in Patent Law and the Human Genome

by Roma Patel, UMN Law and Public Health Student, MJLST Staff

Years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that inventors are not entitled to federal patent protection for discoveries of laws of nature. The Court said, “natural phenomena are the basic tools with which every would-be inventor starts, so locking up the right to use them in a monopoly held by a specific patent owner will frustrate others who might want to look for new ways to interpret [those] phenomena.”

On June 13, a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court ruled that, “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but complementary DNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.” The ruling, authored by Justice Thomas, was issued in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, a landmark case bringing an end to the practice of patenting isolated parts of the human genome as they originally exist.

The defendants, Myriad Genetics, discovered and then patented the location, sequence and mutations of BRCA1 and BRCA2. Both genes are highly associated with a risk of breast and ovarian cancers. If Myriad’s patent claims were found valid, Myriad would have gained the exclusive right to isolate an individual’s BRCA genes–a necessary step in conducting diagnostic testing for the cancers.

The Plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation, consist of a coalition of patients and researchers from University of Pennsylvania, New York University, Columbia, Yale and Emory. Plaintiffs claimed that Myriad’s patent monopoly was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that patents on isolated natural genetic sequences would restrict medical research, limiting progress. From a patient’s perspective, such exclusive patent rights would make getting a second opinion regarding genetic predisposition almost impossible. Additionally, exclusivity would keep the cost of testing BRCA 1 and 2 higher through the absence of competitive pricing.

While patient’s rights advocates and research and educational institutions applaud the decision, many are critical. Attorney and chemistry professor Bernhard Saxe stated that the Court, “trivializes chemistry and elevates biological “information” over chemical structure in patent law, and that usurps the role of Congress and creates a new class of patent-ineligible subject matter by judicial fiat.” In Issue 2 of MJSLT’s 12th volume, Peter Edwards noted that, “It is unwise to blithely remove patent eligibility from fields in which incentives for innovation have a dramatically positive effect on the population as a whole. Patent law was established to incentivize inventions that are useful to the public, while still allowing fair access to innovations. Because the public benefit resulting from incentivizing gene patents far outweighs the potential for public loss, it is in the country’s best interest to structure and interpret patent law to find genes and methods employing them patent eligible.”

Other case outcomes, Mayo v. Prometheus and In re Bilski have determined most diagnostic claims are not patentable. Now that the Court has determined natural isolated genetic sequences are also not patentable, Myriad’s business model, an enterprise predicated on exclusive administration of the BRCAnalysis test to diagnose breast and ovarian cancers, will be difficult to sustain. Biotechnology businesses driven by research and development and investors may face less of an incentive to innovate, which could mean fewer diagnostic tests available on the market. However, multilateral ownership of such natural phenomena could possibly drive more tests to market at lower prices and provide for more accuracy due to alternate testing options. Time will tell us the precise effect this ruling will have on patients, but for now the road beyond the Myriad decision remains unclear.


Will AIA Post-Grant Procedures Reduce Litigation?

by Nihal Parkar, UMN Law Student, MJLST StaffNihal-Parkar-Thumbnail-White-Back.jpgThe America Invents Act (AIA) was signed into law in 2011 and fully went into effect on March 16, 2013. The AIA resulted from efforts to strengthen the US patent system and bring it in conformity with global patenting standards. One of the aims of the AIA was to reduce post-grant litigation related to patent validity. It is common for alleged infringers to challenge the validity of patents that are asserted against them in court. However, such litigation can be expensive and protracted.

Pre-AIA patent law did provide for some processes for challenging patent validity, but they were limited. The AIA tries to expand on pre-existing post-grant patent challenges by providing for patent challenge procedures that mirror litigation (discovery, witness examination, and so on) at an alternative forum for resolving validity disputes: the Patent Trial and Appeal Board at the US Patent and Trademark Office.

It is interesting to contrast pre-AIA scholarly analysis of patent challenge procedures and suggested reforms with post-AIA studies. The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology provides two contrasting articles on point. An earlier, pre-AIA article by Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact (8 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 1, 2006) proposed a multistage post-grant review process. They addressed the lack of discovery and other issues in pre-AIA post-grant processes, and concluded that discovery would be unnecessary as long as the scope of reviewable issues was kept narrow. A recent MJLST note by Kayla Fossen, The Post-Grant Problem: America Invents Falling Short (14 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 573, 2013), reviews the changes introduced by the AIA, and points out that post-grant processes cannot really undo the damage created by ineffective pre-grant procedures. Therefore, the AIA is unlikely to significantly impact post-grant litigation.


Shapewear Patent War: Case of the Bad Patent?

by Jennifer Nomura, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Thumbnail-Jennifer-Nomura.jpgWhen most people think of patents they think of the latest computer technology or advances in medical science; but what about women’s shapewear? For those unaware of what shapewear is, it’s basically the modern version of a corset; it keeps everything pulled in, but (hopefully) more comfortable than a corset. Heather Thomson, founder of Yummie Tummie, has a patent on some of her styles of tank-top shapewear. Corset_Patent_Image.jpgWhen she found out that Spanx, a competing company, was making a very similar looking piece of shapewear, Thomson wasn’t happy. Thomson sent a cease-and-desist letter to Sara Blakely, founder of Spanx and then took to social media to complain. Websites like Forbes and the Huffington Post picked up the story. So far, the situation sounds fairly typical of other patent infringement cases, so why all the press coverage? Did I mention that Heather Thomson is a TV star of Bravo’s Real Housewives of New York? Needless to say, Thomson is not afraid of a little drama. Thomson has declared war against Blakely and Spanx. But Sara Blakely is not the underdog in this situation. Blakely founded Spanx in 2000 and is now a self-made billionaire. Blakely has now filed a declaratory judgment action in court alleging that Spanx is not infringing any of Yummie Tummie’s patents.

Spanx has been in the shapewear business 8 years longer than Yummie Tummie and has its own patents, so this might be the case of the “bad patent”. In an article entitled Patent Reform and Differential Impact, published in Issue 8.1 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, authors Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde define a “bad patent” as one “that should not have been issued.” But Sag and Rohde want to go further. HeatherThomasPatent-cmp.jpg They argue that the term “bad patent” should also include “a patent that was validly issued but is now the subject of hyper-assertion.” The main concern with bad patents is that they “are capable of generating significant revenues and thus have a distorting effect on the allocation of resources in the economy.” This can happen where once a patentee sends a cease-and-desist letter, even if the patent qualifies as a “bad patent,” the alleged infringer will immediately license with the patentee. Or it could be that the parties could take their dispute to court, like Spanx and Yummie Tummie. Now there will be an expenditure of money on both sides trying to settle this issue in court. There is also a drain on public resources as the conflict has to make its way through the court system. Sag and Rohde make several proposed reforms in order to remedy the problem of bad patents. One of their proposed reforms to the litigation process is by fee-shifting. Fee-shifting would require the patentee to pay the costs of litigation if the patent was invalidated based on easily-discoverable prior art. This proposed reform could push potential patent applicants to perform a more comprehensive search through current patents before submitting their application to the PTO. Fee-shifting could prevent bad patents from being issued in the first place, or at least making patentees think twice before they try to enforce their patent against an alleged infringer.

While the public’s interest in the dispute between Yummie Tummie and Spanx has more to do with the reputations of both founders, this situation could revive a push for reform to the patent litigation system. Perhaps there will be a revival of the interest to limit or eliminate “bad patents.”


Apple & Samsung Litigation Shows Need for Patent Reform

by Thomas Manewitz, UMN Law Student, MJLST Managing Editor

Thumbnail-Thomas-Manewitz.jpgIn the past two years, two of the world’s mobile technology leviathans, Apple and Samsung, have engaged in multibillion dollar patent infringement litigation. Specifically, Apple has been seeking damages and fighting for injunctions on several of Samsung’s mobile products in markets across the globe. On August 24, 2012 in the United States, Apple won a 1.049 billion dollar damages award for Samsung’s “willful patent infringement.” In the same lawsuit, Samsung counter sued and won zero damages. In the wake of this trial, Apple is seeking an injunction for 20 Samsung products.

Samsung provides the market with a popular Apple alternative that does not come close to dominating the market share. In the context of the litigation, both Samsung and Apple were forced to release their U.S. sales numbers. Samsung, who is at risk of having its products blocked from the U.S. markets, sold 21 million smart phones and 1.4 million tablets, while Apple sold 86 million smart phones and 34 million tablets. New and different products are now at risk from being removed from consumer markets because of our patent litigation structure. I will not argue that this case alone will temper innovation; however, it does beg the question as to whether or not high profile patent litigation, and the patent system as it currently stands, optimizes the production societal good and innovation. Perhaps the United States patent system should be reorganized based on different principle. For a discussion of the reorganization of the patent system see the United States patent system see Liza Vertinsky’s article in the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Tehcnology, “An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law.”


Apple & Samsung Litigation Shows Need for Patent Reform

by Thomas Manewitz, UMN Law Student, MJLST Managing Editor

Thumbnail-Thomas-Manewitz.jpgIn the past two years, two of the world’s mobile technology leviathans, Apple and Samsung, have engaged in multibillion dollar patent infringement litigation. Specifically, Apple has been seeking damages and fighting for injunctions on several of Samsung’s mobile products in markets across the globe. On August 24, 2012 in the United States, Apple won a 1.049 billion dollar damages award for Samsung’s “willful patent infringement.” In the same lawsuit, Samsung counter sued and won zero damages. In the wake of this trial, Apple is seeking an injunction for 20 Samsung products.

Samsung provides the market with a popular Apple alternative that does not come close to dominating the market share. In the context of the litigation, both Samsung and Apple were forced to release their U.S. sales numbers. Samsung, who is at risk of having its products blocked from the U.S. markets, sold 21 million smart phones and 1.4 million tablets, while Apple sold 86 million smart phones and 34 million tablets. New and different products are now at risk from being removed from consumer markets because of our patent litigation structure. I will not argue that this case alone will temper innovation; however, it does beg the question as to whether or not high profile patent litigation, and the patent system as it currently stands, optimizes the production societal good and innovation. Perhaps the United States patent system should be reorganized based on different principle. For a discussion of the reorganization of the patent system see the United States patent system see Liza Vertinsky’s article in the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Tehcnology, “An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law.”