Ethics

Tomorrow’s Originalism: Would a Time Machine Solve Originalism’s Implementation Problem?

January 23, 2025
Constitutional Law, Ethics, Psychology, Sociology

Solomon Park, MJLST Staffer

I. Tomorrow’s Originalism: After Original Public Meaning Originalism & the Implementation Problem

When interpreting the Constitution, the threshold question is what “meaning [did] the text ha[ve] for competent speakers of American English at the time [the relevant] provision of the text was framed and ratified?”[1] This philosophy—known as Public Meaning Originalism (“PMO”)—has become the predominant way judges approach Constitutional questions.[2] But PMO hasn’t always been the majority methodology.[3] Contrary to the prevalence of PMO in the Roberts Court, it was only relatively recently in District of Columbia v. Heller, that PMO really found its footing. As Justice Scalia then wrote: “in interpreting [the Constitution] we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’”[4] This passage in Heller— and subsequent cases involving constitutional challenges—would usher in a new age of originalism and solidify the prevalence of PMO in modern constitutional jurisprudence.[5]

Although today’s originalism has been defined by PMO as the initial starting point, significant debate persists with how originalism should be implemented. Known as the “implementation problem,” legal scholars have critiqued originalism for its inability to “address how practicing judges and attorneys should apply originalist theories.”[6] This concern over implementation—and workability writ large[7]—has proven to be a significant point of contention in recent Supreme Court cases. And no case better exemplifies these challenges than United States v. Rahimi—a Second Amendment case decided just last term. In five separate concurring opinions, and a single dissent, the Justices took originalism to task—engaging with each other to express their support and concerns with PMO.[8]

This current discord preludes tomorrow’s originalism. But unlike the shift from Original Intent to Original Public Meaning, tomorrow’s originalism will likely not be one of substantive form—but rather of content (i.e. not whether PMO is the correct starting point, but rather what tools should be permissible/given more weight to conduct PMO analysis). Foreshadowing the future, we might consider the wealth of literature that surrounds textualism (i.e. rules surrounding semantic/substantive canons, as well as legislative history) as an indicator of the rigor that originalist jurisprudence might eventually arrive at.

This blog post suggests that before we arrive at tomorrow’s originalism, it may be helpful to take a step back. At its core, PMO has a simple premise: competent speakers of American English around ratification had an idea of what the Constitution meant, and it is this meaning that lawyers, judges, and Justices should now strive to locate.

Focusing on the fundamentals, what if we could literally go back in time and ask these speakers of American English? How exactly would we go about doing so? What sort of parameters would shape the questions we ask? Who would we seek out? This very brief blog post, proposes and shows how the following Mondale Time Machine hypothetical could: concretize ongoing discussions about implementation, and provide a way to clarify, and evaluate, existing originalist tools.

II. The Mondale Time Machine (“MTM”) Hypothetical: Core Capabilities & Limitations

The Mondale Time Machine (“MTM”) Hypothetical—Somewhere in the depths of Minnesota Law’s library, there is a time machine…

This very real device has yet to have been activated but can teleport willing “speakers of American English” to the present. The current plan is to then survey these speakers about the Original Public Meaning of a specific provision of the Constitution.

MTM possesses the following initial capabilities, it can teleport any number of people: from anywhere (i.e. geographic area); from anytime (i.e. can limit the search to a specific range of years); and can even teleport people possessing any permutation of specific characteristics or demographics (i.e. of a certain socioeconomic class, race, or gender). Note: this list of capabilities is non-exhaustive and additional capabilities can be added/subtracted by the reader.

MTM requires researchers—meaning the reader—to actually make these decisions. In preparation for the first round of time travel, and in order to best reflect PMO’s objectives, the reader has been asked to provide parameters—and their rationale—to the list of the above capabilities.

III. MTM Raises Two Core Questions/Opportunities:

This hypothetical raises at least two core questions. First, as a procedural matter how much of an issue is the implementation problem—as well as other problems that have been leveled against PMO? Afterall, if we conclude that not even asking a thousand people from the founding era would be sufficient, then the implementation problem is indeed serious. Some of the best arguments for this side could be that: any number of time travelers are probably under inclusive; the selected time travelers would not be representative of the founding era as a population; and evaluation problems could arise when there is disagreement amongst the time travelers.

Second, the hypothetical provides an opportunity to clarify and evaluate desirable features in current/future originalist tools. For example, if we conclude that teleporting an expert linguist from the founding era would be sufficient—then tools like dictionaries (which reflect the opinion of a small but highly educated group of people) should also receive an elevated status. Answering the hypothetical provides a clear platonic ideal for originalism. For example, if we decide that the time machine should transport people possessing various demographics, then the tools we use for originalist analysis should also reflect this ideal. For this reason, a tool which fails to capture these perspectives lacks a signature quality—perhaps even a necessary one—which should demote the persuasive weight given to the tool.

IV. Conclusion: Would a Time Machine Solve Originalism’s Implementation Problem?

 “Discerning what the original meaning of the Constitution requires in this or that case may sometimes be difficult… Faithful adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning may be an imperfect guide, but I can think of no more perfect one for us to follow.”—Justice Gorsuch, United States v. Rahimi[9]

This passage from Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Rahimi captures two simultaneous truths. Originalism is, and likely will remain, the “imperfect guide” used to interpret the Constitution. But at the same time, originalism has challenging flaws which arise out of its implementation.

Ultimately, my hypothetical highlights these two realities. On the one hand, a gut feeling tells us that a time machine should be able to solve the implementation problem. Afterall, if not even a thousand people from the founding era could resolve the issue, then what could? On the other hand, working through the hypothetical shows the line drawing problems created by the implementation critique. In the face of that difficulty—and as Justice Gorsuch reminds us—that doesn’t mean the inquiry is over.

I hope this blog post presents an interesting, and entertaining, thought experiment. My answer to the hypothetical would take too many words to write. However, I do think that the hypothetical probably strengthens tools that are capable of more holistically representing communities—such as Corpus Linguistics.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Theory of Constitutional Meaning, 101 B. U. L. Rev. 1953, 1957 (2022).

[2] See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Original Public Meaning, 807 Mich. St. L. Rev. 897, 810 n. 5-7 (2024) (providing an in-depth analysis of the use of PMO in: the Supreme Court, various federal courts of appeal, and state supreme courts); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: a New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751, 761 (2009) (“Original public meaning is now the predominant originalist theory”); see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our law?, 115 Colum L. Rev. 2349, 2391 (2015) (concluding that “originalism seems to best describe our law”). But see Justice Stephen Breyer, Pragmatism or Textualism, 138 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 722 (2025) (“While the Court may well be in the midst of a paradigm shift toward textualism and originalism, the unworkability of these approaches in practice will push the Court back toward the traditional approach — gradually and with time”).

[3] See generally Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 599, 599-613 (2004) (describing and explaining the shift from Original Intent Originalism to Original Public Meaning Originalism).

[4] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008).

[5] See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. Rev.  1095, 1095 (2009) (“District of Columbia v. Heller has been hailed by its supporters as a model of ‘new originalism,’ a methodology that focuses on original public meaning and eschews any concern for original intent.”).

[6] Michael L. Smith and Alexander S. Hiland, Originalism’s Implementation Problem, 30 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1063, 1064 (2022).

[7] See generally Kurt Eggret et al., Chapman Law Review Debate: Does Originalism Work?, 26 CHAP. L. REV. 237, 244 (2023) (manuscript of a debate between Professor Kurt Eggert and Professor Lee Strang over Originalism’s workability issue); see also Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 2, at 722.

[8] Compare United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024) (“the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition) (citing N.Y. ST. Rifle and Pistol Ass’n., Inc v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26-31 (2022), with Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702-703 (Sotomayor, J. & Kagan, J. concurring) (critiquing the dissent as being “so exacting as to be useless”), with id. at 711-712 (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (writing to emphasize the importance of originalism. “Faithful adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning may be an imperfect guide, but I can think of no more perfect one for us to follow”), with id. at 714, 719, 719-731 (Kavanaugh, J. concurring) (clearly supporting original public meaning originalism, and examining the role of “pre-ratification history, post-ratification history, and precedent when analyzing vague constitutional text”), with id. at 737-738, 739-740 (Barrett, J. concurring) (explaining the “basic premises of originalism,” and explaining the problem of “level[s] of generality”), with id. at 744, 745-747 (Jackson, J. concurring) (explaining that Bruen’s test has led to serious workability issues for lower courts, and that significant questions remain with originalism’s scope), with id. at 753-763 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (explaining why “[t]he Government does not offer a single historical regulation that is relevantly similar to [the applicable statute]”).

[9] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 711 (2024) (Gorsuch, J. concurring).

The Power of Preference or Monopoly? Unpacking Google’s Search Engine Domination

November 26, 2024
Business Law, Data, Ethics, Industry, Internet, Regulatory, Trade, Trusts and Estates

Donovan Ennevor, MJLST Staffer

When searching for an answer to a query online, would you ever use a different search engine than Google? The answer for most people is almost certainly no. Google’s search engine has achieved such market domination that “to Google” has become a verb in the English language.[1] Google controls 90% of the U.S. search engine market, with its closest competitors Yahoo and Bing holding around 3% each.[2] Is this simply because Google offers a superior product or is there some other more nefarious reason?

According to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the answer is the latter: Google has dominated its competitors by engaging in illegal practices and creating a monopoly. Federal Judge Amit Mehta agreed with the DOJ’s position and ruled in August 2024 that Google’s market domination was a monopoly achieved through improper means.[3] The remedies for Google’s breach of antitrust law are yet to be determined; however, their consequences could have far reaching implications for the future of Google and Big Tech.

United States v. Google LLC

In October 2020, the DOJ and 11 states filed a civil suit against Google in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of U.S. antitrust laws.[4] A coalition of 35 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Washington D.C. filed a similar lawsuit in December 2020.[5] In 2021, the cases were consolidated into a single proceeding to address the overlapping claims.[6] An antitrust case of this magnitude had not been brought in nearly two decades.[7]

The petitioners’ complaint argued that Google’s dominance did not solely arise through superior technology, but rather, through exclusionary agreements designed to stifle competition in online search engine and search advertising markets.[8] The complaint alleged that Google maintained its monopolies by engaging in practices such as entering into exclusivity agreements that prohibited the preinstallation of competitors’ search engines, forcing preinstallation of Google’s search engine in prime mobile device locations, and making it undeletable regardless of consumer preference.[9] For example, Google’s agreement with Apple required that all Apple products and tools have Google as the preinstalled default—essentially an exclusive—search engine.[10] Google also allegedly used its monopoly profits to fund the payments to secure preferential treatment on devices, web browsers, and other search access points, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of monopolization.[11]

According to the petitioners, these practices not only limited competitor opportunities, but also harmed consumers by reducing search engine options and diminishing quality, particularly in areas like privacy and data use.[12] Furthermore, Google’s dominance in search advertising has allowed it to charge higher prices, impacting advertisers and lowering service quality—outcomes unlikely in a more competitive market.[13]

Google rebutted the petitioners’ argument, asserting instead that its search product is preferred due to its superiority and is freely chosen by its consumers.[14] Google also noted that if users wish to switch to a different search engine, they can do so easily.[15]

However, Judge Mehta agreed with the arguments posed by the petitioners and held Google’s market dominance in search and search advertising constituted a monopoly, achieved through exclusionary practices violating U.S. antitrust laws.[16] The case will now move to the remedy determination phase, where the DOJ and Google will argue what remedies are appropriate to impose on Google during a hearing in April 2025.[17]

The Proposed Remedies and Implications

In November, the petitioners filed their final proposed remedies—both behavioral and structural—for Google with the court.[18] Behavioral remedies govern a company’s conduct whereas structural remedies generally refer to reorganization and or divestment.[19]  The proposed behavioral remedies include barring Google from entering exclusive preinstallation agreements and requiring Google to license certain indexes, data, and models that drive its search engine.[20] These remedies would help create more opportunities for competing search engines to gain visibility and improve their search capabilities and ad services. The petitioner’s filing mentioned they would also pursue structural remedies including forcing Google to breakup or divest from its Chrome browser and Android mobile operating system.[21] To ensure Google adheres to these changes, the petitioners proposed appointing a court-monitored technical committee to oversee Google’s compliance.[22]

It could be many years before any of the proposed remedies are actually instituted, given that Google has indicated it will appeal Judge Mehta’s ruling.[23] Additionally, given precedent it is unlikely that any structural remedies will be imposed or enforced.[24] However, any remedies ultimately approved would set a precedent for regulatory control over Big Tech, signaling that the U.S. government is willing to take strong steps to curb monopolistic practices. This could encourage further action against other tech giants and redefine regulatory expectations across the industry, particularly around data transparency and competition in digital advertising.

 

Notes

[1] See Virginia Heffernan, Just Google It: A Short History of a Newfound Verb, Wired (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/just-google-it-a-short-history-of-a-newfound-verb/.

[2] Justice Department Calls for Sanctions Against Google in Landmark Antitrust Case, Nat’l Pub. Radio, (Oct. 9, 2024, 12:38 AM), https://www.npr.org/2024/10/09/nx-s1-5146006/justice-department-sanctions-google-search-engine-lawsuit [hereinafter Calls for Sanctions Against Google].

[3] United States v. Google LLC, 2024 WL 3647498, 1, 134 (2024).

[4] Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google For Violating Antitrust Laws, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws [hereinafter Justice Department Calls for Sanctions].

[5] Dara Kerr, United States Takes on Google in Biggest Tech Monopoly Trial of 21st Century, Nat’l Pub. Radio, (Sept. 12, 2023, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2023/09/12/1198558372/doj-google-monopoly-antitrust-trial-search-engine.

[6] Tracker Detail US v. Google LLC / State of Colorado v. Google LLC, TechPolicy.Press, https://www.techpolicy.press/tracker/us-v-google-llc/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2024).

[7] Calls for Sanctions Against Google, supra note 2 (“The last antitrust case of this magnitude to make it to trial was in 1998, when the Justice Department sued Microsoft.”).

[8] Justice Department Calls for Sanctions, supra note 4.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Kerrr, supra note 5.

[15] Id.

[16] United States v. Google LLC, 2024 WL 3647498, 1, 4 (2024).

[17] Calls for Sanctions Against Google, supra note 2.

[18] Steve Brachmann, DOJ, State AGs File Proposed Remedial Framework in Google Search Antitrust Case, (Oct. 13, 2024, 12:15 PM), https://ipwatchdog.com/2024/10/13/doj-state-ags-file-proposed-remedial-framework-google-search-antitrust-case/id=182031/.

[19] Dan Robinson, Uncle Sam may force Google to sell Chrome browser, or Android OS, The Reg. (Oct. 9, 2024, 12:56 pm), https://www.theregister.com/2024/10/09/usa_vs_google_proposed_remedies/.

[20] Brachmann, supra note 18.

[21] Exec. Summary of Plaintiff’s Proposed Final Judgement at 3–4, United States v. Google LLC No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2024). Id at 4.

[22] Id.

[23] See Jane Wolfe & Miles Kruppa, Google Loses Antitrust Case Over Search-Engine Dominance, Wall Street J. (Aug. 5, 2024, 5:02 pm), https://www.wsj.com/tech/google-loses-federal-antitrust-case-27810c43?mod=article_inline.

[24] See Makenzie Holland, Google Breakup Unlikely in Event of Guilty Verdict, Tech Target (Oct. 11, 2023), https://www.techtarget.com/searchcio/news/366555177/Google-breakup-unlikely-in-event-of-guilty-verdict. See also Michael Brick, U.S. Appeals Court Overturns Microsoft Antitrust Ruling, N.Y. Times (Jun 28, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/28/business/us-appeals-court-overturns-microsoft-antitrust-ruling.html. (summarizing the U.S. Court of Appeals decision overturning of the structural remedies imposed on Microsoft in an antitrust case).

 

 

You Can Protect Your Data . . . Once.

September 26, 2024
Business Law, Data Privacy, Ethics, Internet, Litigation, Social Media

Jessica Schmitz, MJLST Staffer

We scan our face to access our phones. We scan our hands to save five minutes in the TSA line. Teslas track our eyes to ensure we’re watching the road.[1] Our biometric data is constantly being collected by private entities. Though states like California and Texas are attempting to implement new safeguards for its constituents, Illinois recently rolled back protections under its renowned Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).[2] BIPA  protected consumers from private entities that deceptively or illegally collected biometric data.[3] The new rules overturned the Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Cothron v. White Castle System Inc. that allowed claims to accrue for each violation under BIPA’s provisions.[4] While tech companies and liability insurers are no doubt breathing a sigh of relief at the new reforms, litigants going forward may be left without a remedy if their biometric data is mishandled more than once. Below is a history of BIPA’s passing and impact, followed by the likely ramifications of the new reforms.

BIPA’s Passing Was an Early Victory for Data Privacy Protections

BIPA’s passing in 2008 was one of the earliest consumer protection laws for biometric data collection. At that time, major corporations were piloting finger scanning and facial recognition technology in major cities, including Chicago. The law was designed to not only provide recourse for consumers, but also prescribed preventative measures for companies to follow. BIPA’s protections are broad; companies must publish its data collection and retention policies to the public and cannot retain the information it collects for more than three years.[5] Companies must inform users that they are collecting the data, disclose what is being collected, disclose why it’s being collected, and for how long it intends to store the data.[6] Companies cannot disclose someone’s biometric data without express consent, nor can they profit from the data in any way.[7] Lastly, the data must be stored at least as well as a company stores other confidential data.[8]

Unlike laws in other states, BIPA provided a private right of action to enforce data privacy protections. Following its passage, swaths of lawsuits were filed against major corporations, including Amazon, Southwest Airlines, Google, and Facebook.[9] Under BIPA, companies could be liable for purchasing, improperly collecting, improperly storing, or disseminating biometric data, even if the data was not mishandled.[10] Plaintiffs could recover for every violation under BIPA, and could do so without stating an injury or alleging damages.[11] It is no surprise that BIPA class actions tended to favor plaintiffs, often resulting in large settlements or jury verdicts.[12] Since litigants could collect damages on every violation of BIPA’s provisions, it was difficult for companies to assess their potential liability. Every member of a class action could allege multiple violations, and if found liable, companies would owe, at minimum, $1,000 per violation. The lack of predictability often pushed corporate liability insurance policies into settling rather than risk such large payouts.

The 2023 ruling in Cothron implored the legislature to address concerns of disproportionate corporate liability, stating, “We respectfully suggest that the legislature . . . make clear its intent regarding the assessment of damages under the Act.”[13] The legislature rose to the challenge, fearing the court’s interpretation could bankrupt smaller or mid-size companies.[14] The new provisions to BIPA target the Court’s ruling, providing:

“For purposes of subsection (b) of Section 15, a private entity that, in more than one instance, collects, captures, purchases, receives through trade, or otherwise obtains the same biometric identifier or biometric information from the same person using the same method of collection in violation of subsection (b) of Section 15 has committed a single violation of subsection (b) of Section 15 for which the aggrieved person is entitled to, at most, one recovery under this Section.
(c) For purposes of subsection (d) of Section 15, a private entity that, in more than one instance, discloses, rediscloses, or otherwise disseminates the same biometric identifier or biometric information from the same person to the same recipient using the same method of collection in violation of subsection (d) of Section 15 has committed a single violation of subsection (d) of Section 15 for which the aggrieved person is entitled to, at most, one recovery under this Section regardless of the number of times the private entity disclosed, redisclosed, or otherwise disseminated the same biometric identifier or biometric information of the same person to the same recipient. (eff. 8-2-24.)”

Though not left completely without redress, Illinois constituents may now recover only once if their biometric data is recklessly or deceptively collected or disseminated in the same manner.

BIPA Reforms Mark a Trend Towards Laxing Corporate Responsibility

The rollback of BIPA’s provisions come at a time when consumers need it most. The stakes for mishandling biometric data are much higher than that of other collected data. While social security numbers and credit card numbers can be canceled and changed – with varying degrees of ease – most constituents would be unwilling to change their faces and fingerprints for the sake of _____.[15] Ongoing and future technology developments, such as the rise of AI, heightens potential fallout from BIPA violations.  AI-generated deepfakes are becoming more prevalent, targeting both major celebrities like Taylor Swift and Pokimane, and our family members through phishing schemes.[16] These crimes rely on biometric data, utilizing our voices and faces to create realistic depictions of people, and can even recreate our speech cadence and body movements.[17] For victims, recovering on a per-person basis instead of a per-violation basis means they could be further harmed after recovering against a company with no redress.

Corporations, however, have been calling for reforms for year, and believe that these changes will reduce insurance premiums and docket burdens.[18] Prior to the changes, insurers began removing BIPA coverage from litigation insurance plans and adding strict requirements for defense coverage.[19] Insurers also would encourage companies to settle to avoid judgements on a per-violation basis.[20]

Advocates for BIPA reform believe the new changes will reduce insurance costs while still providing litigants with fair outcomes. Though individual litigants may only recover once, they can still recover for actual damages if a company’s actions resulted in more harm than simply violating BIPA’s provisions.  Awards on a per-person basis can still result in hefty settlements or awards that will hold companies accountable for wrongdoing. Instead of stifling corporate accountability, proponents believe the reforms will result in fairer settlements and reduce litigation costs overall.

Without further guidance from the legislature, how the new provisions are applied will be left for state and federal courts to interpret. Specifically, the legislature left one looming question unanswered; do the restrictions apply retroactively? If litigants can only recover from an entity once, are past litigants barred from participating in future actions regarding similar violations? Or do they get one last shot at holding companies accountable? If they lost in a prior suit, can they join a new one? In trying to relieve the court system, the legislature has ironically given courts the loathsome task of interpreting BIPA’s vague new provisions. Litigants and defendants will likely fight tooth and nail to create favorable case law, which is unlikely to be uniform across jurisdictions.

 

Notes

[1] Model Y Owner’s Manual: Cabin Camera, Tesla, https://www.tesla.com/ownersmanual/modely/en_us/GUID-EDAD116F-3C73-40FA-A861-68112FF7961F.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2024).

[2] See generally, California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2018); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier, Tex. Code Ann. § 503.001 (2017); Abraham Gross, Illinois Biometric Privacy Reform Eases Coverage Woes, LexisNexis Law360 (Aug. 8, 2024, 7:13 PM), https://plus.lexis.com/newsstand/law360-insurance-authority/article/1868014/?crid=debb3ba9-22a1-41d6-920e-c1ce2b7a108d&cbc=0,0,0.

[3] Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5 (2024) [hereinafter BIPA].

[4] Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., 216 N.E.3d 918, 924 (Ill. 2023).

[5] BIPA, supra note 3, at sec. 15a.

[6] Id. at sec. 15b.

[7] Id. at sec. 15c-d.

[8] Id. at sec. 15e.

[9] See generally, In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-03747-JD, 2018 WL 2197546 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018); Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F.Supp.3d 1088 (N.D.Ill., 2017); Miller v. S.W. Airlines Co., No. 18 C 86, 2018 WL 4030590 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018), aff’d, 926 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2019).

[10] BIPA, supra note 3, at sec. 15.

[11] Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019).

[12] See, Lauraann Wood, $9M White Castle Fingerprint BIPA Deal Clears Final Approval, LexisNexis Law360 (Aug. 1, 2024, 2:18 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1864687?from_lnh=true; Lauraann Wood, BNSF’s $75M BIPA Deal With Truckers Nears Final OK, LexisNexis Law360 (June 17, 2024, 8:54 AM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1848754?from_lnh=true.

[13] Cothron, 216 N.E.3d at 929 (Ill. 2023).

[14] Updates to Illinois’ Biometric Privacy Signed Into Law Thanks to Cunningham, Office of Bill Cunningham: State Senator, https://www.senatorbillcunningham.com/news/508-updates-to-illinois-biometric-privacy-signed-into-law-thanks-to-cunningham (Aug. 2, 2024, 3:13PM).

[15] See, BIPA, supra note 3, at sec. 5c.

[16] Dan Merica & Ali Swenson, Trump’s Post of Fake Taylor Swift Endorsement Is His Latest Embrace Of AI-Generated Images, AP News (Aug. 20, 2024, 3:48 PM), https://apnews.com/article/trump-taylor-swift-fake-endorsement-ai-fec99c412d960932839e3eab8d49fd5f; Bianca Britton, They Appeared in Deepfake Porn Videos Without Their Consent. Few Laws Protect Them, NBC News (Feb. 14, 2023, 2:48 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/deepfake-twitch-porn-atrioc-qtcinderella-maya-higa-pokimane-rcna69372; Charles Bethea, The Terrifying A.I. Scam That Uses Your Loved One’s Voice, The New Yorker (Mar. 7, 2024), https://www.newyorker.com/science/annals-of-artificial-intelligence/the-terrifying-ai-scam-that-uses-your-loved-ones-voice.

[17] Catherine Bernaciak & Dominic A. Ross, How Easy is it to Make and Detect a Deepfake?, Carnegie Mellon Univ.: SEI Blog (Mar. 14, 2022), https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/how-easy-is-it-to-make-and-detect-a-deepfake/.

[18] Michael C. Andolina et. al., Emerging Issues and Ambiguities Under Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act, Practitioner Insights Commentaries (May 21, 2020), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ib04759309b7b11eabea3f0dc9fb69570/View/FullText.html?listSource=Foldering&originationContext=clientid&transitionType=MyResearchHistoryItem&contextData=%28oc.Default%29&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.

[19] Gross, supra note 2.

[20] Id.

A Requiem for Fear, Death, and Dying: Law and Medicine’s Perpetually Unfinished Composition

March 31, 2024
Biotechnology, Ethics, Health, Healthcare

Audrey Hutchinson, MJLST Staffer

In the 18th and 19th century, the coffins of newly deceased lay six feet below, but were often outfitted with a novel accessory emerging from the freshly turned earth: a bell hung from an inconspicuous stake, its clapper adorned with a rope that disappeared beneath the dirt.[1] Rather than this display serving as a bygone tradition of the mourning process—some symbolic way to emulate connection with the departed—the bell served a more practical purpose: it was an emergency safeguard against premature burial.[2] The design, and all its variously patented 18th and 19th century designs, draws upon a foundational—and by some biopsychological theories, a biologically imperative—quality: fear of death.[3]

In the mid-1700’s, the French author Jacques Benigne Winslow published a book ominously titled The Uncertainty of the Signs of Death and the Danger of Precipitate Interments and Dissections, marking a decisive and public moment in medical history where death was introduced as something nebulous rather than definite to a highly unsettled public.[4] For centuries, medical tests and parameters had existed by which doctors could “affirmatively” conclude a patient had, indeed, passed.[5] While the Victorian newspapers were riddled with adverts for “safety coffins” in a macabre, but unsurprising expression of capitalism in the wake of mounting cholera deaths and the accompanying rate of premature burial reports, efforts to evade the liminal space of “dying” and the finality of “death” can be seen as far back as ancient Hebrew scriptures, wherein resuscitation attempts via chest compressions are described.[6] Perhaps this is unsurprising: psychologist and experimental theorist Robert C. Bolles conceptualized that fear is “a hypothetical cause [motivation] of behavior” and that its main purpose is to keep organisms alive.[7] Perhaps there has always been a subconscious doubt or suspicion about the finality of death, or perhaps it was human desperation and delusion arising from loss that has left behind an ancient record of fear and subsequent acts of defiance in the face of death still germane today.

Contemporarily we see the fruits of this fear of dying, death, or being somewhere in between in the form of advances in medical technology and legal guidelines. Though death is still commonly understood to be a discrete status—a state one enters but cannot exit—medical and legal definitions have, over time, evolved approaching death more gingerly—the former understanding death as a nuanced scale, the latter drawing hard lines on that scale.[8] Today, 43 states have enacted the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Determination of Death Act (“UDDA”).[9] The UDDA requires two distinct standards be met for someone to effectively, and legally, be deemed dead:  1) the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, and 2) the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem.[10] The UDDA’s legal determination of death, in its bright line language, relies in large part on  “generally accepted medical standards” of the medical practice and practitioner discretion. While the loss of respiratory, circulatory, and total brain death of the entire brain are the common parameters of determining death medically, the UDDA is distinctly “silent on acceptable diagnostic tests [and] procedures.” It is argued that the language is purposeful in creating statutory flexibility in an era of constant scientific and medical research, understanding, and innovation.

As it relates to brain death, the medical approach to determining is a scale that contemplates brain injury/activity and somatic survival, a “continuous biological spectrum”[11] that naturally contemplates not only a patient’s current status, but the possibility and likelihood of both degenerative and improved changes in status. But, as a matter of policy and regulation, the UDDA drew a bright line between the two and called it brain-death. Someone in a permanent vegetative state is not considered braindead, but someone with a necrotic “liquified” brain is. As a result, the medical determination of death is arguably subservient to the legal determination, designating a point of no return–not because the medical professionals see no alternate path, but the law has provided a blindfold required from that point forward.

While this may be an efficient way to ensure people are not denied advanced and improved medical practices, it also means that there is ambiguity and variance from state to state as to the nature of governing factual guidelines and standards. There are practical and policy reasons for this, including maximizing efficacy and reach of organ donation systems and generally preventing strain on healthcare resources and systems; nonetheless, the brightline fails to be so bright. While the Commission could have situated the UDDA such that the determination of legal brain death and medical brain death worked in tandem, being triggered at some distinct moment by certain explicit conditions or after certain standardized medical tests, it did not.

Is that because it will not, or because it simply cannot do so? Today, the standards become increasingly muddied by advancements in technology to prolong life that have, in turn, paradoxically, also prolonged the process of dying—expanding the scope of that liminal space. Artificial means of keeping someone alive where they otherwise could not stay so imperatively creates a discrete state of the act of dying. New legal and medical methods of describing these states have become imperative with lively debate ongoing concerning bridging the medical-legal gap concerning death determination[12]—specifically, the distinction between the “permanent” (will not reverse) and “irreversible” (cannot reverse) cessation of cardiac, respiratory, and neurological function relative to the meaning of a determination of death.[13] James Bernat, a neurologist and academic who examines the convergence of ethics, philosophy, and neurology, is a contemporary advocate calling for reconciliation between medical practice with the law.[14] Dr. Bernat suggests the UDDA’s irreversibility standard—a function that has stopped and cannot be restarted—be replaced with a permanence standard—a function that has stopped, will not restart on its own, and no intervention will be undertaken to restart it.[15] This distinction, in large part, is attempting to address the incongruence of the UDDA’s language that, by the ULC’s own concession, “sets the general legal standard for determining death, but not the medical criteria for doing so.”[16] In effect, in trying to define and characterize death and dying, we have created a dynamic wherein one could be medically dead, but not legally.[17]

Upon his death bed, composer Frédéric Chopin uttered his last words: “The earth is suffocating …. Swear to make them cut me open, so that I won’t be buried alive.”[18] A century and a half later, yet only time will tell if law and medicine can find a way to reconcile the increasingly ambiguous nature of dying and define death explicitly and discretely—no bells required.

Notes

[1] Steven B. Harris, M.D. The Society for the Recovery of Persons Apparently Dead. Cryonics (Sept. 1990) https://www.cryonicsarchive.org/library/persons-apparently-dead/.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.; Shannon E. Grogans et. al., The nature and neurobiology of fear and anxiety: State of the science and opportunities for accelerating discovery, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Volume 151, 2023, 105237, ISSN 0149-7634, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105237.

[4] Harris, supra note 1.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Grogans et. al., supra note 3.

[8] Robert D. Truog, Lessons from the Case of Jahi McMath. The Hastings Center report vol. 48, Suppl. 4 (2018): S70-S73. doi:10.1002/hast.961.

[9] Unif. Determination of death act § 1 (Nat’l Conf. of Comm’n on Unif. L Comm’n. 1981).

[10] Id.

[11] Truog supra at S72.

[12] James L. Bernat, “Conceptual Issues in DCDD Donor Death Determination.” The Hastings Center report vol. 48 Suppl 4 (2018): S26-S28. doi:10.1002/hast.948.

[13] James Bernat, (2010). How the Distinction between ‘Irreversible’ and ‘Permanent’ Illuminates Circulatory-Respiratory Death Determination. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 35. 242-55. 10.1093/jmp/jhq018.

[14] Faculty Database: James L. Bernat, M.D. Dartmouth Geisel School of Medicine https://geiselmed.dartmouth.edu/faculty/facultydb/view.php/?uid=353 (last accessed Oct. 23, 2023).

[15] JD and Angela Turi, Death’s Troubled Relationship With the Law Brendan Parent, AMA J Ethics. 2020;22(12):E1055-1061. doi: 10.1001/amajethics.2020.1055; See also, Bernat JL. Point: are donors after circulatory death really dead, and does it matter? Yes and yes. Chest. 2010;138(1):13-16.

[16] Thaddeus Pope, Brain Death and the Law: Hard Cases and Legal Challenges. The Hastings Center report vol. 48 Suppl. 4 (2018): S46-S48. doi:10.1002/hast.954.

[17] Id.

[18] Death: The Last Taboo – Safety Coffins, Australian Museum (Oct. 20, 2020) https://australian.museum/about/history/exhibitions/death-the-last-taboo/safety-coffins/ (last accessed Oct. 23, 2023).

The Double-Helix Dilemma: Navigating Privacy Pitfalls in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing

November 7, 2023
Administrative Law, Biotechnology, Data Privacy, Ethics, Food and Drug Law, Health, Healthcare, Privacy, Regulatory

Ethan Wold, MJLST Staffer

Introduction

On October 22, direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTC-GT) company 23andME sent emails to a number of its customers informing them of a data breach into the company’s “DNA Relatives” feature that allows customers to compare ancestry information with other users worldwide.[1] While 23andMe and other similar DTC-GT companies offer a number of positive benefits to consumers, such as testing for health predispositions and carrier statuses of certain genes, this latest data breach is a reminder that before choosing to opt into these sorts of services one should be aware of the potential risks that they present.

Background

DTC-GT companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com have proliferated and blossomed in recent years. It is estimated over 100 million people have utilized some form of direct-to-consumer genetic testing.[2] Using biospecimens submitted by consumers, these companies sequence and analyze an individual’s genetic information to provide a range of services pertaining to one’s health and ancestry.[3] The October 22 data breach specifically pertained to 23andMe’s “DNA Relatives” feature.[4] The DNA Relatives feature can identify relatives on any branch of one’s family tree by taking advantage of the autosomal chromosomes, the 22 chromosomes that are passed down from your ancestors on both sides of your family, and one’s X chromosome(s).[5] Relatives are identified by comparing the customer’s submitted DNA with the DNA of other 23andMe members who are participating in the DNA Relatives feature.[6] When two people are found to have an identical DNA segment, it is likely they share a recent common ancestor.[7] The DNA Relatives feature even uses the length and number of these identical segments to attempt to predict the relationship between genetic relatives.[8] Given the sensitive nature of sharing genetic information, there are often privacy concerns regarding practices such as the DNA Relatives feature. Yet despite this, the legislation and regulations surrounding DTC-GT is somewhat limited.

Legislation

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides the baseline privacy and data security rules for the healthcare industry.[9] HIPAA’s Privacy Rule regulates the use and disclosure of a person’s “protected health information” by a “covered entity.[10] Under the Act, the type of genetic information collected by 23andMe and other DTC-GT companies does constitute “protected health information.”[11] However, because HIPAA defines a “covered entity” as a health plan, healthcare clearinghouse, or health-care provider, DTC-GT companies do not constitute covered entities and therefore are not under the umbrella of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule.[12]

Thus, the primary source of regulation for DTC-GT companies appears to be the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). GINA was enacted in 2008 for the purpose of protecting the public from genetic discrimination and alleviating concerns about such discrimination and thereby encouraging individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.[13] GINA defines genetic information as information from genetic tests of an individual or family members and includes information from genetic services or genetic research.[14] Therefore, DTC-GT companies fall under GINA’s jurisdiction. However, GINA only applies to the employment and health insurance industries and thus neglects many other potential arenas where privacy concerns may present.[15] This is especially relevant for 23andMe customers, as signing up for the service serves as consent for the company to use and share your genetic information with their associated third-party providers.[16] As a case in point, in 2018 the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline purchased a $300 million stake in 23andMe for the purpose of gaining access to the company’s trove of genetic information for use in their drug development trials.[17]

Executive Regulation

In addition to the legislation above, three different federal administrative agencies primarily regulate the DTC-GT industry: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid services (CMS), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FDA has jurisdiction over DTC-GT companies due to the genetic tests they use being labeled as “medical devices”[18] and in 2013 exercised this authority over 23andMe by sending a letter to the company resulting in the suspending of one of its health-related genetic tests.[19] However, the FDA only has jurisdiction over diagnostic tests and therefore does not regulate any of the DTC-GT services related to genealogy such as 23andMe’s DNA Relatives feature.[20] Moreover, the FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate the other aspects of DTC-GT companies’ activities or data practices.[21] CMS has the ability to regulate DTC-GT companies through enforcement of the Clinical Laboratory Improvements Act (CLIA), which requires that genetic testing laboratories ensure the accuracy, precision, and analytical validity of their tests.[22] But, like the FDA, CMS only has jurisdiction over tests that diagnose a disease or assess health.[23]

Lastly, the FTC has broad authority to regulate unfair or deceptive business practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and has levied this authority against DTC-GT companies in the past. For example, in 2014 the agency brought an action against two DTC-GT companies who were using genetic tests to match consumers to their nutritional supplements and skincare products.[24] The FTC alleged that the companies’ practices related to data security were unfair and deceptive because they failed to implement reasonable policies and procedures to protect consumers’ personal information and created unnecessary risks to the personal information of nearly 30,000 consumers.[25] This resulted in the companies entering into an agreement with the FTC whereby they agreed to establish and maintain comprehensive data security programs and submit to yearly security audits by independent auditors.[26]

Potential Harms

As the above passages illustrate, the federal government appears to recognize and has at least attempted to mitigate privacy concerns associated with DTC-GT. Additionally, a number of states have passed their own laws that limit DTC-GT in certain aspects.[27] Nevertheless, given the potential magnitude and severity of harm associated with DTC-GT it makes one question if it is enough. Data breaches involving health-related data are growing in frequency and now account for 40% of all reported data breaches.[28] These data breaches result in unauthorized access to DTC-GT consumer-submitted data and can result in a violation of an individual’s genetic privacy. Though GINA aims to prevent it, genetic discrimination in the form of increasing health insurance premiums or denial of coverage by insurance companies due to genetic predispositions remains one of the leading concerns associated with these violations. What’s more, by obtaining genetic information from DTC-GT databases, it is possible for someone to recover a consumer’s surname and combine that with other metadata such as age and state to identify the specific consumer.[29] This may in turn lead to identity theft in the form of opening accounts, taking out loans, or making purchases in your name, potentially damaging your financial well-being and credit score. Dealing with the aftermath of a genetic data breach can also be expensive. You may incur legal fees, credit monitoring costs, or other financial burdens in an attempt to mitigate the damage.

Conclusion

As it sits now, genetic information submitted to DTC-GT companies already contains a significant volume of consequential information. As technology continues to develop and research presses forward, the volume and utility of this information will only grow over time. Thus, it is crucially important to be aware of risks associated with DTC-GT services.

This discussion is not intended to discourage individuals from participating in DTC-GT. These companies and the services they offer provide a host of benefits, such as allowing consumers to access genetic testing without the healthcare system acting as a gatekeeper, thus providing more autonomy and often at a lower price.[30] Furthermore, the information provided can empower consumers to mitigate the risks of certain diseases, allow for more informed family planning, or gain a better understanding of their heritage.[31] DTC-GT has revolutionized the way individuals access and understand their genetic information. However, this accessibility and convenience comes with a host of advantages and disadvantages that must be carefully considered.

Notes

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/23andme-notifies-customers-data-breach-into-its-dna-relatives-feature-2023-10-24/#:~:text=%22There%20was%20unauthorized%20access%20to,exposed%20to%20the%20threat%20actor.%22

[2] https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/patient-support-advocacy/protect-sensitive-individual-data-risk-dtc-genetic-tests#:~:text=Use%20of%20direct%2Dto%2Dconsumer,November%202021%20AMA%20Special%20Meeting

[3] https://go-gale-com.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/23andme-notifies-customers-data-breach-into-its-dna-relatives-feature-2023-10-24/#:~:text=%22There%20was%20unauthorized%20access%20to,exposed%20to%20the%20threat%20actor.%22

[5] https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/115004659068-DNA-Relatives-The-Genetic-Relative-Basics

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] https://go-gale-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[10] https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/combined/hipaa-simplification-201303.pdf

[11] Id.

[12] Id; https://go-gale-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[13] https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act-2008

[14] Id.

[15] https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC3035561&blobtype=pdf

[16] https://go-gale-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[17] https://news.yahoo.com/news/major-drug-company-now-access-194758309.html

[18] https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:21%20section:321%20edition:prelim)

[19] https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/33135586.pdf

[20] https://go-gale-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[21] Id.

[22] https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/493.1253

[23] https://go-gale-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[24] https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140512genelinkcmpt.pdf

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] https://go-gale-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[28] Id.

[29] https://go-gale-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=umn_wilson&id=GALE%7CA609260695&v=2.1&it=r&sid=primo&aty=ip

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

Whistleblowers Reveals…—How Can the Legal System Protect and Encourage Whistleblowing?

April 27, 2023
Administrative Law, Business Law, Ethics, Regulatory, Securities Law

Vivian Lin, MJLST Staffer

In July 2022, Twitter’s former head of security, Peiter Zatko, filed a 200+ page complaint with Congress and several federal agencies, disclosing Twitter’s potential major security problems that pose a threat to its users and national security.[1] Though it is still unclear whether  these allegations were confirmed, the disclosure drew significant attention because of data privacy implications and calls for whistleblower protection. Whistleblowers play an important role in detecting major issues in corporations and the government. A 2007 survey reported that in private companies, professional auditors were only able to detect 19% of instances of fraud but whistleblowers were able to expose 43% of incidents.[2]In fact, this recent Twitter scandal, along with Facebook’s online safety scandal in 2021[3] and the famous national security scandal disclosed by Edward Snowden, were all revealed by inside whistleblowers. Without these disclosures, the public may never learn of incidents that involve their personal information and security.

An Overview of the U.S. Whistleblower Protection Regulations

Whistleblower laws aim to protect individuals who report illegal or unethical activities in their workplace or government agency. The primary federal law protecting whistleblowers is the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), passed in 1989. The WPA provides protections for federal employees who report violations such as  gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or dangers to public health or safety.[4]

In addition to the WPA, there are other federal laws that provide industry specific whistleblower protections in private sectors. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in response to the corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s. It requires public companies to establish and maintain internal controls to ensure the accuracy of their financial statements. Whistleblowers who report violations of securities law can receive protection against retaliation, including reinstatement, back pay, and special damages. To further encourage more whistleblowers to come forward with potential securities violations, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank           Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in 2010 which provides incentives and additional protections for whistleblowers. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) established its whistleblower protection program under Dodd-Frank to award qualified whistleblowers for their tips that lead to a successful SEC sanction. Finally, the False Claims Act (FCA) allows individuals to file lawsuits on behalf of the government against entities that have committed fraud against the government. Whistleblowers who report fraud under the FCA can receive a percentage of the amount recovered by the government. In general, these laws give protections for whistleblowers in the private corporate setting, providing anti-retaliation protection and incentives for reporting violations.

Concerns Involved in Whistleblowing and Related Laws

While whistleblower laws in the United States provide important protections for individuals who speak out against illegal or unethical activities, there are still risks associated with whistleblowing. Even with the anti-retaliation provisions, whistleblowers still face retaliation from their employer, such as demotion or termination, and may face difficulties finding new employment in their field. For example, a 2011 report indicated that while the percentage of employees who noticed wrongdoings at their workplaces decreased from the 1992 survey, about one-third of those who called out wrongdoings and were identified as whistleblowers experienced retaliation in the form of threats and/or reprisals.[5]

Besides the fear of retaliation, another concern is the low success rate under the WPA when whistleblowers step up to make a claim. A 2015 research analyzed 151 cases where employees sought protection under the WPA and found that 79% of the cases were found in favor of the federal government.[6] Such a low success rate, in addition to potential retaliation, likely discourages employees from disclosing when they identify wrongdoings at their workplace.

A third problem with the current whistleblowing law is that financial incentives do not work as effectively as expected and might negatively impact corporate governance. From the incentives perspective, bounty hunting might actually discourage whistleblowers when not used well. For example, Dodd-Frank provides monetary rewards for people who report financial fraud that will allow the SEC impose a more than $1 million sanction on the violator, but if an employee discovers a wrongdoing that will not lead to a sanction over $1 million, a study shows that the employee will be less likely to report it timely.[7] From a corporate governance perspective, a potential whistleblower might turn to a regulatory agency for the reward rather than reporting it to the company’s internal compliance program, providing the company with the opportunity to do the right thing.[8]

Potential Changes 

There are several ways in which the current whistleblower regulations can improve. First, to encourage employees to stand up and identify wrongdoings at the workplace, the SEC’s whistleblower protection program should exclude the $1 million threshold requirement for any potential reward. Those who notice illegal behaviors that might not result in a $1 million sanction should also receive a reward if they report the potential risks.[9] Second, to deter retaliation, compensation for retaliation should be proportionate to the severity of the wrongdoing uncovered.[10] Currently, statutes mostly offer backpay, front pay, reinstatement, etc. as compensation for retaliation, while receiving punitive damages beyond that is rare. This mechanism does not recognize the public interest in retaliation cases—the public benefits from the whistleblower’s act while she risks retaliation. Finally, bounty programs might not be the right approach given that many whistleblowers are motivated more by their own moral calling rather than money. Perhaps a robust system ensuring whistleblower’s reports be thoroughly investigated and building stronger protections  from retaliation would work better than bounty programs.

In conclusion, whistleblowers play a crucial role in exposing illegal and unethical activities within organizations and government agencies. While current U.S. whistleblower protection regulations offer some safeguards, there are still shortcomings that may discourage employees from reporting wrongdoings. Improving whistleblower protections against retaliation, expanding rewards to include a wider range of disclosures, and refining the approach to investigations are essential steps to strengthen the system. By ensuring that their disclosures are thoroughly investigated and their lives are not severely impacted, we can encourage more whistleblowers to come forward with useful information which will better protect the public interest and maintain a higher standard of transparency, accountability, and corporate governance in the society.

Notes

[1] Donie O’Sullivan et al., Ex-Twitter Exec Blows The Whistle, Alleging Reckless and Negligent Cybersecurity Policies, CNN (Aug. 24, 2022, 5:59 AM EDT), https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/23/tech/twitter-whistleblower-peiter-zatko-security/index.html.

[2] Kai-D. Bussmann, Economic Crime: People, Culture, and Controls 10 (2007).

[3] Ryan Mac & Cecilia Kang, Whistle-Blower Says Facebook ‘Chooses Profits Over Safety’, N.Y. Times (Oct. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/technology/whistle-blower-facebook-frances-haugen.html.

[4] Whistleblower Protection, Office of Inspector General, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/whistleblower-protection#:~:text=The%20Whistleblower%20Protection%20Act%20 (last accessed: Mar. 5, 2023).

[5] U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Blowing the Whistle: Barriers to Federal Employees Making Disclosures 27 (2011).

[6] Shelley L. Peffer et al., Whistle Where You Work? The Ineffectiveness of the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the Promise of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 35 Review of Public Personnel Administration 70 (2015).

[7] Leslie Berger, et al., Hijacking the Moral Imperative: How Financial Incentives Can Discourage Whistleblower Reporting. 36 AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 1 (2017).

[8] Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd- Frank Act “Bounty Hunting”, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 483.

[9] Geoffrey C. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 73.

[10] David Kwok, The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation, 96 Hastings L.J. 1225.

The Apathetic Divide: Surrogacy and the Anglo-American Courtroom

February 20, 2023
Ethics, EU Law, Health, Healthcare, Reproductive Health

Kelso Horne, MJLST Staffer

The State of New York defines Gestational Surrogacy as “a process where one person, who did not provide the egg used in conception, carries a fetus through pregnancy and gives birth to a baby for another person or couple.” The process of surrogacy can be fraught with legal, technical, and moral issues, particularly when the surrogacy is paid for via contract with the surrogate, also called Compensated Gestational Surrogacy (CGS). Until 2020, this kind of contractual paid surrogacy was illegal in the state of New York. That year, it was legalized, and the regulatory regime normalized by the Child-Parent Security Act.  In contrast, the state of Louisiana has one of the harshest gestational surrogacy regimes in the world, outright banning CGS, and requiring both sets of gametes to come from a couple married residing in the state of Louisiana. But these competing regulatory regimes are not replicated across the nation. To the contrary, most states have not passed any laws legalizing or banning CGS or other fertility practices, like the sale of gametes. With sparse case law and frequent legal limbo, the question of “is CGS legal for me?” can be a difficult question for many Americans.

Across the Atlantic, the question used to be an easy one to answer. In 1985 the UK Parliament Enacted the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, which made it an offense to “initiate or take part in any negotiations with the view of making a surrogacy arrangement”, along with some related activities, like compiling information to assist in the creation of surrogacy arrangements. Critically, however, the Act did not criminalize the act of looking to hire a surrogate, or looking to become one, only being a middleman, or publishing advertisements on behalf of those looking to obtain the services of a surrogate. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 defined the mother of a child under UK law as “[t]he woman who is carrying or has carried a child… and no other woman”. In 2001, the Lords Appeal in Ordinary, which acted as the UK’s highest court until 2009, heard the appeal in Briody v. St Helens and Knowsley Area Health Authority. The question before the Lords was one of damages. A woman, rendered infertile as a result of medical negligence, sought £78,267 in order to obtain the services of a surrogate in California, which had legalized CGS in 1993 in the landmark case Johnson v. Calvert. The Lady Justice Hale, speaking for the court, foreclosed the use of CGS in California or elsewhere, as the proposal was “contrary to the public policy of the country”. While she did not entirely dismiss the idea of providing damages to pay for surrogacy procedures, she said it would be permitted only in the case of a voluntary, unpaid surrogate.

Few appellate court judges get to issue an opinion on the same facts twice in their career. In 2020, in one of her final cases prior to retiring, the Lady Justice Hale, now sitting on the UK Supreme Court, which by then had replaced the Lords Appeal in Ordinary, did just that.  In Whittington Hospital NHS Trust (Appellant) v XX, the court determined that a woman who had been rendered infertile as a result of medical negligence could claim damages, including the costs to pay a United States based surrogate to carry her children. CGS, while still entirely illegal in the UK, could now nevertheless provide the basis for damages in a UK court. The Court did note some factual differences between Whittington Hospital and Briody, notably, that the likelihood that a surrogacy arrangement would result in a child was higher in the former. However, the court’s main argument for its opposite ruling was a change in cultural attitude to surrogacy and its role in society, stating “[t]he use of assisted reproduction techniques is now widespread and socially acceptable.”

While admitting that surrogacy was now widely accepted in UK society, the dissent, authored by The Lord Justice Carnwath, nevertheless disagreed with the Court. It argued that the criminal law of the UK remained clearly averse to commercial surrogacy, and that by awarding damages for CGS in California the court misaligned the UK’s civil and criminal law. Thus, the CGS regimes of the UK and the U.S. are now bound together. UK citizens may seek surrogacy arrangements and have them compensated by the UK government through the UK’s National Health Service, but they must use an American “womb”. A financial arrangement which the UK itself deems too unethical to allow inside its own borders is nevertheless legalized and compensated when occurring in other countries. The deeply strange situation is mirrored in the opaque CGS law in the United States itself.

A quick glance at any 50-state review of laws, compiled either by supporters or opponents to commercial surrogacy, paint a similar picture. They show strange ad hoc mixes of case law which often cover ancillary issues or are at least 30 years old. Some scholars have started to publicly discuss the possible ethical pitfalls of “procreative tourism”, but without clear legal rules governing what arrangements are and are not allowed, it becomes difficult to discuss possible solutions. The dangers of this shadow regime were thrown into stark relief by the war in Ukraine, which prior to the Russian invasion was a major source of surrogate mothers. Mothers were paid on average $15,000 per child, which is considerable in a country where, prior to the invasion, the GDP per capita was less than $5,000. The United States needs to determine if it wishes to become a “destination” country for procreative tourism, as the result in Whittington would seem to suggest it is, and whether it wishes to allow its own citizens the opportunity to travel abroad to engage in CGS.

This blog has touched on only a small fraction of the issues which are faced when determining the ideal regulatory regime for surrogacy. However, a lack of discussion, and a failure to acknowledge possible risks leaves us ignorant of what the problems may be, let alone the route to potential solutions. States have largely failed to address the issue since the first CGS baby was born in their borders, usually in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. It’s time for a serious examination of CGS regulation as it exists, as well as a meaningful discussion about safeguarding the health and wellbeing of those involved in such a transaction. The UK has now done the same, passing the buck without a serious response to the issues surrounding CGS. Regardless of one’s opinion on the results of the Louisiana and New York regulations, potential participants in a surrogacy arraignment in those two states know the boundaries. That should be the case nationwide.

Emptying the Nest: Recent Events at Twitter Prompt Class-Action Litigation, Among Other Things

November 19, 2022
Business Law, Employment Law, Ethics, Internet, Litigation, Social Media

Ted Mathiowetz, MJLST Staffer

You’d be forgiven if you thought the circumstances that led to Elon Musk ultimately acquiring Twitter would be the end of the drama for the social media company. In the past seven months, Musk went from becoming the largest shareholder of the company, to publicly feuding with then-CEO, Parag Agrawal, to making an offer to take the company private for $44 billion, to deciding he didn’t want to purchase the company, to being sued by Twitter to force him to complete the deal. Eventually, two weeks before trial was scheduled, Musk purchased the company for the original, agreed upon price.[1] However, within the first two-and-a-half weeks that Musk took Twitter private, the drama has continued, if not ramped-up, with one lawsuit already filed and the specter of additional litigation looming.[2]

There’s been the highly controversial rollout and almost immediate suspension of Twitter Blue—Musk’s idea of increasing the reliability of information on Twitter and simultaneously helping ameliorate Twitter’s financial woes.[3]Essentially, users were able to pay $8 a month for verification, albeit without actually verifying their identity. Instead, their username would remain frozen at the time they paid for the service.[4] Users quickly created fake “verified” accounts for real companies and spread misinformation while armed with the “verified” check mark, duping both the public and investors. For example, a newly created account with the handle “@EliLillyandCo” paid for Twitter Blue and tweeted “We are excited to announce insulin is free now.”[5] Eli Lilly’s actual Twitter account, “@LillyPad” had to tweet a message apologizing to those “who have been served a misleading message” from the fake account, after the pharmaceutical company’s shares dipped around 5% after the tweet.[6] In addition to Eli Lilly, several other companies, like Lockheed Martin, faced similar identity theft.[7] Twitter Blue was quickly suspended in the wake of these viral impersonations and advertisers have continued to flee the company, affecting its revenue.[8]

Musk also pulled over 50 engineers from Tesla, the vehicle manufacturing company of which he is CEO, to help him in his reimagining of Twitter.[9] Among those 50 engineers are the director of software development and the senior director of software engineering.[10] Pulling engineers from his publicly traded company to work on his separately owned private company almost assuredly raises questions of a violation of his fiduciary duty to Tesla’s shareholders, especially with Tesla’s share price falling 13% over the last week (as of November 9, 2022).[11]

The bulk of Twitter’s current legal issues reside in Musk’s decision to engage in mass-layoffs of employees at Twitter.[12] After his first week in charge, he sent out notices to around half of Twitter’s 7500 employees that they would be laid off, reasoning that cutbacks were necessary because Twitter was losing over $4 million per day.[13] Soon after the layoffs, a group of employees filed suit alleging that Twitter violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act (WARN) by failing to give adequate notice.[14]

The WARN Act, passed in 1988, applies to employers with 100 or more employees[15] and mandates that an “employer shall not order a [mass layoff]” until it gives sixty-days’ notice to the state and affected employees.[16]Compliance can also be reached if, in lieu of giving notice, the employee is paid for the sixty-day notice period. In Twitter’s case, some employees were offered pay to comply with the sixty-day period after the initial lawsuit was filed,[17] though the lead plaintiff in the class action suit was allegedly laid off on November 1st with no notice or offer of severance pay.[18] Additionally, it appears as though Twitter is now offering severance to employees in return for a signature releasing them from liability in a WARN action.[19]

With regard to those who have not yet signed releases and were not given notice of a layoff, there is a question of what the penalties may be to Twitter and what potential defenses they may have. Each employee is entitled to “back pay for each day of violation” as well as benefits under their respective plan.[20] Furthermore, the employer is subject to a civil penalty of “not more than $500 for each day of violation” unless they pay their liability to each employee within three weeks of the layoff.[21] One possible defense that Twitter may assert in response to this suit is that of “unforeseeable business circumstances.”[22] Considering Musk’s recent comments that there is the potential that Twitter is headed for bankruptcy as well as the saddling of the company with debt to purchase it (reportedly $13 billion, with $1 billion per year in interest payments),[23] it seems there is a chance this defense could suffice. However, an unforeseen circumstance is strongly indicated when the circumstance is “outside the employer’s” control[24], something that’s arguable given the company’s recent conduct.[25] Additionally, Twitter would have to show that it has been exercising “commercially reasonable business judgment as would a similarly situated employer” in their conduct, another burden that may be hard to overcome. In sum, it’s quite clear why Twitter is trying to keep this lawsuit from gaining traction by securing release waivers. It’s also clear that Twitter has learned its lesson in not offering severance but they may be wading into other areas of employment law with recent conduct.[26]

Notes

[1] Timeline of Billionaire Elon Musk’s to Control Twitter, Associated Press (Oct. 28, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/twitter-elon-musk-timeline-c6b09620ee0905e59df9325ed042a609.

[2] Annie Palmer, Twitter Sued by Employees After Mass Layoffs Begin, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/04/twitter-sued-by-employees-after-mass-layoffs-begin.html.

[3] Siladitya Ray, Twitter Blue: Signups for Paid Verification Appear Suspended After Impersonator Chaos, Forbes (Nov. 11, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2022/11/11/twitter-blue-new-signups-for-paid-verification-appear-suspended-after-impersonator-chaos/?sh=14faf76c385c; see also Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2022, 5:43 PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1589403131770974208?s=20&t=bkkh_m5EgMreMCU-GWxXrQ.

[4] Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2022, 5:35 PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1589401231545741312?s=20&t=bkkh_m5EgMreMCU-GWxXrQ.

[5] Steve Mollman, No, Insulin is not Free: Eli Lilly is the Latest High-Profile Casualty of Elon Musk’s Twitter Verification Mess, Fortune(Nov. 11, 2022), https://fortune.com/2022/11/11/no-free-insulin-eli-lilly-casualty-of-elon-musk-twitter-blue-verification-mess/.

[6] Id. Eli Lilly and Company (@LillyPad), Twitter (Nov. 10, 2022, 3:09 PM), https://twitter.com/LillyPad/status/1590813806275469333?s=20&t=4XvAAidJmNLYwSCcWtd4VQ.

[7] Mollman, supra note 5 (showing Lockheed Martin’s stock dipped around 5% as well following a tweet from a “verified” account saying arms sales were being suspended to various countries went viral).

[8] Herb Scribner, Twitter Suffers “Massive Drop in Revenue,” Musk Says, Axios (Nov. 4, 2022), https://www.axios.com/2022/11/04/elon-musk-twitter-revenue-drop-advertisers.

[9] Lora Kolodny, Elon Musk has Pulled More Than 50 Tesla Employees into his Twitter Takeover, CNBC (Oct. 31, 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/31/elon-musk-has-pulled-more-than-50-tesla-engineers-into-twitter.html.

[10] Id.

[11] Trefis Team, Tesla Stock Falls Post Elon Musk’s Twitter Purchase. What’s Next?, NASDAQ (Nov. 9, 2022), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/tesla-stock-falls-post-elon-musks-twitter-purchase.-whats-next.

[12] Dominic Rushe, et al., Twitter Slashes Nearly Half its Workforce as Musk Admits ‘Massive Drop’ in Revenue, The Guardian (Nov. 4, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/04/twitter-layoffs-elon-musk-revenue-drop.

[13] Id.

[14] Phil Helsel, Twitter Sued Over Short-Notice Layoffs as Elon Musk’s Takeover Rocks Company, NBC News (Nov. 4, 2022), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/twitter-sued-layoffs-days-elon-musk-purchase-rcna55619.

[15] 29 USC § 2101(a)(1).

[16] 29 USC § 2102(a).

[17] On Point, Boston Labor Lawyer Discusses her Class Action Lawsuit Against Twitter, WBUR Radio Boston (Nov. 10, 2022), https://www.wbur.org/radioboston/2022/11/10/shannon-liss-riordan-musk-class-action-twitter-suit (discussing recent developments in the case with attorney Shannon Liss-Riordan).

[18] Complaint at 5, Cornet et al. v. Twitter, Inc., Docket No. 3:22-cv-06857 (N.D. Cal. 2022).

[19] Id. at 6 (outlining previous attempts by another Musk company, Tesla, to get around WARN Act violations by tying severance agreements to waiver of litigation rights); see also On Point, supra note 17.

[20] 29 USC § 2104.

[21] Id.

[22] 20 CFR § 639.9 (2012).

[23] Hannah Murphy, Musk Warns Twitter Bankruptcy is Possible as Executives Exit, Financial Times (Nov. 10, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/85eaf14b-7892-4d42-80a9-099c0925def0.

[24] Id.

[25] See e.g., Murphy supra note 22.

[26] See Pete Syme, Elon Musk Sent a Midnight Email Telling Twitter Staff to Commit to an ‘Extremely Hardcore’ Work Schedule – or Get Laid off with Three Months’ Severance, Business Insider (Nov. 16, 2022), https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-twitter-staff-commit-extremely-hardcore-work-laid-off-2022-11; see also Jaclyn Diaz, Fired by Tweet: Elon Musk’s Latest Actions are Jeopardizing Twitter, Experts Say. NPR (Nov. 17, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/11/17/1137265843/elon-musk-fires-employee-by-tweet (discussing firing of an employee for correcting Musk on Twitter and potential liability for a retaliation claim under California law).

 

Twitter Troubles: The Upheaval of a Platform and Lessons for Social Media Governance

November 17, 2022
Administrative Law, Business Law, Ethics, Internet, Regulatory, Social Media, Telecommunication

Gordon Unzen, MJLST Staffer

Elon Musk’s Tumultuous Start

On October 27, 2022, Elon Musk officially completed his $44 billion deal to purchase the social media platform, Twitter.[1] When Musk’s bid to buy Twitter was initially accepted in April 2022, proponents spoke of a grand ideological vision for the platform under Musk. Musk himself emphasized the importance of free speech to democracy and called Twitter “the digital town square where matters vital to the future of humanity are debated.”[2] Twitter co-founder Jack Dorsey called Twitter the “closest thing we have to a global consciousness,” and expressed his support of Musk: “I trust his mission to extend the light of consciousness.”[3]

Yet only two weeks into Musk’s rule, the tone has quickly shifted towards doom, with advertisers fleeing the platform, talk of bankruptcy, and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) expressing “deep concern.” What happened?

Free Speech or a Free for All?

Critics were quick to read Musk’s pre-purchase remarks about improving ‘free speech’ on Twitter to mean he would change how the platform would regulate hate speech and misinformation.[4] This fear was corroborated by the stream of racist slurs and memes from anonymous trolls ‘celebrating’ Musk’s purchase of Twitter.[5] However, Musk’s first major change to the platform came in the form of a new verification service called ‘Twitter Blue.’

Musk took control of Twitter during a substantial pullback in advertisement spending in the tech industry, a problem that has impacted other tech giants like Meta, Spotify, and Google.[6] His solution was to seek revenue directly from consumers through Twitter Blue, a program where users could pay $8 a month for verification with the ‘blue check’ that previously served to tell users whether an account of public interest was authentic.[7] Musk claimed this new system would give ‘power to the people,’ which proved correct in an ironic and unintended fashion.

Twitter Blue allowed users to pay $8 for a blue check and impersonate politicians, celebrities, and company media accounts—which is exactly what happened. Musk, Rudy Giuliani, O.J. Simpson, LeBron James, and even the Pope were among the many impersonated by Twitter users.[8] Companies received the same treatment, with an impersonation Eli Lilly and Company account writing “We are excited to announce insulin is free now,” causing its stock to drop 2.2%.[9]This has led advertising firms like Omnicom and IPG’s Mediabrands to conclude that brand safety measures are currently impeded on Twitter and advertisers have subsequently begun to announce pauses on ad spending.[10] Musk responded by suspending Twitter Blue only 48 hours after it launched, but the damage may already be done for Twitter, a company whose revenue was 90% ad sales in the second quarter of this year.[11] During his first mass call with employees, Musk said he could not rule out bankruptcy in Twitter’s future.[12]

It also remains to be seen whether the Twitter impersonators will escape civil liability under theories of defamation[13] or misappropriation of name or likeness,[14] or criminal liability under state identity theft[15] or false representation of a public employee statutes,[16] which have been legal avenues used to punish instances of social media impersonation in the past.

FTC and Twitter’s Consent Decree

On the first day of Musk’s takeover of Twitter, he immediately fired the CEO, CFO, head of legal policy, trust and safety, and general counsel.[17] By the following week, mass layoffs were in full swing with 3,700 Twitter jobs, or 50% of its total workforce, to be eliminated.[18] This move has already landed Twitter in legal trouble for potentially violating the California WARN Act, which requires 60 days advance notice of mass layoffs.[19] More ominously, however, these layoffs, as well as the departure of the company’s head of trust and safety, chief information security officer, chief compliance officer and chief privacy officer, have attracted the attention of the FTC.[20]

In 2011, Twitter entered a consent decree with the FTC in response to data security lapses requiring the company to establish and maintain a program that ensured its new features do not misrepresent “the extent to which it maintains and protects the security, privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of nonpublic consumer information.”[21] Twitter also agreed to implement two-factor authentication without collecting personal data, limit employee access to information, provide training for employees working on user data, designate executives to be responsible for decision-making regarding sensitive user data, and undergo a third-party audit every six months.[22] Twitter was most recently fined $150 million back in May for violating the consent decree.[23]

With many of Twitter’s former executives gone, the company may be at an increased risk for violating regulatory orders and may find itself lacking the necessary infrastructure to comply with the consent decree. Musk also reportedly urged software engineers to “self-certify” legal compliance for the products and features they deployed, which may already violate the court-ordered agreement.[24] In response to these developments, Douglas Farrar, the FTC’s director of public affairs, said the commission is watching “Twitter with deep concern” and added that “No chief executive or company is above the law.”[25] He also noted that the FTC had “new tools to ensure compliance, and we are prepared to use them.”[26] Whether and how the FTC will employ regulatory measures against Twitter remains uncertain.

Conclusions

The fate of Twitter is by no means set in stone—in two weeks the platform has lost advertisers, key employees, and some degree of public legitimacy. However, at the speed Musk has moved so far, in two more weeks the company could likely be in a very different position. Beyond the immediate consequences to the company, Musk’s leadership of Twitter illuminates some important lessons about social media governance, both internal and external to a platform.

First, social media is foremost a business and not the ‘digital town square’ Musk imagines. Twitter’s regulation of hate speech and verification of public accounts served an important role in maintaining community standards, promoting brand safety for advertisers, and protecting users. Loosening regulatory control runs a great risk of delegitimizing a platform that corporations and politicians alike took seriously as a tool for public communication.

Second, social media stability is important to government regulators and further oversight may not be far off on the horizon. Musk is setting a precedent and bringing the spotlight on the dangers of a destabilized social media platform and the risks this may pose to data privacy, efforts to curb misinformation, and even the stock market. In addition to the FTC, Senate Majority Whip, and chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Dick Durbin, has already commented negatively on the Twitter situation.[27] Musk may have given powerful regulators, and even legislators, the opportunity they were looking for to impose greater control over social media. For better or worse, Twitter’s present troubles could lead to a new era of government involvement in digital social spaces.

Notes

[1] Adam Bankhurst, Elon Musk’s Twitter Takeover and the Chaos that Followed: The Complete Timeline, IGN (Nov. 11, 2022), https://www.ign.com/articles/elon-musks-twitter-takeover-and-the-chaos-that-followed-the-complete-timeline.

[2] Monica Potts & Jean Yi, Why Twitter is Unlikely to Become the ‘Digital Town Square’ Elon Musk Envisions, FiveThirtyEight (Apr. 29, 2022), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-twitter-is-unlikely-to-become-the-digital-town-square-elon-musk-envisions/.

[3] Bankhurst, supra note 1.

[4] Potts & Yi, supra note 2.

[5] Drew Harwell et al., Racist Tweets Quickly Surface After Musk Closes Twitter Deal, Washington Post (Oct. 28, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/10/28/musk-twitter-racist-posts/.

[6] Bobby Allyn, Elon Musk Says Twitter Bankruptcy is Possible, But is That Likely?, NPR (Nov. 12, 2022), https://www.wglt.org/2022-11-12/elon-musk-says-twitter-bankruptcy-is-possible-but-is-that-likely.

[7] Id.

[8] Keegan Kelly, We Will Never Forget These Hilarious Twitter Impersonations, Cracked (Nov. 12, 2022), https://www.cracked.com/article_35965_we-will-never-forget-these-hilarious-twitter-impersonations.html; Shirin Ali, The Parody Gold Created by Elon Musk’s Twitter Blue, Slate (Nov. 11, 2022), https://slate.com/technology/2022/11/parody-accounts-of-twitter-blue.html.

[9] Ali, supra note 8.

[10] Mehnaz Yasmin & Kenneth Li, Major Ad Firm Omnicom Recommends Clients Pause Twitter Ad Spend – Memo, Reuters (Nov. 11, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/technology/major-ad-firm-omnicom-recommends-clients-pause-twitter-ad-spend-verge-2022-11-11/; Rebecca Kern, Top Firm Advises Pausing Twitter Ads After Musk Takeover, Politico (Nov. 1, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/01/top-marketing-firm-recommends-suspending-twitter-ads-with-musk-takeover-00064464.

[11] Yasmin & Li, supra note 10.

[12] Katie Paul & Paresh Dave, Musk Warns of Twitter Bankruptcy as More Senior Executives Quit, Reuters (Nov. 10, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-information-security-chief-kissner-decides-leave-2022-11-10/.

[13] Dorrian Horsey, How to Deal With Defamation on Twitter, Minc, https://www.minclaw.com/how-to-report-slander-on-twitter/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2022).

[14] Maksim Reznik, Identity Theft on Social Networking Sites: Developing Issues of Internet Impersonation, 29 Touro L. Rev. 455, 456 n.12 (2013), https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=lawreview.

[15] Id. at 455.

[16] Brett Snider, Can a Fake Twitter Account Get You Arrested?, FindLaw Blog (April 22, 2014), https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/criminal-defense/can-a-fake-twitter-account-get-you-arrested/.

[17] Bankhurst, supra note 1.

[18] Sarah Perez & Ivan Mehta, Twitter Sued in Class Action Lawsuit Over Mass Layoffs Without Proper Legal Notice, Techcrunch (Nov. 4, 2022), https://techcrunch.com/2022/11/04/twitter-faces-a-class-action-lawsuit-over-mass-employee-layoffs-with-proper-legal-notice/.

[19] Id.

[20] Natasha Lomas & Darrell Etherington, Musk’s Lawyer Tells Twitter Staff They Won’t be Liable if Company Violates FTC Consent Decree (Nov. 11, 2022), https://techcrunch.com/2022/11/11/musks-lawyer-tells-twitter-staff-they-wont-be-liable-if-company-violates-ftc-consent-decree/.

[21] Id.

[22] Scott Nover, Elon Musk Might Have Already Broken Twitter’s Agreement With the FTC, Quartz (Nov. 11, 2022), https://qz.com/elon-musk-might-have-already-broken-twitter-s-agreement-1849771518.

[23] Tom Espiner, Twitter Boss Elon Musk ‘Not Above the Law’, Warns US Regulator, BBC (Nov. 11, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-63593242.

[24] Nover, supra note 22.

[25] Espiner, supra note 23.

[26] Id.

[27] Kern, supra note 10.

Digital Literacy, a Problem for Americans of All Ages and Experiences

May 10, 2022
COVID-19, Cryptocurrency, Cyber Security, Data, Education, Ethics, Internet, Psychology, Sociology

Justice Shannon, MJLST Staffer

According to the American Library Association, “digital literacy” is “the ability to use information and communication technologies to find, evaluate, create, and communicate information, requiring both cognitive and technical skills.” Digital literacy is a term that has existed since the year 1997. Paul Gilster coined Digital literacy as “the ability to understand and use information in multiple formats from a wide range of sources when it is presented via computers.” In this way, the definition of digital literacy has broadened from how a person absorbs digital information to how one develops, absorbs, and critiques digital information.

The Covid-19 Pandemic taught Americans of all ages the value of Digital literacy. Elderly populations were forced online without prior training due to the health risks presented by Covid-19, and digitally illiterate parents were unable to help their children with classes.

Separate from Covid-19, the rise of crypto-currency has created a need for digital literacy in spaces that are not federally regulated.

Elderly

The Covid-19 pandemic did not create the need for digital literacy training for the elderly. However, the pandemic highlighted a national need to address digital literacy among America’s oldest population. Elderly family members quarantined during the pandemic were quickly separated from their families. Teaching family members how to use Zoom and Facebook messenger became a substitute for some but not all forms of connectivity. However, teaching an elderly family member how to use Facebook messenger to speak to loved ones does not enable them to communicate with peers or teach them other digital literacy skills.

To address digital literacy issues within the elderly population states have approved Senior Citizen Technology grants. Pennsylvania’s Department of Aging has granted funds to adult education centers for technology for senior citizens. Programs like this have been developing throughout the nation. For example, Prince George’s Community College in Maryland uses state funds to teach technology skills to its older population.

It is difficult to tell if these programs are working. States like Pennsylvania and Maryland had programs before the pandemic. Still, these programs alone did not reduce the distance between America’s aging population and the rest of the nation during the pandemic. However, when looking at the scale of the program in Prince George’s County, this likely was not the goal. Beyond that, there is a larger question: Is the purpose of digital literacy for the elderly to ensure that they can connect with the world during a pandemic, or is the goal simply ensuring that the elderly have the skills to communicate with the world? With this in mind, programs that predate the pandemic, such as the programs in Pennsylvania and Maryland, likely had the right approach even if they weren’t of a large enough scale to ensure digital literacy for the entirety of our elderly population.

Parents

The pandemic highlighted a similar problem for many American families. While state, federal, and local governments stepped up to provide laptops and access to the internet, many families still struggled to get their children into online classes; this is an issue in what is known as “last mile infrastructure.”During the pandemic, the nation quickly provided families with access to the internet without ensuring they were ready to navigate it. This left families feeling ill-prepared to support their children’s educational growth from home. Providing families with access to broadband without digital literacy training disproportionately impacted families of color by limiting their children’s growth capacity online compared to their peers. While this wasn’t an intended result, it is a result of hasty bureaucracy in response to a national emergency. Nationally, the 2022 Workforce Innovation Opportunity Act aims to address digital literacy issues among adults by increasing funding for teaching workplace technology skills to working adults. However, this will not ensure that American parents can manage their children’s technological needs.

Crypto

Separate from issues created by Covid-19 is cryptocurrency. One of the largest selling points of cryptocurrency is that it is largely unregulated. Users see it as “digital gold, free from hyper-inflation.”While these claims can be valid, consumers frequently are not aware of the risks of cryptocurrency. Last year the Chair of the SEC called cryptocurrencies “the wild west of finance rife with fraud, scams, and abuse.”This year the Department of the Treasury announced they would release instructional materials to explain how cryptocurrencies work. While this will not directly regulate cryptocurrencies providing Americans with more tools to understand cryptocurrencies may help reduce cryptocurrency scams.

Conclusion

Addressing digital literacy has been a problem for years before the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, when new technologies become popular, there are new lessons to learn for all age groups. Covid-19 appropriately shined a light on the need to address digital literacy issues within our borders. However, if we only go so far as to get Americans networked and prepared for the next national emergency, we’ll find that there are disparities between those who excel online and those who are are ill-equipped to use the internet to connect with family, educate their kids, and participate in e-commerce.

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