Section 230

Are Social Media Empires Liable for “Terror” Organizations?

February 16, 2023
Constitutional Law, First Amendment, Internet, Social Media, Social Welfare

Ray Mestad, MJLST Staffer

The practicality, ease of use, and sheer addictiveness of social media has led to its massive explansion around the world. Approximately 65% of the world uses the internet, and of that group, only 5% does not use social media.[1] So 60% of the world is on social media, around 4.76 billion people.[2] For most, social media is one of the simplest ways to stay connected and communicate with friends, family, and other people in their circle. But along with the growing use of social media, questions have been raised regarding the potential liability social media corporations may have for the content that is posted on their platforms. Recently, lawsuits have been filed against companies like Google, Twitter, and Facebook for allegedly allowing groups accused of terrorism to spread their message or plan on their platforms.[3] The question we are left with is to what extent are social media companies responsible for posts on their sites that lead to violence?

The family of Nohemi Gonzales, an American student killed in Paris during a 2015 Islamic State attack, is suing Google for platforming the Islamic State by allowing them to post videos on Youtube, and then recommending them to people with the Google algorithm.[4] And the family of Nawras Alassaf, a Jordanian citizen killed in a 2017 Istanbul Islamic State attack, is suing Twitter, Google, and Facebook, for not doing more to prevent the organization from using their platform as a communications and messaging tool.[5] Gonzales v. Google and Twitter v. Taamneh will both be presenting their oral arguments to the Supreme Court this month, February 2023.[6]

The legal issues in these cases are rooted in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.[7] 47 U.S.C. 230 intends to protect freedom of expression by protecting intermediaries that publish information posted by users.[8] Section 230(c)(1) states that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”[9] This protects web platforms from liability for the content that users post.

Further, Section 230(c)(2) states that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of…any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected…”[10] This is known as the “Good Samaritan” provision. Like 230(c)(1), Section 230(c)(2) gives internet providers liability protection, allowing them to moderate content in certain circumstances and then providing a safeguard from the free speech claims that would be made against them.[11]

The question is whether or not defendant social media platforms should be shielded from liability for platforming content that has allegedly led to or facilitated violent attacks. In Gonzales, the Justice department stated that although the company is protected against claims for hosting ISIS videos, a claim may be filed against Google for allowing Youtube to provide targeted recommendations of the videos.[12] And in Taamneh, the 9th Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that there was room for the claim to go forward under the Anti-Terrorism Act because Twitter had generalized knowledge of the Islamic State’s use of their services.[13]

Section 230 has drawn an eclectic mix of critics and supporters. For example, although many conservatives and free speech advocates support the protections of Section 230, there have also been conservatives that oppose the code due to perceived restriction of conservative viewpoints on social media platforms. For example, prominent Republican Josh Hawley from Missouri has come out against the code, stating that the tech platforms ought to be treated as distributors and lose Section 230 protections.[14] In fact, Hawley introduced a piece of legislation opposing Section 230 called the Federal Big Tech Tort Act to impose liability on tech platforms.[15] And on the left, Section 230 is supported by those who believe the voices of the marginalized are protected by 230 and would otherwise be at the whim of tech companies, but opposed by people who fear that the code enables political violence and hate speech.[16]

The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in both Gonzales and Taamneh. In Gonzales, the plaintiffs are arguing that Section 230 should not protect the actions of Google because the events occurred outside the US, it is preempted by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), and the algorithmic recommendations transform Google / Youtube from an interactive computer service to an information content provider.[17] Google is arguing that they should be protected by 230, particularly 230(c)(1).[18] The 9th Circuit stated that although 230 did apply abroad, that JASTA shouldn’t supersede 230. Instead, 230 and JASTA should run parallel to each other. The 9th Circuit further stated that the claims based on revenue sharing (rather than ad targeting) should be dismissed. They did not think Google was contributing to terrorism, because they were motivated by financial enrichment rather than ideology, and affirmed the dismissal, partially because there was not clear enough information of how much support Google had provided to ISIS.[19] Future decisions regarding this case will implicate things like whether algorithmic recommendations should apply to 230.[20]

In Taamneh, the defendants argued that there was no proximate cause, as well as arguing about the inapplicability of Section 230.[21]  Unlike in Gonzales, Taamneh had adequately stated a claim for aiding and abetting because the social media companies had more explicit knowledge of how their platforms were being used by these groups. The Taamneh dismissal was reversed. The Supreme Court review of this case will have implications on what it means to support or have a relationship with a group via a social media platform. In both of these cases, fears regarding the scope of 230 were expressed, which could reflect poorly on its applicability going forward.[24]   

Gonzales and Taamneh will hit the Supreme Court soon. If 230 is restricted, it would enable greater free speech but risks exposing more people to harms like hate speech or violence.  However, if 230 is preserved as is, it could restrict the accessibility and openness that has made the internet what it is today. Whichever decision is made, there will be massive implications for what the internet looks like in the future.

Notes

[1] https://www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-media-research/#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20social%20media,growth%20of%20%2B137%20million%20users.

[2] Id.

[3] https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-us-supreme-court-technology-france-social-media-6bee9b5adf33dd15ee64b0d4d4e5ec78

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/01/03/2023-is-poised-be-landmark-year-tech-legal-bouts/

[7] https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/department-justice-s-review-section-230-communications-decency-act-1996

[8] https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230

[9] https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-47-telecommunications/chapter-5-wire-or-radio-communication/subchapter-ii-common-carriers/part-i-common-carrier-regulation/section-230-protection-for-private-blocking-and-screening-of-offensive-material

[10] https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/gonzalez-v-google/

[11] https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/gonzalez-v-google/

[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/09/tech-critics-urge-supreme-court-narrow-section-230/

[13] https://knightcolumbia.org/blog/twitter-v-taamneh-in-the-supreme-court-whats-at-stake

[14] Supa Washington Post

[15] https://www.hawley.senate.gov/hawley-files-gonzalez-v-google-amicus-brief-supreme-court-challenging-big-techs-section-230

[16] Supa Washington Post

[17] https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-grants-certiorari-gonzalez-v-google-and-twitter-v-taamneh-overview

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20]

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24]Id.

After Hepp: Section 230 and State Intellectual Property Law

October 13, 2022
Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Internet, Social Media

Kelso Horne IV, MJLST Staffer

Although hardly a competitive arena, Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”) is almost certainly the best known of all telecommunications laws in the United States. Shielding Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and websites from liability for the content published by their users, § 230(c)’s policy goals are laid out succinctly, if a bit grandly, in § 230(a) and § 230(b).[1] These two sections speak about the internet as a force for economic and social good, characterizing it as a “vibrant and competitive free market” and “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”[2] But where §§ 230(a),(b) both speak broadly of a utopian vision for the internet, and (c) grants websites substantial privileges, § 230(e) gets down to brass tacks.[3]

CDA: Goals and Text

The CDA lays out certain limitations on the shield protections provided by § 230(c).[4] Among these is § 230(e)(2) which states in full, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”[5] This particular section, despite its seeming clarity, has been the subject of litigation for over a decade, and in 2021 a clear circuit split was opened between the 9th and 3rd Circuit Courts over how this short sentence applies to state intellectual property laws. The 9th Circuit Court follows the principle that the policy portions of § 230 as stated in §§ 230(a),(b) should be controlling, and that, as a consequence, state intellectual property claims should be barred. The 3rd Circuit Court follows the principle that the plain text of § 230(e)(2) unambiguously allows for state intellectual property claims.

Who Got There First? Lycos and Perfect 10

In Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., the 1st Circuit Court faced this question obliquely; the court assumed that they were not immunized from state intellectual property law by § 230 and the claims were dismissed, but on different grounds.[6] Consequently, when the 9th Circuit released their opinion in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBILL LLC only one month later, they felt free to craft their own rule on the issue.[7] Consisting of a few short paragraphs, the court’s decision on state intellectual property rights is nicely summarized in a short sentence. They stated that “As a practical matter, inclusion of rights protected by state law within the ‘intellectual property’ exemption would fatally undermine the broad grant of immunity provided by the CDA.”[8] The court’s analysis in Perfect 10 was almost entirely based on what allowing state intellectual property claims would do to the policy goals stated in § 230(a) and § 230(b), and did not attempt, or rely on, a particularly thorough reading of § 230(e)(2). Here the court looks at both the policy stated in § 230(a) and § 230(b) and the text of § 230(e)(2) and attempts to rectify them. The court clearly sees the possibility of issues arising from allowing plaintiffs to bring cases through fifty different state systems against websites and ISPs for the postings of their users. This insight may be little more than hindsight, however, given the date of the CDA’s drafting.

Hepp Solidifies a Split

Perfect 10 would remain the authoritative appellate level case on the issue of the CDA and state intellectual property law until 2021, when the 3rd Circuit stepped into the ring.[9] In Hepp v. Facebook, Pennsylvania newsreader Karen Hepp sued Facebook for hosting advertisements promoting a dating website and other services which had used her likeness without her permission.[10] In a much longer analysis, the 3rd Circuit held that the 9th Circuit’s interpretation argued for by Facebook “stray[ed] too far from the natural reading of § 230(e)(2)”.[11] Instead, the 3rd Circuit argued for a closer reading of the text of § 230(e)(2) which they said aligned closely with a more balanced selection of policy goals, including allowance for state intellectual property law.[12] The court also mentions structural arguments relied on by Facebook, mostly examining how narrow the other exceptions in 230(e) are, which the majority states “cuts both ways” since Congress easily cabined meanings when they wanted to.[13]

The dissent in Hepp agreed with the 9th Circuit that the policy goals stated in §§230(a),(b) should be considered controlling.[14] It also noted two cases in other circuits where courts had shown hesitancy towards allowing state intellectual property claims under the CDA to go forward, although both claims had been dismissed on other grounds.[15] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the dissent sees the structural arguments as compelling, and in Facebook’s favor.[16] With the circuits now definitively split on the issue, the text of §§ 230(a),(b) would certainly seem to demand the Supreme Court, or Congress, step in and provide a clear standard.

What Next? Analyzing the CDA

Despite being a pair of decisions ostensibly focused on parsing out what exactly Congress was intending when they drafted § 230, both Perfect 10 and Hepp left out any citation to legislative history when discussing the § 230(e)(2) issue. However, this is not as odd as it seems at first glance. The Communications Decency Act is large, over a hundred pages in length, and § 230 makes up about a page and a half.[17] Most of the content of the legislative reports published after the CDA was passed instead focused on its landmark provisions which attempted, mostly unsuccessfully, to regulate obscene materials on the internet.[18] Section 230 gets a passing mention, less than a page, some of which is taken up with assurances that it would not interfere with civil liability for those engaged in “cancelbotting,” a controversial anti-spam method of the Usenet era.[19] It is perhaps unfair to say that § 230 was an afterthought, but it is likely that lawmakers did not understand its importance at the time of passage. This may be an argument for eschewing the 9th Circuit’s analysis which seemingly imparts the CDA’s drafters with an overly high degree of foresight into § 230’s use by internet companies over a decade later.

Indeed, although one may wish that Congress had drafted it differently, the text of § 230(e)(2) is clear, and the inclusion of “any” as a modifier to “law” makes it difficult to argue that state intellectual property claims are not exempted by the general grant of immunity in § 230.[20] Congressional inaction should not give way to courts stepping in to determine what they believe would be a better Act. Indeed, the 3rd Circuit majority in Hepp may be correct in stating that Congress did in fact want state intellectual property claims to stand. Either way, we are faced with no easy judicial answer; to follow the clear text of the section would be to undermine what many in the e-commerce industry clearly see as an important protection and to follow the purported vision of the Act stated in §§230(a),(b) would be to remove a protection to intellectual property which victims of infringement may use to defend themselves. The circuit split has made it clear that this is a question on which reasonable jurists can disagree. Congress, as an elected body, is in the best position to balance these equities, and they should use their law making powers to definitively clarify the issue.

Notes

[1] 47 U.S.C. § 230.

[2] Id.

[3] 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).

[4] Id.

[5] 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).

[6] Universal v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)(“UCS’s remaining claim against Lycos was brought under Florida trademark law, alleging dilution of the “UCSY” trade name under Fla. Stat. § 495.151. Claims based on intellectual property laws are not subject to Section 230 immunity.”).

[7] 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).

[8] Id. at 1119 n.5.

[9] Kyle Jahner, Facebook Ruling Splits Courts Over Liability Shield Limits for IP, Bloomberg Law, (Sep. 28, 2021, 11:32 AM).

[10] 14 F.4th 204, 206-7 (3d Cir. 2021).

[11] Id. at 210.

[12] Id. at 211.

[13] Hepp v. Facebook, 14 F.4th 204 (3d Cir. 2021)(“[T]he structural evidence it cites cuts both ways. Facebook is correct that the explicit references to state law in subsection (e) are coextensive with federal laws. But those references also suggest that when Congress wanted to cabin the interpretation about state law, it knew how to do so—and did so explicitly.”).

[14] 14 F.4th at 216-26 (Cowen, J., dissenting).

[15] Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).

[16] 14 F.4th at 220 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (“[T]he codified findings and policies clearly tilt the balance in Facebook’s favor.”).

[17] Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137-39.

[18] H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 104-230 at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).

[19] Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: Does the Internet Still Need Section 230 Immunity?, 68 Cath. U. L. Rev. 597, 602 n.27 (2019); see Denise Pappalardo & Todd Wallack, Antispammers Take Matters Into Their Own Hands, Network World, Aug. 11, 1997, at 8 (“cancelbots are programs that automatically delete Usenet postings by forging cancel messages in the name of the authors. Normally, they are used to delete postings by known spammers. . . .”).

[20] 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).

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