April 2026

Who Owns the Night Sky? Reflect Orbital Wants to Sell Sunlight From Space.

April 21, 2026
Administrative Law, Energy Law, Environmental Law, International Law, Space Law

Brynn Ayers, MJLST Staffer

A California startup is preparing to launch a satellite with an eighteen-by-eighteen-meter mirror into low-Earth orbit, with the stated goal of redirecting sunlight onto the dark side of the planet, on demand, for a fee.[1] Reflect Orbital raised at least $20 million in venture capital,[2] secured a U.S. Air Force contract,[3] and filed openly with the FCC.[4] The company’s pitch is straightforward: sunlight is the most abundant energy source in the solar system, but roughly 2.2 billion times more of it misses Earth than hits it.[5] What if we redirected some of that excess back? By 2035, Reflect Orbital envisions a constellation of over 50,000 mirrors providing light at up to 36,000 lux, full daylight, for hours at a time, to paying customers anywhere on Earth.[6] Its first demonstration satellite, Eärendil-1, is targeting a mid-2026 launch.[7]

The FCC Chokepoint

In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the gatekeeper for commercial satellite operations.[8] Reflect Orbital filed its application in August 2025, seeking authorization to launch and operate its first demonstration satellite.[9] When making its decisions, the FCC must determine whether the project is in the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.”[10]

That public-interest standard is broad enough that it could allow the FCC to weigh light pollution, ecosystem disruption, and human health impacts. In practice, the FCC rarely exercises that muscle for satellite applications.[11] Its review framework is built around radio frequency interference and orbital debris, not the redirection of visible light onto the Earth’s surface.[12]

The response from the scientific community has been extraordinary. The American Astronomical Society formally filed a petition to deny Eärendil-1’s launch,[13] arguing that the potential for interference with billions of dollars in federally-funded astronomical research, combined with risks to human health and the environment, outweighs the limited experimental value of the mission.[14] Over 1,800 public comments flooded the FCC docket.[15] DarkSky International has urged the commission to close what it calls “longstanding regulatory gaps” before approving any deployment.[16]

The NEPA Vacuum

Perhaps the most significant legal vulnerability in this entire regulatory picture is the near-total absence of environmental review. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the foundational federal law requiring agencies to assess the environmental impact of major federal actions.[17]

Satellites, largely, do not require environmental impact statements. The FCC has long applied a “categorical exclusion” to satellite licensing, which is a formal determination that a category of actions has no significant environmental effect and therefore requires no review.[18] The Commission’s reasoning, articulated explicitly in a rule-change process it opened in August 2025, is that satellites are “extraterritorial activities” with effects located outside U.S. jurisdiction.[19] Because the satellite is in space, the FCC argues, its effects are not subject to domestic environmental law.[20]

Critics, including the AAS, American Institute of Biological Sciences, and twenty-six co-signing scientific organizations, have argued this reasoning is legally and factually untenable. A satellite designed to redirect light onto the Earth’s surface is not an activity with extraterritorial effects; it is an activity with profoundly terrestrial ones. The light hits the ground. It affects wildlife.[21] It disrupts human circadian rhythms.[22] It washes out the night sky. The argument that all of this is beyond the reach of NEPA because the mirrors are in orbit stretches the categorical exclusion well beyond its intended scope.

Making matters more fraught, the Trump Administration’s January 2025 “Unleashing American Energy” executive order directed agencies to revisit and reduce their NEPA requirements.[23] The FCC’s August rulemaking followed in that regulatory spirit. The practical effect has been to further insulate satellite applications from the kind of environmental review that, many legal observers argue, a project of this scale plainly demands.[24]

The Liability Frontier

Beyond the licensing question, Reflect Orbital faces significant potential liability exposure under existing U.S. and international law, particularly if anything goes wrong.

The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects holds launching states strictly liable for damage caused by their space objects on the Earth’s surface.[25] This is a treaty obligation of the U.S. government, but under the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act and related regulations, liability can flow back to operators through indemnification requirements and insurance mandates.[26] If a malfunctioning Reflect Orbital mirror were to cause a vehicle accident, harm wildlife across a protected habitat, or damage another satellite in a collision, the legal claims could implicate multiple statutes, multiple agencies, and potentially multiple countries.

This malfunction scenario is not hypothetical. In August 2024, NASA’s Advanced Composite Solar Sail System began tumbling uncontrollably after deployment, flashing unpredictably across the night sky.[27] A similar failure in a commercial mirror constellation, at scale, could produce consequences that existing tort law is poorly equipped to address. Who has standing to sue? In which court? Under which country’s law? These questions have no settled answers.

The Public Interest Standard and What Comes Next

The FCC is now in the position of having to decide an application for which its existing legal tools are a poor fit. Its public-interest standard is capacious but untested in this context. Its environmental review framework is designed for a different era of satellite deployment. Its liability regime was built for communications satellites, not for mirrors that intentionally shine light on populated areas of the Earth.

What the agency decides about Eärendil-1 will set a precedent that extends far beyond one demonstration satellite. If the FCC grants the license without requiring an independent environmental impact assessment, as DarkSky International has called for, it will effectively signal that a constellation of 50,000 light-redirecting mirrors can be built without any formal review of what that means for human health, wildlife, or the night sky. If it denies the license or imposes meaningful conditions, it will be charting genuinely new legal territory for commercial space operations.

 

Notes

[1] Kenneth Chang & Hiroko Tabuchi, A Big Night Light in the Sky? Start-Up Wants to Launch a Space Mirror, N. Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2026) https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/09/climate/space-mirror-satellite-solar.html?unlocked_article_code=1.XFA.VK5j.mSvGAODBU5zQ&smid=url-share.

[2] Press Release, Reflect Orbital, Reflect Orbital Secures $20 Million in Series A Funding Led by Lux Capital (May 14, 2025), https://www.reflectorbital.com/press/reflect-orbital-secures-20-million-in-series-a-funding-led-by-lux-capital.

[3] Press Release, Reflect Orbital, Reflect Orbital Selected for SBIR Phase II Contract by AFWERX to Advance Satellite-Based Sunlight Redirection Technology (June 3, 2025), https://www.reflectorbital.com/press/reflect-orbital-selected-for-sbir-phase-ii-contract-by-afwerx-to-advance-satellite-based-sunlight-redirection-technology.

[4] FCC, Report No. SAT-01972, Satellite Licensing Division and Satellite Programs and Policy Division Information RE: Applications Accepted for Filing (2026).

[5] Reflect Orbital, https://www.reflectorbital.com/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2026.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] FCC, Satellite, https://www.fcc.gov/general/satellite#:~:text=Satellite%20technology%20provides%20telecommunications%20service,space%20stations%20and%20earth%20stations.

[9] FCC, supra note 4.

[10] 47 U.S.C.A. § 307 (West 2004).

[11] Press Release, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, FCC Must Consider Impacts of Million-Satellite Constellation (Mar. 24, 2026).

[12] Two Satellite Proposals Threaten Dark and Quiet Skies Worldwide, Astrobites (Feb. 26, 2026), https://astrobites.org/2026/02/26/reflect-orbital-ai-data-center/.

[13] ColinHamill, Policy Update (11 March 2026), Am. Astronomical Soc’y, https://aas.org/posts/news/2026/03/policy-update-11-march-2026.

[14] Colin Hamill, Policy Update (26 March 2026), Am. Astronomical Soc’y, https://aas.org/posts/news/2026/03/policy-update-26-march-2026.

[15] Action Alert: Provide Input to the FCC on Proposed Satellite Systems, Am. Astronomical Soc’y, https://aas.org/action-alert-provide-input-fcc-proposed-satellite-systems#:~:text=Over%201800%20comments%20have%20been,is%20in%20the%20public%20interest) (last visited Apr. 8, 2026).

[16] Sunlight on Demand: How Orbital Illumination Systems Threaten to Change the Night as We Know it, DarkSky (Dec. 22, 2025), https://darksky.org/news/orbital-illumination-systems/.

[17] What is the National Environmental Policy Act?, EPA (Feb. 23, 2026), https://www.epa.gov/nepa/what-national-environmental-policy-act.

[18] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-23-105005, Satellite Licensing: FCC Should Reexamine Its Environmental Review Process for Large Constellations of Satellites (200), https://www.gao.gov/assets/730/723690.pdf.

[19] Modernizing the Commission’s National Environmental Policy Act Rules, 90 Fed. Reg. 40295, 40300 (Aug. 19, 2025) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 1).

[20] Id.

[21] Kathryn L G Russart & Randy J Nelson, Artificial Light at Night Alters Behavior in Laboratory and Wild Animals, 329 J. Experimental Zoology 401, 402 (2018), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6205897/.

[22] Mark Bult, Effects of Light Pollution, DarkSky (Apr. 27, 2023), https://darksky.org/resources/what-is-light-pollution/effects/wildlife-ecosystems/; Light Pollution Harms Wildlife and Ecosystems, DarkSky (Apr. 27, 2023) https://darksky.org/resources/what-is-light-pollution/effects/wildlife-ecosystems/.

[23] Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed, Reg, 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025).

[24] Drew Reagan, DarkSky International Opposes Reflect Orbital’s Proposed Orbital Illumination System, DarkSky (Dec. 19, 2025), https://darksky.org/news/organizational-statement-reflect-orbital/.

[25] Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, UN Off. for Outer Space Affs., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html.

[26] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-88, Commercial Space Launch Insurance: views Differ on Need for Change to Insurance Approach but Clarification is Needed (2016), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-17-88.

[27] Mike Wall, NASA’s Solar-Sailing Spacecraft has a Bent Boom and is Still Tumbling in Earth Orbit, Space (Oct. 25, 2024), https://www.space.com/nasa-acs3-solar-sail-bent-boom.

Your Digital Doppelgänger

April 13, 2026
Artificial Intelligence, Business Law, Data, Privacy

Lillie Grant, MJLST Staffer

What counts as harm in an age of inference?

Modern systems do not just collect information; they generate it.[1] From patterns in behavior, timing, and interaction, they derive conclusions about people that those people never actually shared.[2] Often, those conclusions are more revealing than anything someone would voluntarily disclose.[3] And yet, the law does not clearly or consistently treat that process as harmful.[4]

Privacy law has mostly been built around disclosure.[5] The usual question is whether information was knowingly shared, improperly collected, or revealed to the wrong people.[6] The basic idea is that the data starts with the individual and then moves outward.[7] But inference does not work like that.[8] It is not about what is given; it is about what is created.[9]

The difference is more significant than it first appears, because when a system converts small pieces of behavior into conclusions about a person, it does more than record activity; it interprets it, producing not just a list of actions but a statement about their meaning.[10]

The law has not caught up. Courts are much more comfortable recognizing harm when inferred information shows up in the world in a visible way.[11] If something is revealed, shared, or used in a way that clearly affects someone, it looks like a familiar kind of injury.[12] It has consequences that feel real and immediate.[13]

But most inferences never get that far.[14] They stay inside the system that produced them.[15] They shape what someone sees, what is recommended, what is prioritized, and sometimes what opportunities are available, all without a discrete, traceable event.[16] Even when those inferences are accurate or deeply personal, they often do not trigger legal protection.[17] There is no clear moment where something was “disclosed,” and without that, courts struggle to recognize harm at all.[18]

That leaves a gap: privacy law still depends on the idea that information is something a person gives.[19] Something you can point to and say, “This was shared.”[20] But inferred data does not fit into that model.[21] It is not handed over; it is built, and because of that, it slips past categories that were never designed to capture this kind of process.[22] The problem is not just theoretical; it affects whether someone can even bring a claim.[23] To get into court, a plaintiff has to show a concrete injury.[24] Not just a feeling that something is off, but something the law is willing to recognize as harm.[25] When the issue is inference, the information may shape real outcomes but does so quietly, without a clear moment that satisfies the law’s demand for discrete injury.[26]

At the same time, these inferences are not meaningless. They are the product. Companies are not just collecting data for the sake of it; they are turning it into insights that can be used to target ads, keep people engaged, and make money.[27] The value is not just in what people do, but in what can be figured out from what they do.[28]

That raises a harder question. If a company can take your behavior, turn it into something new, and profit from it, what exactly belongs to you? The raw data came from you, but the conclusion did not. The law tends to treat that distinction as important.[29] It is not obvious that it should settle the issue at all.[30]

Recent lawsuits by authors challenge the use of their works to train AI systems as a form of uncompensated extraction,[31] but because those claims focus on the inputs used to build these systems, they leave open a distinct question: whether individuals have any claim to the inferences generated about them, suggesting the problem is not just data use but the unrecognized extraction and monetization of information produced about individuals.

There are limited signals in existing law suggesting that creating new data about a person can itself be treated as harm, most clearly in biometric cases where courts have recognized that generating something like a faceprint is significant even without further use.[32]

Part of what makes inference so difficult is that it does not feel like a clear violation. There is no obvious intrusion or single moment where something is taken; instead, it happens gradually as bits of behavior accumulate and are turned into meaning that appear harmless on their own but are surprisingly complete in the aggregate.[33] That creates a deeper tension. The better systems get at understanding people, the less clear it becomes what it even means, legally, to “know” something about someone.[34] At what point does a pattern become information? And at what point does producing that information start to matter in a legal sense?

The better framing is to abandon disclosure as the organizing principle. Maybe the issue is not disclosure at all. Maybe it is extraction. Systems are not just observing behavior; they are pulling meaning out of it and turning that meaning into something usable.[35] That something can be scaled, sold, and built into entire business models.[36] But the legal rules we have are still mostly about what people choose to share, not what can be created from what they do.[37]

If that is right, the problem is only intensifying, as systems increasingly rely on information that no one explicitly provided but that still feels personal, making it harder to say that nothing of consequence is being taken. The law offers no clear answer, leaving inferred data central in practice but misaligned with doctrines of harm. This leaves individuals in a position where systems can form detailed conclusions about them while they have little ability to see or challenge those conclusions, reflecting a definition of harm that no longer matches how information is actually produced and used.

 

Notes

[1] See generally Joan M Wrabetz, What Is Inferred Data and Why Is It Important?, ABA (Aug. 22, 2022), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/resources/business-law-today/2022-september/what-is-inferred-data-and-why-is-it-important/.

[2] Id.

[3] See Hal Conick, AI and the Law, Univ. Chi. L. Sch. (Dec. 9, 2024), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/ai-and-law.

[4] Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 494.

[5] See Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974: Conditions of Disclosure to Third Parties, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/disclosures-third-parties (last visited Apr. 9, 2026, at 16:12 CST).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] See Wrabetz, supra note 1.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] See Harith Khawaja, Injury, in Fact: The Internet, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Standing in Digital Spaces, 36 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 165, 172 (2025).

[12] See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021); Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U.L Rev 793 (2022).

[13] Id.

[14] Jeffrey Erickson, What Is AI Inference?, Oracle (Apr. 2, 2024), https://www.oracle.com/artificial-intelligence/ai-inference/#:~:text=Inference%2C%20to%20a%20lay%20person,in%20the%20training%20data%20set.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021); Citron & Solove, supra note 12.

[18] Id.

[19] Citron & Solove, supra note 12.

[20] See Pamela J. Wisniewski & Xinru Page, Privacy Theories and Frameworks, in Modern Socio-Technical Perspectives on Privacy 15 (2022).

[21] Wrabetz, supra note 1.

[22] See Privacy by Proxy: Regulating Inferred Identities in AI Systems, IAPP (Nov. 12, 2025), https://iapp.org/news/a/privacy-by-proxy-regulating-inferred-identities-in-ai-systems.

[23] See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Wrabetz, supra note 1.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] See Pramode Chiruvolu et al., Fair Use and AI Training: Two Recent Decisions Highlight the Complexity of This Issue, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (July 8, 2025) https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2025/07/fair-use-and-ai-training.

[32] See Ross D. Emmerman & Mark Goldberg, Illinois Supreme Court Rules No Actual Harm Needed for Biometric Information Protection Act Claims; Floodgates Open, Loeb & Loeb LLP (Jan. 2019) https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2019/01/illinois-supreme-court-rules-no-actual-harm-needed.

[33] Wrabetz, supra note 1.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); ); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).

The “Search Party” Backfire: How a Super Bowl Ad Ignited a Bipartisan Privacy Reckoning in Minnesota

April 9, 2026
Artificial Intelligence, Constitutional Law, Data, Privacy, Social Media

Ella Stromberg, MJLST Staffer

Introduction: Heartwarming Ad with a Chilling Reality

During the 2026 Super Bowl, a commercial meant to pull at the heartstrings of millions of viewers instead ignited a firestorm of debate over the future of American privacy. The advertisement was Ring’s new “Search Party” feature, a tool designed to help find lost dogs by utilizing a neighborhood-wide network of AI-powered doorbell cameras.[1] While the mission of reuniting lost pets with their families appears noble, the ad’s high-profile debut served as a rare moment of corporate transparency regarding the vast surveillance infrastructure growing around us. The resulting backlash has exposed a significant gap in consumer surveillance laws, one that Minnesota legislators are now aggressively moving to fill.

How the Ring “Search Party” Feature Works

To the casual viewer, the Search Party feature seems like a simple community service. However, the underlying mechanics are far more complex. The feature utilizes AI to scan footage from opted-in neighbor cameras to identify lost pets based on characteristics such as breed, size, and fur pattern.[2] The feature is enabled by default, meaning users are automatically enrolled unless they navigate a multi-step process to opt out.[3] This captured footage can be stored for up to 180 days, creating a massive, retrospective, searchable database of neighborhood activity.[4] Ring founder, Jamie Siminoff, defended this expansion, noting that advances in AI allow these features to be implemented at a scale and speed previously impossible.[5]

The Viral Backlash

The marketing for the Search Party feature encouraged users to “be a hero in your neighborhood”, but the public reception was decidedly less heroic.[6] In the week following the Super Bowl ad, nearly 50% of social media conversations regarding Ring were negative, compared to only 14% that were positive.[7] Users took to platforms like Reddit to claim they were requesting refunds, while some even posted videos of themselves destroying their Ring cameras in protest.[8] Legal experts were equally struck by the campaign. Dr. Jane Kirtley, Professor of Media, Ethics, and Law here at the University of Minnesota, noted it was interesting that Ring would be “so candid about the potential use of this particular technology.”[9] Critics argued the ad was “creepy” and “dystopian,” suggesting that if AI can be used to track a specific dog across a neighborhood, there is little barrier to using the same infrastructure to track specific people.[10]

Privacy Advocates’ Responses

The concerns raised by privacy advocates like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) center on the fundamental problem of consent.[11] While a camera owner might opt-in to the network, the Ring cameras also record every passerby, from postal workers to neighbors, without their permission.[12] EFF attorney Mario Trujillo warns that this creates a “large surveillance apparatus” that can easily be tapped into by law enforcement.[13]

There is also fear of a slippery slope when Search Party is combined with Ring’s “Familiar Faces” facial recognition technology, which identifies specific individuals who approach a doorway.[14] Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) expressed concerns in a formal letter to Ring, warning that the opt-out design is confusing and risks creating 24/7 surveillance networks near sensitive locations like hospitals, schools, and courthouses.[15] Further, the history of partnerships between Ring and surveillance companies like Flock Safety has raised alarms regarding data-sharing with federal agencies like ICE.[16] Although Ring recently canceled its partnership with Flock, citing resource constraints, advocates remain wary of how easily private residential data can be integrated into broader police intelligence networks.[17]

Minnesota’s Rapid Legislative Response

The Search Party controversy made one thing clear: Minnesota currently lacks laws preventing private companies from sharing this type of residential video data with third parties or government entities.[18] In response, a bipartisan group of Minnesota lawmakers introduced a five-bill package aimed at regulating AI and protecting digital rights.[19] Led by the unlikely duo of Senator Erin Maye Quade and Senator Eric Lucero, the bills target several key areas: SF 1857 targets prohibiting children under 18 from accessing AI chatbots,[20] SF 1856 bans health insurers from using AI to determine medical necessity,[21] SF 3098 blocks “dynamic pricing” set by AI algorithms,[22] SF 1886 mandates disclosure when a consumer is interacting with AI,[23] and SF 1120 aims to create a landmark ban on reverse warrants.[24]

SF 1120 has particular significance stemming from the Ring ad. It would prohibit the government from using reverse location or reverse keyword searches, which are digital dragnets that compel tech companies to hand over data on every device in a specific area or every person who searched for a specific term.[25] The bill includes a civil cause of action, allowing individuals to sue for $1,000 per violation if their data is obtained unlawfully.[26] Senator Lucero argued these controls are necessary to “empower individuals against these multi-billion dollar industries.”[27]

The path to enactment faces two major hurdles. First, law enforcement groups, including the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, testified that banning reverse warrants would have “extensive negative consequences” for solving complex crimes.[28] Second, a federal complication looms; an Executive Order from President Trump establishes an AI litigation task force to challenge state laws, threatening to pull funding from states with “onerous” AI laws.[29]

Looking Forward

The Ring Super Bowl ad was intended to be a marketing triumph, but instead, it became a rare moment where the public saw a glimpse of the surveillance nightmare being built around them. The swift, bipartisan response in the Minnesota legislature signals that surveillance privacy is no longer a partisan issue but now a fundamental question of constitutional rights that the public wants answers to. As these bills move through the legislature, they highlight the unresolved tension between legitimate law enforcement needs and Fourth Amendment protections. If passed, Minnesota’s approach could become a model for state-level digital rights, provided it can survive the looming threat of federal preemption. For now, the Search Party backfire serves as a potent reminder that in the age of AI, “common-sense guardrails” are no longer optional; they are necessary.[30]

 

Notes

[1] See Ring, Search Party from Ring | Be a Hero in Your Neighborhood, YouTube (Feb. 2, 2026), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OheUzrXsKrY.

[2] Abby Haymond, Ring’s New AI Lost Dog Feature Raises Privacy Concerns, WDAM (Feb. 11, 2026 at 22:10 CST), https://www.wdam.com/2026/02/12/rings-new-ai-lost-dog-feature-raises-privacy-concerns/.

[3] Todd Bishop, What Ring’s ‘Search Party’ Actually Does, And Why It’s Super Bowl Ad Gave People the Creeps, GeekWire (Feb. 10, 2026 at 11:14), https://www.geekwire.com/2026/what-rings-search-party-actually-does-and-why-its-super-bowl-ad-gave-people-the-creeps/.

[4] Madison Lisowski & Danae Holmes, Concerns Over AI Video Surveillance Grow Following Big Game Ad, W. Mass. News (Mar. 2, 2026 at 15:10 CST), https://www.westernmassnews.com/2026/03/02/concerns-over-ring-cameras-grow-following-big-game-ad/.

[5] Bishop, supra note 3.

[6] See e.g., Lisowski & Holmes, supra note 4.

[7] Sam Sabin, Doorbell Cams, Surveillance Tech Face Growing Backlash, Axios (Feb. 17, 2026), https://www.axios.com/2026/02/17/doorbell-cams-and-surveillance-tech-face-growing-public-backlash.

[8] Id.

[9] Corin Hoggard, Ring’s AI Feature Raises Privacy Alarms, Fox 9 (Feb. 10, 2026 at 9:37 CST), https://www.fox9.com/news/rings-ai-feature-raises-privacy-alarms.

[10] Bishop, supra note 3; Haymond, supra note 2.

[11] See, e.g., Beryl Lipton, No One, Including Our Furry Friends, Will Be Safer in Ring’s Surveillance Nightmare, Elec. Frontier Found. (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/02/no-one-including-our-furry-friends-will-be-safer-rings-surveillance-nightmare-0.

[12] Haymond, supra note 2.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. See also Lipton, supra note 11; Bishop, supra note 3.

[15] Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, Krishnamoorthi Raises Alarm Over Ring’s New AI “Search Party” Feature, Citing Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns (Feb. 27, 2026), https://krishnamoorthi.house.gov/media/press-releases/krishnamoorthi-raises-alarm-over-rings-new-ai-search-party-feature-citing.

[16] Bishop, supra note 3; Jay Stanley, Flock’s Aggressive Expansions Go Far Beyond Simple Driver Surveillance, ACLU (Aug. 18, 2025), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-roundup.

[17] Sabin, supra note 7; Lipton, supra note 11.

[18] Hoggard, supra note 9.

[19] Howard Thompson, MN Lawmakers Introduce AI Regulations Aimed at Protecting Children, Curtailing Surveillance, Fox 9 (Mar. 9, 2026 at 13:46 CDT), https://www.fox9.com/news/mn-lawmakers-introduce-ai-regulations-aimed-protecting-children-curtailing-surveillance.

[20] S.F. 1857, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2025), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/0/SF/1857/versions/0/.

[21] S.F. 1856, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2025),  https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/0/SF/1856/versions/latest/.

[22] S.F. 3098, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2025), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/0/SF/3098/versions/latest/.

[23] S.F. 1866, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2025), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/0/SF/1886/versions/latest/.

[24] S.F. 1120, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2025), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/0/SF/1120/versions/latest/.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Michelle Griffith, Minnesota Lawmakers Push Bipartisan Measures to Regulate AI, SC Times (Mar. 11, 2026 at 2:45 CT), https://www.sctimes.com/story/news/politics/2026/03/11/minnesota-senate-considers-bipartisan-push-to-regulate-ai-artificial-intelligence-dfl-gop/89082394007/.

[28] Id; Minn. Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, BCA Opposition to S.F. 1120 (Minn. Senate Comm. on Judiciary and Public Safety, Mar. 5, 2026), https://assets.senate.mn/committees/2025-2026/3128_Committee_on_Judiciary_and_Public_Safety/BCA-Opposition-to-SF1120-3-5-26-Signed-3-5-26.pdf (letter from BCA Superintendent Evans to Chair Latz opposing SF 1120).

[29] Exec. Order No. 14365, Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence, 90 Fed. Reg. 58499 (Dec. 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/16/2025-23092/ensuring-a-national-policy-framework-for-artificial-intelligence; Thompson, supra note 19.

[30] Chris Farrell & Ellen Finn, Slate of Bills Looking to Regulate AI Introduced at Minnesota Capitol, Minn. Pub. Radio (Mar. 9, 2026 at 13:35), https://www.mprnews.org/episode/2026/03/09/slate-of-bills-looking-to-regulate-ai-introduced-at-state-capitol.

Can American Antitrust Law Keep Up With Artificial Intelligence?

April 6, 2026
Antitrust, Artificial Intelligence, Business Law, Economics, Intellectual Property

Alec J. Berin, Matthew P. Suzor, and Quintin C. Cerione of Miller Shah LLP

Since the debut of OpenAI’s ChatGPT in late 2022, artificial intelligence (AI) has exploded from an experimental tool to a global industry. The exponential rise of generative AI, although providing companies and consumers with greater levels of efficiency and productivity, is putting pressure on American antitrust law to play catch up in regulating the growing AI market.

As AI becomes commonplace today, one of the greatest challenges it poses is that its building blocks—chips, cloud infrastructure, and large-language models—are largely controlled by only a handful of companies.[1] A major concern, therefore, is whether American antitrust law, which was largely designed during an industrial period dominated by railroads and manufacturing, can address the competitive risks of the AI era. Regulators and courts have started to express their perspectives about these issues, yet more questions than answers have emerged.

The Intersection of American Antitrust Doctrine and AI

The core of the American antitrust framework is comprised of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), Clayton Act (1914), and Federal Trade Commission Act (1914).[2] The Sherman Act was initially enacted in an effort to target monopolization by barring exclusionary practices, while the Clayton Act filled its holes by prohibiting mergers and acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”[3] Historically, courts have applied these laws to industries defined by physical assets, such as steel, oil, and operating systems.[4] Today, however, the market power increasingly consists of control over intangible items: data and algorithms.

Regulators are attempting to offer guidance on how these statutes apply in a digital and data-driven era. For example, in 2023 the FTC and DOJ issued revised Merger Guidelines, which warned that a merger could undermine competition if it “creates a firm that can limit access to products or services that its rivals use to compete.”[5] Although this is not directed exclusively at tech companies, this language nonetheless suggests antitrust law’s expanded focus on vertical integration—especially relevant for companies’ partnerships aimed at combining the control of AI infrastructure and data services.

The particular challenge for regulating market power in the AI sector is defining the relevant market. Because AI depends on key inputs—vast amounts of data and computational resources – rather than traditional products and services that have historically defined markets, delineating the relevant market is uniquely complex. This is clearly indicated in a 2025 report from the Congressional Research Service, which warns that “limited access to data” may threaten competition, regardless of whether AI services remain free to consumers.[6] In the coming years, determining whether AI regulation will be concentrated on the models, chips, or cloud services used for these products—or if they will be considered a single integrated stack—will be critical in influencing enforcement outcomes.

Early AI-Antitrust Legal Battles

In recent months, lawsuits against major tech companies have begun to address how far traditional antitrust principles extend into the AI space.[7] This October, a class-action lawsuit filed against Microsoft[8] alleged that its financial relationship with Open AI—particularly a deal granting Microsoft exclusive cloud computing that restricts the supply of computational resources needed to run ChatGPT—both limited market competition and artificially drove up ChatGPT subscription prices while diminishing product quality for millions of Open AI users.[9] Similar concerns are being raised by antitrust experts regarding Nvidia’s $100 billion partnership with OpenAI,[10] as experts fear that building such a relationship will give both companies an unfair advantage over their competitors.

Perhaps most notably, a September ruling by a federal judge in a landmark antitrust case against Google illustrated how AI may continue to be an obstacle in regulating monopolies.[11] Although the judge affirmed that “Google cannot use the same anticompetitive playbook for its GenAI products that it used for Search,” he insisted that the emergence of generative AI has granted companies a greater ability “to compete with Google than any traditional search company developer has been in decades” and ultimately spared Google from the harsh penalties.[12] This exemplifies the inherent tension of AI; a technology capable of fostering and hindering competition will prove only more difficult for regulators to address in years to come.

Critical Legal Questions to Consider

Going forward, courts will need to answer a series of questions to best address the competitive concerns of AI. First, as AI blurs product boundaries—with single companies being involved in many layers of the supply chain—determining whether these layers represent distinct or integrated markets has big implications for assessing anticompetitive behavior.

Second, because several of the most popular AI products offer services for free or at low costs, harm to consumers may lie outside the scope of price fixing but instead resulting from diminished product quality and restricted access to inputs.[13] It will be up to courts and regulators to determine when harm is being committed in the AI market.

Third, defining the line between integration and exclusion will become increasingly urgent. Though partnerships and acquisitions may accelerate innovation, unlawful exclusion may arise through integrated companies’ restriction of rivals’ access to essential inputs or result in self-preferencing through exclusive supply arrangements. Though this risk is outlined in the 2023 Merger Guidelines, it remains to be seen how courts will approach this issue in the coming years.

 

Notes

[1] See e.g., Jay Stanley, Will Giant Companies Always Have a Monopoly on Top AI Models?, ACLU (Aug. 20, 2025), https://www.aclu.org/news/racial-justice/will-giant-companies-always-have-a-monopoly-on-top-ai-models; Steven Levy, There Is Only One AI Company. Welcome to the Blob, Wired (Nov. 21, 2025 at 11:00), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-industry-monopoly-nvidia-microsoft-google/.

[2] See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38; Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.

[3] The Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

[4] See e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (applying the Sherman Act to the steel industry); FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (applying the Federal Trade Commission Act and Clayton Act to the oil industry); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 346 U.S. App. D.C. 330 (2001) (applying the Sherman Act to operating systems).

[5] Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (issued Dec. 18, 2023),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/2023-merger-guidelines.

[6] Congressional Research Service, Artificial Intelligence and Competition Policy (2025), CRS Insight No. IN12458, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12458.

[7] Mike Scarcella, AI Users Sue Microsoft in Antirust Class Action Over OpenAI Deal, Reuters (Oct. 13, 2025 at 17:47 CDT), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/ai-users-sue-microsoft-antitrust-class-action-over-openai-deal-2025-10-13/.

[8] Class Action Complaint, Samuel Bryant et al. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 3:25‑cv‑08733 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 13, 2025) (alleging anticompetitive restraints arising from Microsoft’s partnership with OpenAI).

[9] Scarcella, supra note 7.

[10] Jody Godoy, Nvidia’s $100 Billion OpenAI Play Raises Big Antitrust Issues, Reuters (Sept. 23, 2025),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/nvidias-100-billion-openai-play-raises-big-antitrust-concerns-2025-09-23/.

[11] See generally, United States v. Google LLC, 803 F. Supp. 3d 18 (D.D.C. 2025) (remedies decision addressing generative AI’s competitive effects).

[12] Id. at 99, 128.

[13] Scarcella, supra note 7.

You Can’t Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too: How the Endangerment Finding Rescission Clears the Path for More State Climate Action

April 1, 2026
Administrative Law, Energy Law, Environmental Law, Torts Law

Eli Dotson, MJLST Staffer

In the decade since the landmark 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, the governments of the world have fallen far short of their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction pledges.[1] Climate change is intensifying: rising emissions have breached key CO2e and temperature thresholds and are destabilizing the biosphere.[2] In the U.S., the lack of sufficient action at the federal level was recently exacerbated by the Trump Administration’s rescission of the Endangerment Finding, a key Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule that served as the foundation for GHG regulation under the Clean Air Act (CAA).[3] But there may be a silver lining: the federal government’s abdication of authority may have inadvertently handed states a significant advantage in ongoing legal battles over two innovative climate regulation strategies. Minnesota is perfectly positioned to exploit this advantage and lead the next wave of state climate accountability.

First, on the policy front, Vermont and New York led the nation in passing “Climate Superfund” laws in 2024.[4] Taking inspiration from the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”), these statutes establish strict liability for parties with a significant nexus to the state that extracted or refined fossil fuels during recent decades.[5] These responsible parties would be forced to pay cost-recovery damages based on their share of GHG emissions, with payments going to a program fund that would finance climate adaptation projects.[6] Both statutes remain mired in litigation challenging their constitutionality. A coalition of private plaintiffs including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Petroleum Institute mounted challenges in federal court in both Vermont and New York; President Trump also issued Executive Order 14260 instructing the Attorney General to take action against both statutes, which the Department of Justice did in May 2025.[7]

Second, on the litigation side, local governments in at least ten states have sued Big Oil companies for damages related to their GHG emissions, typically under common law tort claims like nuisance.[8] The Second Circuit denied New York City’s attempt to recover from four Big Oil companies in 2021,[9] while Hawaii’s Supreme Court allowed Honolulu’s suit against Big Oil to proceed in 2023, explicitly condemning the Second Circuit’s reasoning.[10] Although it denied certiorari in the Hawaii appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court could potentially resolve the split this term in County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor Energy USA, Inc.; environmental advocates see the Supreme Court’s decision to grant cert as a bad omen.[11]

One key legal issue underlies both the Climate Superfund and climate tort litigation: the preemptory scope of the CAA vis-à-vis GHG emission regulation. Though not intended for GHG regulation when originally drafted, the CAA was shoehorned into that role via the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and the EPA’s subsequent Endangerment Finding.[12] Numerous federal courts have found that the CAA preempts federal common law tort claims.[13] However, the parties opposing liability for fossil fuel companies in the litigation discussed above proffer a different, largely untested theory: they allege that, via field preemption and conflict preemption, state and local statutory and common law attempts to recover damages for GHG emissions are displaced by the CAA’s comprehensive air pollution regulation scheme.[14] This aligns with EPA’s recent contradictory statement that “the CAA also continues to preempt state common-law claims and statutes that seek to regulate out-of-state emissions”[15]—apparently arguing that preemption extends to litigation seeking remedies for harms caused by GHG emissions.[16]

This is where the Trump Administration’s effort to dismantle federal climate regulation could backfire. The EPA is asserting that it lacks statutory authority under the CAA to regulate GHG as “air pollutants,” which now must “threaten health or welfare through local or regional exposure” in order to fall into EPA’s regulatory bailiwick.[17] Since the EPA is forfeiting its statutory authority to regulate GHG, any argument for federal field preemption collapses because no “comprehensive regulatory scheme” can exist. While opponents may argue that the preemption derives from the CAA’s statutory text rather than EPA’s regulatory choices, that argument grows considerably weaker when the agency itself has disclaimed the authority Congress supposedly delegated. Simply put, the parties opposing GHG emissions regulation cannot have their cake and eat it, too. Either the federal government has authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA, or states must be allowed to do so. Rescinding the Endangerment Finding necessarily creates constitutional space for state and local governments to take broader action.

Minnesota legislators are contemplating the opportunity to occupy this vacant climate policy space with a Climate Superfund Law: on March 4, 2026, the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Superfund Act (GGPSA) was introduced into the Minnesota Senate.[18] The Supreme Court could tangentially cast doubt on the constitutionality of the GGPSA via Commissioners of Boulder County (which deals with common law tort claims, not statutory claims). But Minnesota could still seize the current opportunity and learn from the litigation in Vermont and New York. A more narrowly tailored Climate Superfund law that draws a more circumscribed zone of liability for GHG emissions would preclude claims of extraterritorial regulation and interstate commerce clause violation like those that have plagued the Vermont and New York laws.[19] For example, damages could be explicitly tied only to emissions from fossil fuels that were extracted or refined in the state of Minnesota (rather than global emissions) by slightly revising the definition of “Covered greenhouse gas emissions” in the bill. Adapting the statute in this manner could reduce industry opposition (and litigation expenses) and increase the ultimate likelihood of recovery.

The Big Oil companies that are the target of Climate Superfund laws and climate tort lawsuits supply the global economy with a critical input which has driven massive increases in material prosperity. Yet their product also indisputably threatens the stability of earth’s climatic system, and for decades they have waged systematic disinformation, lobbying, and mercenary science campaigns to block common-sense climate policies.[20] Big Oil companies have also extracted enormous wealth from the earth’s natural resources—the five oil majors earned a total of $102 billion in profits and paid their CEOs $104 million in 2024 alone.[21] Holding these corporations accountable for their deception and obstruction by requiring them to pay their fair share of externalities is a just solution that will shift the cost of climate adaptation from the public to those directly responsible.

The Trump Administration’s decision to rescind the Endangerment Finding was intended to shield the fossil fuel industry from federal regulation. In doing so, it may have exposed the industry to something worse: a patchwork of state liability regimes with no federal preemption to hide behind. By stripping away the federal preemption shield, the Trump Administration has potentially handed every state in the union a sword, and Minnesota is perfectly positioned to take the first swing.

 

Notes

[1] Joint Research Centre, G20 Climate Strategies Insufficient to Meet Paris Agreement Goals, Eur. Comm’n (Jan. 31, 2025), https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news-and-updates/g20-climate-strategies-insufficient-meet-paris-agreement-goals-2025-01-31_en.

[2] Isabelle Boscaro-Clarke et al., Global Climate Highlights 2025, Copernicus Climate Change Serv. (Jan. 28, 2026),  https://climate.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/custom-uploads/GCH-2025/GCH2025-full-report.pdf.

[3] Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, 91 Fed. Reg. 7686 (Feb. 18, 2026) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, 1039).

[4] Jack Raffetto & Rose Quam-Wickham, Vermont and New York Climate Acts are First in a Wave of Likely Climate Change Cost Recovery Laws, Sidley Austin LLP,  (June 20, 2024), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2024/06/vermont-and-new-york-climate-acts-are-first-in-a-wave-of-likely-climate-change-cost-recovery-laws.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Kristina McKean, The Pending Fate of Climate Superfund Statutes, Geo. Env. L. Rev. (Jan. 29, 2026), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/environmental-law-review/blog/the-pending-fate-of-climate-superfund-statutes/.

[8] Center for Climate Integrity, Big Oil Accountability Lawsuits (2026), https://climateintegrity.org/lawsuits; see also Miranda Green, The Supreme Court Case That Could End Local Climate Suits, Atmos (Mar. 4, 2026), https://atmos.earth/political-landscapes/the-supreme-court-case-that-could-end-local-climate-suits/.

[9] City of N.Y. v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2021).

[10] City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, 153 Haw. 326, 349 (2023).

[11] Suncor Energy Inc., vs. County Commissioners of Boulder County, Docket No. 25-170 (U.S. Aug 12, 2025); see also Green, supra note 8.

[12] Jody Freeman, Beyond ‘Endangerment’: Finding a Way Forward for U.S. on Climate, Yale Env’t 360 (Mar. 3, 2026), https://e360.yale.edu/features/endangerment-finding.

[13] City & Cnty. Of Honolulu, 153 Haw. at 349.

[14] Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 14, United States of America et al v. State of Vermont et al, Docket No. 2:25-cv-00463 (D. Vt. May 01, 2025).

[15] See Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 3.

[16] Eric Christensen et al., EPA Strikes at the Roots of Federal GHG Regulations, Rescinds Endangerment Finding for Motor Vehicles, Beveridge & Diamond (Feb. 13, 2026), https://www.bdlaw.com/publications/epa-strikes-at-the-roots-of-federal-ghg-regulations-rescinds-endangerment-finding-for-motor-vehicles/.

[17] See Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 3.

[18] S.F. 4126, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2026).

[19] Complaint, supra note 14 at 17-22.

[20] Zanagee Artis, Unveiling Big Oil’s Campaign of Lies, NRDC News & Comment. (May 10, 2024), https://www.nrdc.org/bio/zanagee-artis/unveiling-big-oils-campaign-lies.

[21] Energy Profits, History-making Profits. World-ending Emissions. (June 2025), https://energy-profits.org/.

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